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BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS V. UMBEHR: THE
INADEQUACIES OF EXTENDING PICKERING ANALYSIS TO
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
This Note challenges the restrictive First Amendment free speech protec-
tion that the Supreme Court gave to government contractors in Board of
County Commissioners v. Umbehr when it applied the Pickering balancing
test, developed nearly thirty years ago in Pickering v. Board of Education in
the context of government employees. It does so by first questioning whether
the First Amendment free speech protections given to government employees
should be similar for government contractors. It then explores whether the
Pickering balancing test should be applied to cases involving government
contractors as it was in Umbehr.
The author concludes that the Court improperly restricted the First
Amendment free speech rights of government contractors by failing to take
into account the numerous modifications the Court has made to the
Pickering balancing test that have gradually eroded the broader protections
of Pickering and by failing to account for the potentially significant differ-
ences between public employees and government contractors. The author
thus proposes a new test that would both incorporate the Court's views
regarding the free speech rights df government employees and account for
the potentially significant differences between public employees and govern-
ment contractors.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 28, 1996, in two separate rulings, the United States Supreme
Court appeared to grant the same First Amendment protections to govern-
ment contractors as it had granted to public employees in prior Court deci-
sions. In the first of these two decisions, Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr,' the Court held that the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend-
1 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996). The second decision issued by the Court, O'Hare Truck
Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake, 116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996), addressed the constitutional
implications of retaliatory action by a governmental agency in response to a contractor's
exercise of First Amendment free speech rights, but constrained its analysis to situations
involving nonhiring or dismissal stemming from political affiliation. See id. at 2358-61.
Supreme Court decisions involving similar political patronage dismissals in the public
employment sector originated with Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). Together with the O'Hare decision, they form part of a
similar but distinct branch of First Amendment free speech protection cases in public
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ment protects the rights of an independent contractor and that the extent of
such protection is measured, as in the case of public employees, by the
balancing test formulated by the Court in Pickering v. Board of Education.2
"[A]djusted to weigh the government's interests as contractor rather than as
employer,"3 the Pickering test would seem to weigh the interests of the
contractor "in commenting upon matters of public concern" against the
interests of the contracting agency "in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through" the contractor.4 A closer reading of Umbehr,
however, reveals a much more complex and restrictive version of the
Pickering test-one that effectively blends over two decades of Supreme
Court modifications with an abridged restatement of the original test.
The appropriate question now, over four decades after the Supreme
Court's initial decision to confer constitutional protections on public em-
ployees and nearly thirty years after Pickering, is whether similar constitu-
tional protections for government contractors are warranted. If these
protections are warranted, then the question remains as to whether the limit-
ed protection of an increasingly modified version of the Pickering balancing
test is sufficient.
This Note addresses these issues in three stages. First, this Note explores
the development of law relating to First Amendment speech rights for public
employees leading up to the decision in Umbehr. Second, this Note exam-
ines the Court's reasoning and methodology in applying Pickering analysis
to First Amendment free speech claims brought by contractors under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in response to retaliatory action by a government contracting
agency.' Third, it discusses the inadequacies of applying this type of restric-
tive analysis to such cases and proposes a new test that both incorporates
employment situations and involve analysis of the confidentiality of an employee's
relationship with an employer. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Law of Patronage at a
Crossroads, 12 J.L. & POL. 341, 353-55 (1996) (explaining the different tests under
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983), and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968), as compared to Elrod). Because this Note will focus on the
Pickering analysis in the government contracts context, this line of cases will not be
examined.
2 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2346.
3 Id.
4 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
' Section 1983 is the applicable statute under which First Amendment free speech
claims may be brought. It states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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the Court's views toward public employee speech and accounts for the po-
tentially significant differences between public employees and government
contractors.
II. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF FREE SPEECH RIGHTS FOR PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES LEADING TO BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS V. UMBEHR
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment purports simply to
provide for the right of speech, free from statutory abridgement.6 The sim-
plicity of the Clause as written, however, belies the Supreme Court's ongo-
ing struggle in the last seventy-seven years7 to define these rights within the
framework of a democratic society. The Court's basic dilemma has been
how to balance individual interests in engaging in an important fundamental
activity with societal interests in functioning free from harmful or unhealthy
disruption
In trying to strike this balance, the Court's treatment of different classes
of individuals has been far from uniform. Depending on the role of the
individual in society and his or her relationship to the government, the Court
has formulated various approaches to limiting or extending governmental
abridgement of First Amendment free speech rights.9
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I states in part, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press .... "
See Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of Individual Rights: The
First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1, 3 n.1 (1990) (identifying
opposition to the institution of the draft during World War I as giving rise to the first
notable decisions that interpreted the extent of First Amendment protection).
8 See, e.g., Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2347; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 188
(1952); McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517-18 (Mass. 1892); see
also Ken Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 121 (1989)
(arguing that "[a]ccording to a minimal principle of liberty" the government should not
interfere with communication that has no potential for harm).
9 See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517 (1980) (holding that government
workers dismissed on grounds of political affiliation may not be protected by the First
Amendment when political affiliation is an appropriate consideration for employment).
The Court's differentiation between various distinct groups in its approach to First
Amendment rights is most noticeable, however, in its approach to cases involving the
military. The military has been described as a "specialized society separate from civilian
society," Ingber, supra note 7, at 87 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743
(1974)), structured to "foster 'instinctive obedience,"' id. (quoting Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)), so as to "fulfill its 'primary business ... to
fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise,' id. (quoting United States ex
rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955)). But see FCC v. League of Women Vot-
ers, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (holding that the First Amendment free speech rights of recipi-
ents of small government subsidies outweighed the interests of the government in re-
pressing a large amount of speech).
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The Supreme Court's approach to the First Amendment free speech
rights of government employees traditionally was one of the most restrictive
areas of judicial constitutional policy. During the latter part of the nineteenth
century and through the first half of this century, the Court refused to recog-
nize that government employees had the right to object to employment con-
ditioned on the limitation or denial of certain constitutional rights."0 In the
1950s and 1960s, however, the Court implicitly began to reject this restric-
tive approach in a series of cases involving statutes that required public
employees to swear oaths of loyalty." Beginning with Wieman v.
Updegraff2 in 1952, the Court instituted a policy that recognized that mak-
ing government employment conditional upon the surrender or restriction of
First Amendment free speech liberties violated the First Amendment." It
was not until fifteen years after Wieman, however, with the Court's decision
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents" in 1967, that the Court explicitly ac-
knowledged the immutable constitutional rights of government employ-
ees.
15
The appellant in Keyishian, an English instructor at the State University
of New York, was one of four faculty. members at the university who re-
fused to sign a statement as a condition of employment certifying either that
he was not a Communist, or that if he was a Communist or had been a
Communist, that he had communicated that fact to the president of the uni-
versity." Keyishian objected to signing the certificate on First Amendment
free speech grounds, and, as a result, the university declined to review his
one-year-term contract. 17
The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the New York statute requiring
this type of political certification was too vague, and that such vagueness
was not in keeping with the strict standards of narrow specificity governing
First Amendment rights." Although careful to recognize that under prior
10 See McAuliffe, 29 N.E. at 517 (containing the oft-cited formulation of this view,
in which Justice Holmes observed that a policeman "may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman"). Justice Holmes's
formulation in McAuliffe is characteristic of the Court's approach from Ex parte Curtis,
106 U.S. 371 (1882), through Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). See
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983).
" See Connick, 461 U.S. at 144 (1983) (citing Sherbert v. Varner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Torcoro v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488 (1961); Wiemann, 344 U.S. 183 (1952)).
12 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
13 See id. at 191-92.
14 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
'5 See id. at 605-06.
16 See id. at 592.
" See id.
's See id. at 603-04.
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interpretation of the Constitution, public employment made contingent on
the surrendering of constitutional rights would not have violated the First
Amendment, the Court in Keyishian laid this line of prior interpretation to
rest.' 9 In a strongly worded opinion, the Court reiterated that "the theory
that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to
any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly reject-
ed."2 In effect, the Keyishian decision made explicit what prior cases had
implied: In keeping with the purpose of the First Amendment, public em-
ployees should not be prevented from participating in public affairs.21 It
was not until the following year, however, in its decision in Pickering v.
Board of Education,22 that the Supreme Court addressed the extent to
which government employees reasonably could participate in public affairs
and, necessarily, the related restrictions governing such participation.'
Marvin L. Pickering was a teacher in Township High School District
205 in Will County, Illinois.' While employed by the district, Pickering
wrote a letter to a local newspaper in which he criticized the local school
board and the superintendent of schools.' In the letter reprinted in the
newspaper, Pickering questioned the prudence of a proposed tax increase
that would raise previous revenue-raising proposals. 6 After determining
that the publication of the letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation
and administration of the schools of the district" in violation of a state stat-
ute, the Board dismissed Pickering from his teaching position. 7 Pickering
then appealed, claiming that the Board's decision unlawfully violated his
constitutionally protected right to free speech.'
In its decision, the Supreme Court, citing Keyishian as precedent, reject-
ed the decisions of the Will County Circuit Court and the Illinois State
Supreme Court, which had affirmed the Board's decision.' The Court then
introduced the standard by which courts have judged all subsequent First
Amendment speech cases involving public employees:'" The extent of pub-
lic employees' First Amendment free speech rights depends on the "balance
19 See id. at 605-06.
Id. (quoting Keyishian, 345 F.2d at 239).
21 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983); see also Paul Ferris Solomon,
The Public Employee's Right of Free Speech: A Proposal for a Fresh Start, 55 U. CIN.
L. REV. 449, 452 (1986).
2 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
2 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 145.
u See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
See id.
26 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
27 Id.
2 See id. at 565.
29 See id. at 565, 568.
3o See Connick, 461 U.S. at 145.
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between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its em-
ployees."'"
For government employees, the Pickering decision had two distinct
implications. On the one hand, the Court strengthened its holding in
Keyishian by outlining a specific convention for courts to follow in analyz-
ing similar free speech cases. On the other hand, by emphasizing the need
to balance state interests with the interests of the individual, the Court es-
sentially qualified its rejection in Keyishian of any inquiry into whether an
employee was subject to "unreasonable" employment conditions.32 Accord-
ingly, Pickering effectively limited the broad sweep of Keyishian, allowing
that "even termination because of protected speech may be justified when
legitimate countervailing government interests are sufficiently strong."33
In 1977, the Court decided the case of Mount Healthy City School Dis-
trict Board of Education v. Doyle.' The case involved a nontenured teach-
er, Doyle, who reported to a local radio station the contents of a memoran-
dum circulated by the Board of Education concerning dress and appearance
requirements for teachers.35 Following the radio station's announcement of
those requirements, the Board cited Doyle for mishandling professional
matters and notified him that he would not be rehired.36 The district court,
in a decision subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, determined that the First Amendment protected Doyle's speech and
that Doyle's speech played a substantial part in the Board's decision to
withhold continuing employment.37 Accordingly, both courts found that the
Board had violated Doyle's constitutionally protected free speech right.3"
The district court's broad formulation of the constitutional rights of
public employees, however, was short-lived. After reviewing the Board's
appeal, the Supreme Court articulated an additional test to be used in con-
junction with the balancing test established in Pickering.39 Specifically, a
plaintiff employee must first show that the disputed conduct was constitu-
tionally protected, and that the conduct was either a "substantial" or "moti-
31 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
32 See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06.
'3 Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (1996).
429 U.S. 274 (1977).
31 See id. at 282. The proposal for the change in the dress code "was apparently
prompted by the view of some in the administration that there was a relationship be-
tween teacher appearance and public support for bond issues." Id.
36 See id. Doyle understood that any resolution concerning the proposal was sup-
posed to have occurred through a joint teacher-administration decision. See id.
37 See id. at 283.
" See id.
39 See id. at 285.
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vating factor" in the employer's decision either to terminate or not to rehire
the employee.4" If the employer then can demonstrate "by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision concerning
[the employee's] re-employment even in the absence of the protected con-
duct," the employer may still escape liability.4'
Through this additional test, the Court attempted to stave off the poten-
tial for employee abuse of the First Amendment as an impenetrable wall
against employer retaliation in employer-employee conflicts. The Court
justifiably recognized that a test that merely focused on the presence of
constitutionally protected conduct "could place an employee in a better
position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected conduct than
he would have occupied had he done nothing."42 The Court's solution to
this potential problem, however, effectively replaced the barrier against pub-
lic-employer retaliation with a significant hurdle for public employees' con-
stitutional claims stemming from employers' retaliatory action.
Two years later, in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dis-
trict,43 the Supreme Court appeared to strengthen the Pickering test in fa-
vor of public employees. The petitioner in Givhan, an English teacher in a
public junior high school in Mississippi, was dismissed, at least in part, for
making "'petty and unreasonable demands"' in an "'insulting,' 'hostile,'
'loud,' and 'arrogant"' manner during several private encounters with the
school principal." Givhan subsequently sued for reinstatement on the
grounds that her First Amendment right of free speech had been violated.45
Following a district court ruling in favor of Givhan, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, relying on the Supreme Court's deci-
sions in Pickering and Mt. Healthy." Under its interpretation of these prior
decisions, the Fifth Circuit concluded that both decisions contained "the
strong implication.., that private expression by a public employee is not
constitutionally protected." '47 The Supreme Court reversed, flatly rejecting
40 Id. at 287.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 285.
U 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
44 Id. at 412 (quoting respondent Western Line Consolidated School District).
41 See id. at 411-12.
46 See id. at 412-13. The Fifth Circuit also cited Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593
(1972), which was decided on the basis of the balancing test articulated in Pickering.
See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413; Perry, 408 U.S. at 598. Perry stands for the determination
that tenure, or the right to an employment position, is immaterial to the determination of
First Amendment rights. See Perry, 408 U.S at 597-98; see also Solomon, supra note
21, at 454-55.
4' Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413 (quoting Ayers v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 555
F.2d 1309, 1318 (1977)).
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the Fifth Circuit's reading of Pickering and Mt. Healthy.48 In its decision,
the Court concluded that the First Amendment provides protection for em-
ployee speech touching upon matters of public concern, even if such speech
were to occur in private encounters between a public employer and its em-
ployee.49 The Court, however, added a significant qualifying note to its
holding, stating that in cases involving private expression, courts must con-
sider the additional factors of manner, time, and place of delivery in deter-
mining the extent to which the expression threatened the agency's institu-
tional efficiency.5" Consequently, these ancillary considerations, in conjunc-
tion with the standard Pickering balancing test, largely offset any potential
for increased constitutional protection for public employees.
In 1983, with its decision in Connick v. Myers,5 the Supreme Court
continued to pare away public employees' First Amendment protections. As
an assistant district attorney in New Orleans, Myers had voiced her objec-
tions to her impending transfer to a different section of criminal court.52
Finding her objections ineffective, and desiring an assessment of the extent
of support for her views, Myers prepared and circulated within the District
Attorney's office a questionnaire designed to obtain feedback from cowork-
ers on subjects including office policy, the level of worker confidence in
management, and whether the workers generally "felt pressured to work in
political campaigns."53 In response to Myers's actions-deemed by her su-
pervisor to be a "mini-insurrection"-Myers was fired from her position on
charges of insubordination. 4 Myers subsequently initiated a section 1983
suit for unlawful abridgement of her First Amendment right of free
speech.55
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the district court's findings
(which the Fifth Circuit had affirmed) that Myers's speech "involved matters
of public concern and that the State had not 'clearly demonstrated' that the
survey 'substantially interfered' with the operations of the [government
agency]."56 Instead, the Court held that Myers's speech predominantly con-
cerned matters of personal interest and that the First Amendment therefore
did not protect the speech.57 In reaching this conclusion, however, the
48 See id. at 414.
4' See id.
0 See id. at 415 n.4.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
S2 See id., at 140.
5 Id. at 141. For the complete text of the questionnaire, see id. app. at 155 (repro-
ducing "Questionnaire distributed by respondent on October 7, 1980").
14 Id. at 141 (quoting Myers's supervisor).
5 See id. For additional explanation, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
16 Id. at 142.
" See id. at 154. The Court conceded that "one question [concerning "pressure[] to
work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates"]in Myers' ques-
600 [Vol.. 6:2
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Court qualified the Pickering test still further, shifting the balance substan-
tially in favor of the government employer.
First, and most importantly, the Court's ruling effectively limited the
applicability of the Pickering balancing test to cases involving employee
speech about matters of public interest.58 Thus, any speech not falling un-
der this limited and largely undefined59 description automatically fails to
qualify for First Amendment protection. According to the Court, "absent the
most unusual circumstances," personnel decisions based merely on an
employee's expression of personal interests are not subject to review by fed-
eral courts.60
Second, the Court limited any determination of the "matter of public
concern" requirement to an examination of "content, form, and context of a
given statement, as revealed by the whole record., 61 Referring specifically
to "context," the Court explained, "When employee speech concerning of-
fice policy arises from an employment dispute concerning the very applica-
tion of that policy to the speaker, additional weight must be given to the
supervisor's view that the employee has threatened the authority of the
employer to run the office., 62 In effect, and contrary to its opinion in Mt.
Healthy, the Court severely limited the constitutional protections of any
public employee who exercises First Amendment free speech rights subse-
quent to an employment dispute.63
Third, the Court expanded the amount of judicial deference to be given
to a government employer "when close working relationships are essential to
fulfilling public responsibilities."" Although the Court determined that
such a relationship existed between an assistant attorney and a district attor-
ney, it nevertheless failed to establish general guidelines regarding which
other relationships would qualify for this additional deference.65 The result
essentially was a mandate for judicial deference regarding employer deci-
tionnaire ... touch[ed] upon a matter of public concern," id. at 149, but concluded that
it did so "in only a most limited sense." Id. at 154.
8 See id. at 147; see also D. Gordon Smith, Comment, Beyond "Public Concern":
New Free Speech Standards for Public Employers, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 249, 254 (1990).
" For criticism of the "public interest" qualification as undefinable, see Smith, supra
note 57, at 258-62.
60 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
61 Id. at 147-48 (footnote omitted).
62 Id. at 153; see also Solomon, supra note 21, at 466 (pointing out the inconsisten-
cies between Connick and Givhan in the Court's use of context as constitutionally sig-
nificant).
63 See Solomon, supra note 21, at 467.
6 Connick, 461 U.S. at 151-52.
6 See Solomon, supra note 21, at 468.
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sions absent an employer's extraordinary violation of an employee's
rights.'
Finally, the Court virtually eliminated any need for a government em-
ployer to show that actual disruption of agency interests had occurred as a
result of an employee's speech.67 Instead, as long as a government employ-
er reasonably believes that such disruption will result, courts should give
wide deference to an employer's decision to terminate an employee. As
such, in determining public employees' First Amendment free speech rights,
the Court essentially replaced objectivity with subjectivity, substituting ab-
stract belief for concrete evidence.
It was against this background of increasingly restrictive decisions in
public employee speech cases that the Supreme Court addressed the subject
of government contractors' First Amendment free speech rights in
Umbehr.68 Since its first decision explicitly recognizing the immutable con-
stitutional rights of public employees in 1967,69 the Supreme Court had
begun a judicial refining process that effectively shifted the balance of pow-
er in determining those rights back to the government. Just two years prior
to Umbehr, in its most recent government-employee speech decision, Waters
v. Churchill," the Court reinforced its restrictive approach to such cases,
stating:
The key to First Amendment analysis of government em-
ployment decisions, then, is this: The government's interest
in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently as possi-
ble is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it
acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employ-
er. The government cannot restrict the speech of the public
at large just in the name of efficiency. -But where the govern-
ment is employing someone for the very purpose of effec-
6 See id. at 468-69.
67 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. The Court apparently equates "disruption of the
office and destruction of working relationships," id, with inhibiting the government
interest of "promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its em-
ployees." Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see also supra notes
20-32 and accompanying text.
68 Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
69 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967); see also supra notes
14-21 and accompanying text.
70 511 U.S. 661 (1994). This case did little to modify the Court's approach to em-
ployee speech cases other than to declare that in cases in which the factual basis for
applying the Pickering balancing test is unknown, courts must "look to the facts as the
employer reasonably found them to be." Id. at 677 (plurality opinion). This procedural
clarification, however, may be seen as a continuation of the Court's highly deferential
treatment of the government as an employer.
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tively achieving its goals, such restrictions may well be
appropriate.7
Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that the Supreme Court in Umbehr chose
to apply the most restrictive approach of all to cases involving the First
Amendment free speech rights of government contractors.72
III. FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH RIGHTS FOR GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTORS: ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION IN UMBEHR
Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr73 is the latest chapter in the
evolution of Pickering and its progeny. Twenty-eight years after the Court
first articulated a test to determine the extent of First Amendment free
speech rights for government employees, the Court finally deemed that the
same rights, determined under the same analysis, should apply to govern-
ment contractors as well. That the Court waited for nearly three decades
after its decision in Pickering to extend First Amendment free speech privi-
leges to government contractors, however, calls for a close examination of
the decision.74 Moreover, the Court's extension of these First Amendment
rights by simply equating government contractors with public employees,
emphasizes the need for heightened examination. The decision raises the
important issue of the validity of the Court's assumption that government
contractors are equivalent to government employees for constitutional pur-
poses. If this assumption is incorrect and the two groups in fact are quite
different, then the Court's decision to treat them the same is inequitable and
legally unsound.
Beginning in 1981, Umbehr contracted with Wabaunsee County to haul
trash on an exclusive basis for each of the cities in the county.75 In 1985,
Umbehr renewed his contract with the county under an agreement that al-
lowed for automatic annual renewal subject to notice limitations if either
Id. at 675 (plurality opinion). The Court subsequently quotes in part this passage
in Umbehr for the proposition that "we have, therefore, 'consistently given greater
deference to government predictions of harm used to justify restrictions of employee
speech than to predictions of harm used to justify restrictions on the speech of the pub-
lic at large."' Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348 (quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 673).
' See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
73 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
'7 In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that there has been a substantial
split between the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits (which support First Amendment
rights for government contractors) and the Third and Seventh Circuits (which reject
First Amendment rights for government contractors). See id. at 2346. The earliest of the
cases that the Court cited is Sweeney v. Bond, 669 F.2d 542, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878
(1982), a political affiliation case involving government contractors. See id.
' See id. at 2345.
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party wished to terminate.76 Under this contract, Umbehr continued to haul
trash on an exclusive and uninterrupted basis for six of the seven cities in
the county until 1991. During the same period, Umbehr continuously criti-
cized the Board of County Commissioners, speaking at board meetings and
writing letters and editorials in newspapers impugning the Board's misman-
agement of the county.' In response to Umbehr's outspoken criticism, the
Board first threatened to censor the official county newspaper if it were to
publish any more of his writings. Then, in 1991, the Board voted two to one
to terminate Umbehr's contract.78 In 1992, Umbehr brought suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against the two majority members of the Board for First
Amendment free speech violations.79
The district court found that the Board terminated Umbehr's contract in
retaliation for Umbehr's having exercised his First Amendment free speech
rights and that Umbehr suffered damages as a result of the termination."
The court also found, however, that because the First Amendment did not
protect government contractors' speech, Umbehr had no legal claim against
the Board.8' On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the
Pickering balancing test protects government contractors' speech and there-
fore entitles contractors to the same protections as public employees. 2 The
Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's ruling, but limited its decision
to cases involving the termination of pre-existing contractual relationships in
retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech.83
Throughout its decision, the Court's basic premise was that government
contractors are similar enough to public employees "in most relevant re-
spects" to warrant equal treatment.8 Accordingly, any rules that would be
applicable to public employees in determining their constitutional rights also
should be applied to government contractors. 5 The Court viewed the
Pickering balancing test as a nuanced approach that would allow courts to
7' See id. Either party could terminate the contract at the end of each year if the
terminating party were to give 60 days prior notice. The parties could renegotiate the
contract if either party were to give 90 days prior notice. See id.
" See id. Umbehr's criticisms concerned topics such as landfill user rates, the cost
of obtaining official documents from the county, mismanagement of taxpayers' money,
and Board violations of the Kansas Open Meetings Act (which the Board subsequently
vindicated in a signed consent decree). See id.
78 See id.
71 See id. at 2345-46.
' See Umbehr v. McClure, 840 F. Supp. 837, 839 (D. Kan. 1993), rev'd, 44 F.2d
876 (1995), aff'd, 116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
81 See id.
82 See Umbehr, 44 F.3d at 883.
83 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2352.
84 Id.
85 See id. at 2348.
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consider the "variety of interests that may arise in independent contractor
cases" and that would accommodate the differences between contractors and
employees. 6 Accordingly, the Court rejected the appellant's proposed
brightline rules, that Justice Scalia supported in his dissent, that attempted to
differentiate government contractors from public employees. 7
The Court's formulation of the Pickering balancing test, however, con-
tinued the highly deferential approach to agency action that Pickering's
progeny had engendered. Under this formulation, the initial burden is on the
contractor to show that the termination of the contract resulted from the
contractor's speech on a matter of public concern.8 Once the contractor
has met this burden, the government agency essentially has three potential
avenues of escape from liability. First, the agency could prevail if it were to
show that it would have terminated the contractor regardless of the
contractor's speech. 9 Second, the agency could prevail if it were to show
that, "deferentially viewed," its legitimate interests as a contracting agency
outweigh the government contractor's First Amendment free speech inter-
ests.9" Finally, even if the agency were to fail to establish either of the
above requirements, under certain circumstances the agency's liability would
be offset. For example, if the agency were to show that, based on facts
gathered subsequent to the termination, it would have terminated the con-
tractor at some later time, the contractor's available remedy presumably
would be limited or disallowed.9' Likewise, if the contractor could arrange
subsequent alternative contractual agreements, contractor damages could be
limited to the extent that such agreements would offset potential losses from
termination.92
The most important and most telling of these escape clauses in the
Court's decision is the second, which provides indemnity against agency
liability if the agency's "legitimate interests" outweigh the contractor's inter-
ests in commenting on matters of public concern.93 On its face, this provi-
sion seems to echo, though in abridged form, the Court's prior formulation
of the balancing test used in Pickering and subsequent public employee
speech cases. In those cases, the Court weighed, albeit with a substantial
and increasing array of caveats and addenda,94 "the interests of the [em-
86 Id. at 2349.
87 See id.
88 See id. at 2352.
See id. (holding that the requisite burden is a preponderance of the evidence, "in
light of [the agency's] knowledge, perceptions, and policies at the time of the termina-
tion").
90 Id.
"' See id.
92 See id.
3 See id.
4 See id. at 2347-48.
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ployee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the pub-
lic services it performs through its employees."95 The Court's decision in
Umbehr, which refers repeatedly to the Pickering balancing test as the mod-
el for contractor speech cases,9" merely reinforces the impression that the
Court took a substantially similar approach to the issue of government con-
tractor speech. 97
However, the version of the Pickering test applied by the Court to gov-
ernment contractors is not just a simplified restatement; it is a substantially
different formulation. In examining the development of the Court's reason-
ing in the middle part of the decision, it is notable that, within the span of a
single page, the Court morphed the Pickering test from a broad, but reason-
ably worded balancing of each party's legitimate interests,98 into an unqual-
ified and highly deferential consideration of the government's "legitimate
interests" and "needs."" Specifically, the Court stated that, in determining
whether contractor speech is constitutionally protected, "[d]eference is . . .
due to the government's reasonable assessments of its interests as contrac-
tor. 1 oo0
Significantly, these government interests no longer appear to be limited
by determinations of government effectiveness or efficiency-concepts that
originally lay at the heart of the Pickering balancing test... and that have
been the subject of much discussion concerning the practicality and validity
of Pickering and its progeny." Essentially, the Court simply opened wide
the door to an agency's defense of its own actions concerning contractors.
In the process, the Court precluded contractors from showing that an
agency's actions were unconstitutional simply because those actions were
unrelated to either government effectivenss or efficiency. In effect, any
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, quoted in Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2347-48 (emphasis
added).
96 See id. at 2346-47.
97 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2346-50, 2352.
98 As mentioned supra note 94 and accompanying text, this test compares a
contractor's interest in commenting on matters of public concern with an agency's inter-
est "in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its [contrac-
tors]." Id. at 2347-48. As the court pointed out in Umbehr, Waters further qualified the
government's interest as an interest "in achieving its goals as effectively and efficiently
as possible . . . ." Id. at 2348 (quoting Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1887
(1994)) (emphasis added).
Id. at 2348.
,00 Id. at 2349.
101 See supra note 97.
102 See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 7, at 59; Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Costs of Agen-
cies: Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment in the Administrative State, 106
YALE L.J. 1233, 1233 n.5 (1997).
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stated agency goal might now be a prima facie valid reason to restrict
contractors' First Amendment free speech rights, subject only to possible
judicial review.
To determine the validity of the Court's application of this latest and
most deferential version (to the agency) of the Pickering test to First
Amendment free speech cases involving government contractors it is essen-
tial first to determine the validity of the Court's assumption that "indepen-
dent government contractors are similar in most relevant respects [to] gov-
ernment employees" so that "the same form of balancing analysis should
apply to each."1 3 Accordingly, a brief examination of the arguments of
both parties, as well as the Court's response to those arguments, is neces-
sary.
The primary argument of both parties in Umbehr was that "independent
contractors in general ... work at a greater remove from government offi-
cials than do most government employees.""' The Board of County Com-
missioners even argued that freedom from the government's right of super-
vision and control is "the key feature of an independent contractor's con-
tract."1 5 The only disagreement the parties had with respect to the unique
relationship between government contractors and the agency was how such a
relationship should affect the constitutional protection of contractors' free
speech rights."'
The Board of County Commissioners argued that the government's
inability to assiduously control a contractor merely heightens the
government's need to have absolute control in determining who performs a
contract and whether that party should be terminated for unsatisfactory
performance."° Accordingly, if a contracting agency were to disapprove of
a contractor's behavior, it must have the ability to terminate the contract if
such a remedy is appropriate. 8 The Board further argued that the greater
financial independence that most contractors enjoy exacerbates the lack of
government control."° Unlike public employees whose sole means of live-
lihood is their government position, contractors usually will have other
contracts or other income-earning ventures. Following this logic, the con-
tractor has less financial incentive to conform its behavior to agency stan-
dards, making necessary the additional deterrent mechanism of at-will con-
tract termination by the agency.
103 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2352.
104 Id. at 2348.
1o' Id. (emphasis added).
106 See infra text accompanying notes 106-10.
107 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348.
o See id.
109 See id. at 2349; see also id. at 2366-67 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that public
contractors usually are corporations, not dependent on single government contracts for
their earnings, nor even for "an indispensable part" of their earnings).
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Umbehr argued that the logical result of limited interaction between a
contractor and a contracting agency is a corresponding attenuation in "gov-
ernment interests in maintaining harmonious working environments.""'
Accordingly, a contractor's First Amendment free speech interests should
carry more weight under a Pickering analysis. Furthermore, Umbehr argued,
because contractors merely perform services for the government and other-
wise are "independent" from the government, the public does not perceive
contractor speech as reflective of government policy."' Consequently, gov-
ernment concerns about contractor interference with agency performance on
a public relations level"' are largely unfounded.
The Court's response, both to the parties to the suit and to the dissent,
with respect to the issue of whether government contractors and public
employees are substantially different, essentially was to avoid the issue. The
Court merely observed that contractors and employees are similar to the
extent that the government needs to be able to terminate members of both
groups for various performance-related deficiencies."3 Likewise, the Court
found that members of both groups, due to their close relationship with the
government, have an interest in speaking out on matters of public con-
cern."' The Court failed to make an adequate comparison of any func-
tional differences between the two groups, however, and it also failed to
address the legitimate arguments made by Umbehr, the Board, and the dis-
sent.' Instead, the Court blandly suggested that despite the "force" of
those arguments, Pickering and its progeny can accomodate any differences
between government contractors and public employees."6
The Court's explanation of how Pickering might accommodate contrac-
tor and employee differences, however, is difficult to assess, largely because
the Court never discussed these differences. The Court assumed that the
primary difference between contractors and employees (one that is complete-
ly irrelevant in the First Amendment context) is whether a contract is la-
beled "a contract of employment or a contract for services."".7 This as-
11o Id. at 2349.
. See id. at 2348.
112 See Smith, supra note 57, at 570 (arguing that the dissemination of false informa-
tion that undermines the public's trust in a government agency may be categorized as
disruption of the agency).
113 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2347.
114 See id.
"' See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
116 Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348.
117 Id. at 2349 (citation omitted). Problematic is the Court's statement that govern-
ment agencies may easily manipulate determinations of constitutional claims based on
formal distinctions between claimants. This claim lies on the assumption that other less
formal, but equally identifiable, distinctions between government contractors and public
employees either do not exist or may not be assessed by the finder of fact. For exami-
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sumption, however, conflicts with the Court's subsequent assessment that
"[i]ndependent contractors appear to us to lie somewhere between the case
of government employees, who have the closest relationship with the gov-
ernment, and our other unconstitutional conditions precedents, which involve
persons with less close relationships with the government." ' Because of
the breadth of this constitutional netherworld that government contractors
presumably inhabit, the Court's decision to extend the increasingly limited
protections of government employees"9 while ignoring the more extensive
protections of those less closely related to the government seems, at the
least, rather arbitrary.
IV. ASSESSING THE SUPREME COURT'S COMPARISON OF GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTORS AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
The Supreme Court's determination that public employees and govern-
ment contractors are "similar in most relevant respects"'" ignores substan-
tial differences that clearly distinguish public employees from government
contractors. As both Umbehr and the Board noted, the primary difference
between government contractors and public employees lies in their respec-
tive working relationships with the government.' These differences, how-
ever, are not limited only to the extent to which each group is subject to
government supervision and control. 22 Rather, the most important differ-
ences are substantive, going to the very basis of each party's relationship
with the government. Chief among these differences are the degree of inter-
dependency between an agency and its employees as compared to that be-
tween the agency and government contractors, the level of agency expertise
as compared to that of its employees and contractors, and, finally, the identi-
ty of a public employee as compared to that of a government contractor.1
2 3
Together, these three factors comprise a substantial obstacle to the Court's
finding that public employees and government contractors are substantially
similar. In turn, these factors call into question the Court's justification for
nation of these distinctions, see infra notes 123-62 and accompanying text.
118 Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2350. Among this latter group are "claimants for tax ex-
emptions" for whom the First Amendment limitation is subject to heightened scrutiny to
determine whether the limitation serves a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518, 528-29 (1958). Also included are "recipients of small gov-
ernment subsidies." See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380
(1984). First Amendment limitations in a broadcasting context must be narrowly tai-
lored to further a substantial governmental interest. See id.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 87-99.
120 Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2352.
1 See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
'z See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348.
'z See discussion infra Parts IV.A-C.
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applying the Pickering balancing test indiscriminately to both employees and
contractors of government agencies.
A. Distinguishing Between Agency-Employee Dependency and Agency-
Contractor Dependency
Government employees exist in a mutually dependent relationship with
the government: The government as we know it arguably would not exist
without its employees, and the employees would not have their livelihood
without the government. Under the Court's espoused hierarchical approach
to workplace governance, 24 however, the government's interest in main-
taining order to promote efficiency" becomes a far more significant con-
sideration than the workers' desire.
1 26
Government contractors operate under a different dynamic. As both the
Board and the dissent pointed out in Umbehr, contractors usually are not
dependent solely on the government for their existence. 27 More important-
12 See Ingber, supra note 7, at 60-61; Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Free-
dom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 52 (1987); Solo-
mon, supra note 21, at 472.
Under a traditional hierarchical or mechanical approach to management, manage-
ment controls all aspects of the employment environment, holding all decision-making
authority as well as the information, discretion, and planning power necessary to imple-
ment that authority. See Ingber, supra note 7, at 60. In accordance with this model, the
bureaucracy is like a machine, with workers taking on the roles of machine parts and
working in conjunction to fulfill predetermined goals. See id. Management clearly speci-
fies the rules, regulations, and roles of each worker, that are necessary to the fulfillment
of management goals. See id. Furthermore, because organizational goals are thought to
be "unrelated to the needs of fungible workers," workers' obedience to management and
adherence to workplace structure are of paramount importance-at the expense of
workers' "feelings." Id. at 60-61.
This hierarchical model as applied to government and the private sector has been
criticized by communitarian theorists and others who believe that the workplace should
be based on workforce loyalty and positive participation. See id. at 61. "Communitarian
theorists believe that '[i]ndividual participants are never merely "hired hands" but bring
along their heads and hearts: they enter the organization with individually shaped ideas,
expectations, and agendas, and they bring with them differing values, interests, and
abilities."' Id. (quoting W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL,
AND OPEN SYSTEMS 55 (2d ed. 1987). Accordingly, communitarians believe that
workplace morale is critical to efficient performance and that workers' ability to speak
up concerning the "terms, content, and conditions of employment" is essential to mo-
rale. Id.
125 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2347-48; Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968).
"26 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2349; Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 1886
(1995) (plurality opinion).
27 See supra note 108.
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ly for purposes of First Amendment free speech regulation, the government
is not directly dependent on individual government contractors. Through
various regulations implemented to ensure competition, the state and federal
governments have taken affirmative steps to avoid organizational conflicts of
interest resulting from government overdependence.' 2s Theoretically, the
open-market competition of the competitive-bid process serves this purpose
by freeing the government from reliance on particular contractors. 2 9 Con-
tractors, unlike government employees, do not function solely as a part of
the governmental bureaucracy, wherein government would not exist without
contractor participation. Instead, the role of contractors is a supplemental
one, fulfilled through the provision of services that the government believes
the private labor market would perform more advantageously than would
government employees." In turn, the government's legitimate interest in
limiting the speech of individual contractors becomes more marginal than its
interest in limiting the speech of government employees.
Nevertheless, in many procurement situations, the government does not
or cannot apply the competitive-market approach, either as a matter of law
or as a matter of fact.13 1 For example, when the government awards con-
tracts on a noncompetitive basis in sole-source (and occasionally even in
competitive-bid) situations, the government may predetermine awardees. In
these types of noncompetitive arrangements, none of the benefits otherwise
available in the competitive-bid process incur, 1 2 the government becomes
" See Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), Pub. L. 98-369, Div. B,
Title VII, §2701, 98 Stat. 1175 (requiring federal acquisitions to be conducted through
full and open competition to the greatest practical extent in order to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in the procurement of property and services by the execu-
tive branch).
129 See RANDALL FITZGERALD, WHEN GOVERNMENT GOES PRIVATE: SUCCESSFUL
ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC SERVICES 223-27, 234-36 (1988).
130 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
131 See generally 48 C.F.R. §6.2 (1996) (allowing the contracting officer to exclude
sources for the purposes of establishing and maintaining alternative sources as well as
for the purposes of establishing small business set-asides); id. §6.3 (providing seven
statutory exceptions to the full and open competition requirement, including cases in
which: (1) there are a limited number of responsible sources and no other supplier can
meet the agency's need, (2) there is an unusual and compelling urgency that would
cause serious injury to the agency were the number of solicited sources not limited, (3)
maintenance for industrial mobilization, or maintenance for engineering, research, and
development by an educational, nonprofit, or federally funded research center is re-
quired, (4) an international agreement controls, (5) the purchase is authorized by statute,
or consists of a name brand commercial product purchased for resale, (6) competition
would jeopardize national security, and (7) the agency head determines competition is
not in the public's best interest); id. §49.402-6(b) (permitting the contracting officer to
use any appropriate terms and acquisition methods in certain reprocurement contracts).
132 See id; see also JOHN D. HANRAHAN, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT 29-30 (1983);
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increasingly reliant on particular contractors, and, in keeping with the
Court's argument in Umbehr, such contractors may then occupy a status
closer to that of public employees."
The similarity of government reliance on public employees and govern-
ment contractors in noncompetitive procurements, however, cannot be ex-
tended to other situations. Even when the competitive-market concept breaks
down in government contract situations, another aspect of the contractor-
agency dynamic-expertise-substantially distinguishes the roles of govern-
ment contractors from the roles of government employees."M Accordingly,
a government agency's increased reliance on a contractor has far different
implications than an agency's reliance on its own employees.
B. Distinguishing Between Employee and Contractor Expertise
According to the Court, of all the groups involved in unconstitutional-
conditions precedents, "government employees.., have the closest rela-
tionship with the government."' 35 One result of this relationship is that
public employees are deemed to have significant knowledge of their
employers' policies and procedures." and therefore are "the members of
the community most likely to have informed and definite opinions" about
potential or actual government failings.'37
Greater access to information concerning the policies and procedures of
a government agency, however, is not unique to nonmanagement agency
employees. Because of the close proximity of individual public employees
to agency management, employees' observations concerning the day-to-day
functioning of an agency are not necessarily beyond the knowledge of their
supervisors.3 Furthermore, employee management may have additional
information, unknown to lower-level employees, that provides justification
for some particular policy or procedure to which an employee may object.
Accordingly, an agency's reliance on an employee, though absolute in terms
of maintaining the agency's existence, is more limited in terms of acquiring
special knowledge or expertise.
The same explanation does not hold true in the case of government
contractors. Generally, increased government reliance on nongovernment
cf. FITZGERALD, supra note 128, at 227-33; DONALD F. KETrL, SHARING POWER: PUB-
LIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE MARKETS 29-35 (1993).
133 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
134 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
133 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct at 2350.
136 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality opinion).
137 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968).
138 This is necessarily the case under the Court's present hierarchical view of the
government workplace in which "management holds all decision-making authority,
information, discretion, and planning power." Ingber, supra note 7, at 60.
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entities is frequently accompanied by a decrease in government managerial
supervision and control.139 Both parties in Umbehr argued, and the Court
acknowledged to some extent, that "independent contractors in general ..,.
work at a greater remove from government officials.""14 As a result, gov-
ernment contractors often have a closer working knowledge of the task for
which they have contracted than does the contracting agency. This hands-off
form of reliance on the contractor by the contracting agency is further en-
couraged to the extent that government contractors frequently are perceived
as having a greater degree of expertise than the agency for which they con-
tract.' An agency's perception of a contractor's expertise, combined with
139 See KETrL, supra note 131, at 13, 29; e.g., SECTION OF PUBLIC CONTRACT LAW,
AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTING 7 (1991). The authors cite the Ramo-Wooldridge Corporation's relation-
ship with the Air Force to develop ICBM technology during the 1950s as an example of
an agency contracting with private industry to overcome the agency's inability to man-
age the program effectively on its own. See idt at 7-8. The authors note that "[s]imilar
problems persist today, as the Government works to cope with all the ramifications of
contracting out government functions." Id. at 7, n.4.
'- Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2348. Although the Court did not dispute this statement,
the Court did ignore the concept of reduced government supervision as a factor in de-
termining the existence of a contracting relationship between a service provider and a
government agency. See id. at 2349. Nevertheless, 48 C.F.R. §37.104 makes clear the
significance of the degree of government supervision in any contractual situation involv-
ing provision of services to a government agency:
(c)(1) An employer-employee relationship under a service contract occurs when,
as a result of (i) the contract's terms or (ii) the manner of its administration dur-
ing performance, contractor personnel are subject to the relatively continuous
supervision and control of a Government officer or employee. However, giving an
order for a specific article or service, with the right to reject the finished product
or result, is not the type of supervision or control that converts an individual who
is an independent contractor (such as a contractor employee) into a Government
employee.
(2) Each contract arrangement must be judged in the light of its own facts and
circumstances, the key question always being: Will the Government exercise
relatively continuous supervision and control over the contractor personnel per-
forming the contract? The sporadic, unauthorized supervision of only one of a
large number of contractor employees might reasonably be considered not rele-
vant, while relatively continuous Government supervision of a substantial number
of contractor employees would have to be taken strongly into account.
48 C.F.R. § 37.104 (1983).
141 See KETrL, supra note 131, at 27. Kettl has stated that government agencies "fre-
quently contract[] out under the assumption that the contractor knows more and can
perform better than the government could." Id.; ;ee also RUTH HOOGLAND DEHOOG,
CONTRACTING OUT FOR HUMAN SERVICES: ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND ORGANIZA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVES 72 (1984) (observing that her case study involving the contract-
ing of services on behalf of the Michigan Department of Social Services and Depart-
ment of Labor revealed that expertise was the primary, and for some agency officials
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its less-than-stringent managerial approach, causes the contractor, rather than
the agency, to occupy a position of close alignment with policy questions
and general matters of public concern associated with contract performance.
This concept of contractor expertise is crucial to any examination of the
contractor-agency relationship. The Court's present approach to contractor
speech, 142 however, ignores the element of contractor expertise. The Court
prefers to defer to an agency's assessment of the constitutionality of the
agency's actions.143 Stanley Ingber has described the Court's deference to
agencies as stemming from the Court's belief that "because courts are insti-
tutionally ill-equipped to assess the constitutionality of actions within institu-
tional settings, such judgments are better left to those immersed in such
settings.' ' 4 Ingber has argued that this logic is questionable as applied to
public employees by arguing that management is immersed in institutional
(or agency) settings and this is unable to objectively view employee
speech: 4 1 "Those accustomed to wielding power cannot readily put them-
selves within the perspective of someone they have been inculcated to view
as subordinate. ''1
46
In the case of government contractors, both the Court's and Ingber's
views have substantial merit. The notable difference, however, is that the
contractor, rather than the agency, may be viewed as the expert and, there-
fore, as the competent party. Furthermore, because the contractor is not in a
position of power, but merely in a position of expertise, the contractor's
"immersion" in the institutional context permits both meaningful insight and
objectivity, with fewer bureaucratic biases. Accordingly, in any First
Amendment free speech determination, courts should more heavily weigh
contractors' opinions and observations concerning contract performance,
procedure, and policy than they weigh agencies' opinion and observations.
the only, reason that the purchase of services had been made).
142 For a discussion of the Court's use of the hierarchical model of organizational
structure in viewing contractor speech, see supra note 123.
143 See Ingber, supra note 7, at 97; see also Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2349. In its deci-
sion, in Umbehr the Court demonstrated substantial judicial deference to the Board,
stating that "in this case ... the Board exercised contractual power, and its interests as
a public service provider, including its interest in being free from intensive judicial
supervision of its daily management functions, are potentially implicated. Deference is
therefore due to the government's reasonable assessments of its interests as contractor."
Id. (emphasis added).
1 Ingber, supra note 7, at 97.
'4' See id. at 98.
146 Id.
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C. Distinguishing Between Employees and Contractors as Speakers
The cases leading up to Umbehr involving First Amendment speech by
public employees define a speaker as an individual who has spoken on his
or her own behalf about a matter that may or may not have been of public
concern. 14 7 As in Keyishian,'48 a public employee also may be joined by
other employees who, as individuals, have adopted the same beliefs and are
defined as a group because of these similar beliefs.' When speaking as
public employees concerning matters pertaining to their employment, how-
ever, these individuals define themselves and their speech vis-a-vis their
individual employment capacities. 5 ° Accordingly, they may be viewed as
a collective of public employees representing only themselves as individuals
and answerable only to the employing agency in that capacity. 5' In such
cases, the determination as to whether employee speech deals with a matter
of public concern must be subject to increased scrutiny. 2
When government contractors speak, however, it is not as easy to deter-
mine whether they are speaking in their capacity as individuals or as gov-
ernment contractors. As in Umbehr, they may be individuals representing
their own interests,' or they may be employers speaking out on matters
of public concern on behalf of their companies and employees.'54 Al-
though the number of employees implicated in contractor speech varies
depending on the subject matter of the speech and the size of the contracting
firm, it is apparent that such speech is not limited to individuals.'55 The
Pickering test, which analyzes the "interests of the [employee], as citi-
147 See discussion supra Part II.
148 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
"4 See id.
ISo See Massaro, supra note 123, at 30-31 (arguing that "the typical worker will be
unlikely to complain about trouble within government operations unless the problem
touches him or her personally").
1' See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2366 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A public employee is
always an individual . . ").
152 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 (1983).
l See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345.
154 See, e.g., North Miss. Communications, Inc. v. Jones, 792 F.2d 1330 (1986). In
this case, the appellant, North Mississippi Communications, complained that as a result
of critical editorials and news stories aimed at several of its board members, the Board
developed ill will toward the North Mississippi Times, and retaliated by switching most
of its advertising to a rival newspaper (by a margin of six to one), and by threatening
other North Mississippi Times advertisers with a loss of county business unless they
also were to withdraw their ads. See id. at 1332-33.
155 For example, Newport News Shipbuilding, located in Newport News, Virginia, is
a government contractor employing nearly 18,000 workers. See Christopher Dinsmore,
Analyst Says Yard's Stock May Rise in '97, PILOT-STAR (Virginia), Feb. 14, 1997, at
D6.
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zen ' 156 cannot apply in situations that involve neither individual govern-
ment employees nor individual contractors, such as corporate contractors.
Government contractors also differ from government employees as
speakers in the nature of their relationship to contracting agencies.157 Be-
cause government employees generally work within the confines of their
employing agencies, they ordinarily are in closer contact with agency man-
agement. Contractors, however, generally work at a greater remove from
agencies and agency management. 5 Where this difference holds true, the
Court's concerns in the employer-agency relationship about disruption and
the undermining of trust and confidence in the relationship59 have much
less force in the case of a contractor-agency relationship. First, any commu-
nicative impact stemming from contractor speech has less significance than
that of employee speech because there is less contact between a contractor
and the agency about which the contractor spoke than there is between an
employee and his or her employing agency. Second, unlike an employee's
communication, found in previous Court cases to warrant prohibition de-
pending on the degree of disruption,6 ° a contractor's communication has
far less impact because of the remote physical location of the contractor in
relation to the agency and its management.161 The impact of contractor
speech also is lessened by the contractor's contractual arrangement with the
agency, which provides the agency with protections against disruption of
agency objectives.'62
156 Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2347 (quoting Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)).
157 See Roosevelt, supra note 101, at 1239.
158 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 680 (1994) (plurality opinion);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983).
" See, e.g., Connick, 461 U.S. at 153 (stating that "[w]hen a government employee
personally confronts his immediate superior, the employing agency's institutional effi-
ciency may be threatened not only by the content of the employee's message but also
by the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered"); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 79 (1949) (holding that the act of broadcasting political views at a government
workplace at a volume that prevented employees from working was disruptive enough
to warrant prohibition).
161 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
162 See, e.g., FAR 52.249-8(a)(1)(i) (stating that contract default clauses for federal
procurements provide that failure to deliver or perform on time will be sufficient
grounds for terminating the contract); Kit Pack Co., ASBCA No. 33135, 89-3 BCA
22,151 (stating that time generally is of the essence in all government contracts that
contain fixed dates for performance or delivery). Were an agency to claim that speech
indirectly disrupted agency activity by disrupting the performance of the contractor, it
seems logical that the agency could make such a claim only if it could show that the
speech prevented the contractor from performing according to the terms of the contract.
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D. Proposal for a New Balancing Test for Government Contractors
The substantial differences that exist between government contractors
and public employees call into question the Court's assertion that the "ex-
isting framework" of Pickering and its progeny is adequate to determine the
First Amendment free speech rights of both groups. The Pickering balancing
test presumes to weigh the interests of the employee in commenting on
matters of public concern against the interests of the government, as an
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service it performs
through its employees.'63 This balancing test, however, as substantially
broadened through revisions by cases following Pickering,1" now is even
less applicable to government contractor speech than it was under its origi-
nal less restrictive formulation. In weighing the respective interests of agen-
cies, employees, and contractors, the Court gives great deference. to agencies
in deciding what policies best serve the agencies' interests.65 This defer-
ence, however, stems from the Court's myopic view that agencies possess a
superior degree of competency in assessing the constitutionality of their ac-
tions" and that contractors, like their government employee counterparts,
are per se in a position to cause serious disruption to agency activities.'67
In deciding to apply the Pickering balancing test in First Amendment
free speech cases involving independent government contractors, the Court
failed to differentiate between two parties distinctly different in nature.
Consequently, the Court promulgated a far weaker standard of review than
should apply to government contractors in First Amendment free speech
cases. '6 In fact, the Court's application of the Pickering balancing test
weighs more heavily against government contractors than it ever weighed
against government employees in similar cases.'69 The burdensome restric-
tions placed on the First Amendment free speech rights of government con-
tractors as a result of this weakened standard of review are both unfair and
unconstitutional and call for a revision of the balancing test applied in
Umbehr and other similar cases.
The formulation of any test determining the constitutional rights of a
specific group should account for the group's substantial relevant character-
istics that distinguish it from other groups. In the case of government con-
tractors, it is essential that courts account for the unique contractor-agency
163 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
16 See supra text accompanying notes 33-71.
165 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2349.
16 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text through the end of Part IV.B.
167 See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2352.
1 See supra text accompanying notes 87-101.
169 See id.
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relationship, including proximity to contract performance and relative
knowledge and expertise. 7 '
A primary consideration in developing an appropriate balancing test for
a group's First Amendment free speech rights is the goal of such a test. In
Pickering, the Court attempted to balance the relevant interests of the parties
to the action, which it defined as "the interests of the [employee], as a citi-
zen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees." '' Likewise, in cases involving govern-
ment contractors, courts should weigh the interests of a contractor in exer-
cising First Amendment free speech rights against the interests of an agency
in preventing the exercise of those rights. In fashioning a test that will equi-
tably determine government contractor speech rights, courts should factor in
the characteristics of contractor speech that differentiate it from public em-
ployee speech.'72
In Umbehr, under its formulation of Pickering, the Supreme Court
placed on the independent government contractor the initial burden of show-
ing that the agency terminated the contractor for having exercised constitu-
tionally protected free speech rights.'73 Under this Note's proposed bal-
ancing test, if a contractor were to meet this burden, then a court would
proceed through additional steps that would permit the court to consider the
unique aspects of the contractor-agency relationship.
First, the agency would have to show that the speech directly interfered
with the stated contractual objectives. Such a showing most likely would
prove a violation of the terms of the contract, as well as provide a solid
basis for an agency claim that the speech compromised the efficiency and
effectiveness of the agency. 7" If the government agency were to fail to
170 See discussion supra Parts IV.A-C.
171 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
172 See, e.g., Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2350 (noting a "spectrum" of other cases in
which the Court found it necessary to differentiate between speakers).
1 See id. at 2352.
7 Significantly, due to the nature of the policy-based objectives of the government
agency, the efficiency or effectiveness of the contractual objectives, regardless of the
speech, would not be implicated. See KETrL, supra note 131, at 17. Kettl states that in
the government procurement context,
[e]fficiency, the achievement of a given level of output at the lowest possible
price, is certainly desirable .... Efficiency, however, is not government's only
goal; it pursues other, sometimes contradictory, goals at the same time.
Government's fundamental challenge in serving the public interest is balancing
the pursuit of efficiency with other goals that have equal, sometimes greater im-
portance.
Id.; see also GEORGE W. DOWNS & PATRICK D. LARKEY, THE SEARCH FOR GOVERN-
MENT EFFICIENCY: FROM HUBRIS TO HELPLESSNESS 222 (1986) (stating the proposition
that the business principle of "working with a manageable set of clear operational
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meet this burden, then no government action adverse to the contractor would
be warranted.
If the agency were to meet its burden, however, the contractor would
have to show that such interference occurred as a result of speech directly
related to his role as a contractor. This element is crucial because it forms
the basis for the contractor's claim that he is differently situated from public
employees.175 If the contractor were to meet this burden, then courts would
have to view deferentially the interests of the contractor in exercising his
First Amendment free speech rights.
In effect, this proposed two-step process would determine whether a
contractor's speech sufficiently impacted an agency as to warrant the
contractor's dismissal. It also would determine whether, due to the subject
of the speech and the relative proximity of the speaker (as opposed to the
agency) to the subject of the speech, the court would have to view suspi-
ciously the actions of the agency in response to that speech.
If the contractor were to fail to meet his burden, the contractor effective-
ly would take on the characteristics of any other employee and would be
deemed to have acted with no greater authority than the agency. In that
case, the court would have to view deferentially the actions of the agency,
following the model of Pickering as formulated by its progeny prior -to
Umbehr.
176
Any test of First Amendment free speech rights should account for the
specific facts of each case, including "the variety of interests that may
arise' 177 in such cases. The test also should provide, however, a reasonable
basis for testing the interests of each party involved according to each
goals" is often unworkable in the governmental context due to the conflicting goals and
interests of agencies, inherent in a democratic political system).
For these same reasons, however, as well as because of general perceptions and
specific adverse findings concerning government efficiency, agency claims of harm may
be more difficult to make. See Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-62(2)(a), 107 Stat. 285 (codified as enacted in scattered sections of 31
U.S.C.A.):
The Congress finds that ... (2) Federal managers are seriously disadvantaged in
their efforts to improve program efficiency and effectiveness, because of insuffi-
cient articulation of program goals and inadequate information on program perfor-
mance; and (3) congressional policymaking, spending decisions and program
oversight are seriously handicapped by insufficient attention to program perfor-
mance and results.
One may argue that through findings such as these, Congress effectively has disabled
agencies and courts from relying on agency-defined determinations of efficiency.
175 See discussion supra Parts IV.A-C. Generally, a contractor will have difficulty
claiming special expertise, remoteness, et cetera, if the speech is unrelated to its role as
contractor. See id.
176 See supra Part II (discussing Pickering progeny).
177 Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2349.
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party's differences relative to those interests. 7 ' This Note's proposed test
would recognize the relationship between a contractor and an agency, the
terms of the contract and its performance, and the concept of contractor
expertise. Moreover, the test would bring about an element of certainty to
government contractors' First Amendment free speech claims by clearly
defining the areas of valid First Amendment speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
In applying the Pickering balancing test to the facts of Umbehr, the
Supreme Court sought to utilize in First Amendment free speech cases in-
volving independent government contractors the same rule that courts previ-
ously had used only in public employee speech cases.'79 The Court rea-
soned that the Pickering test provided a "nuanced approach" that would
recognize and provide for any differences between public employees and
government contractors.80 Unfortunately, the Court's analysis failed to ac-
count for the numerous refinements that gradually had eroded the broader
protections of Pickering.'' More importantly, the Court's opinion over-
looked the numerous substantial differences between government contractors
and public employees-differences that have a direct impact on the determi-
nation of First Amendment free speech protections and that make the appli-
cation of the revised Pickering test inappropriate.' Accordingly, this Note
proposes an alternative approach.
The proposed approach offers a less restrictive treatment of contractor
speech dealing specifically with the speaker's role as contractor. Logically,
it is this area of contractor speech that distinguishes the contractor from the
public employee as speaker and that warrants increased protection. The test
is not so exacting, however, that it cannot account for various competing in-
terests of the parties under different fact situations. It merely purports to
define a certain area of contractor speech that courts should examine more
carefully and protect more diligently.
Nearly thirty years ago, the Supreme Court developed the Pickering test
to determine the extent of First Amendment free speech protection in a case
involving the free speech rights of a school teacher. The Court, however,
never intended that the test define the First Amendment free speech rights of
government contractors, and that intent should not now be supposed. By
effectively expanding its definition of public employees to include govern-
ment contractors, the Supreme Court has unfairly restricted the rights of a
' See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
... See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2346.
'80 Id. at 2349.
181 See discussion supra Part II.
2 See discussion supra, Parts III-IV.
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distinct group through questionable guilt-by-association analysis. The Court
instead should recognize the distinctions that exist between government
contractors and public employees and use its judicial authority accordingly.
After waiting three decades for First Amendment free speech protection,
government contractors should have the opportunity to realize that protec-
tion.
LUTHER D. TUPPONCE
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THE HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL (STRUCK) JURY IN THE
UNITED STATES AND ITS RELATION TO VOIR DIRE
PRACTICES, THE REASONABLE CROSS-SECTION
REQUIREMENT, AND PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
James Oldham*
In this Article, Professor Oldham provides a unique historical study
of the special, or struck, jury in the United States. First, Professor
Oldham discusses the influence of the 1730 English statute on eigh-
teenth-century American law and reviews the procedures of several
states in which the struck jury remains valid, in addition to the once-
authorized procedures that states have since declared invalid. He also
analyzes the relationship between the struck jury and peremptory chal-
lenges. Second, Professor Oldham analyzes the special qualifications of
the jurors comprising special juries in the context of the "blue ribbon,"
or "high-class, " jury, the jury of experts, and the juries for property
condemnation and diking district assessment disputes. Third, he analyzes
the relationship between the special jury and the reasonable cross-sec-
tion requirement in light of constitutional limitations on peremptory
challenges.
Professor Oldham argues that perhaps there still may be a place for
special juries and that history justifies continued experimentation with
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C. The first
version of this paper was presented at the Conference on the Role of the Jury in a
Democratic Society sponsored by the John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
Georgetown University Law Center, October 1995. I wish to thank Jeffrey Abramson
and Morris Arnold for thoughtful commentary. Also, for reading the paper in draft and
for their valuable suggestions, I am grateful to John Langbein, Daniel Klerman, and the
participants in the Legal History Colloquium at New York University Law School.
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jury composition, including the special jury. He concludes that formulas
for selecting juries, especially those that are aimed at obtaining fair and
intelligent verdicts, have achieved historical legitimacy and should be al-
lowed a reasonable coexistence with the reasonable cross-section re-
quirement.
INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I explore the history of the special jury in the United
States and relate it to two fundamental features of the institution of trial
by jury. The first is what every schoolchild learns: No one who claims to
be innocent can be sentenced to jail unless found guilty of wrongdoing
by a jury of his or her peers. The second is the requirement that the
pooled names of potential jurors used by the courts must comprise, as
nearly as possible, a reasonable cross section of the community.' A re-
quirement that a defendant's trial jury empanel a representative number
of his or her peers (taken from a class that would represent a distinct
constituent group in the community), instead of the peers merely being
present in the jury pool, could link these two concepts. This additional
step, although taken in the past and recently advocated by a few reform-
ers, has no support in contemporary jury practices.
The "jury of peers" notion has an ancient lineage that still reverber-
ates as a supposedly important part of every American's heritage. A re-
cent opinion of United States District Judge Hutton of the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, disposing of a show cause order against a woman
who failed to appear for jury service, illustrates the modern, nostalgic
perception of this heritage. Judge Hutton wrote that "[t]he right to a trial
by a jury of one's peers is one of the cornerstones of the American judi-
cial system. It is a birthright cherished by generations of American citi-
zens ... ." A 1968 Supreme Court discussion of the objectives of the
framers of the federal and state constitutions similarly concluded that
1 This requirement is now a widespread feature of state and federal law. For a
thoughtful and thorough discussion of this jurisprudential "sea change," see JEFFREY
ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY ch. 3 (1994).
In re Tiffany Green, No. 96-0222, 1996 WL 660949, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 13,
1996). Judge Hutton then quoted language from a 1918 Arizona case about "the blood
and treasure it has cost to get and keep this birthright" and the "evils tyranny and the
lust of power have visited upon the weak and helpless who were without its protecting
aegis," after which he presented a remarkable one-page history of trial by jury across
four thousand years. Id. at *2-3 (citing Preistly v. Arizona, 171 P. 137, 138 (Ariz.
1918)).
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"[p]roviding an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers
gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt, or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge."3 Con-
sider also the 1995 conviction of former Congressman Walter R. Tucker
III for extorting bribes while serving as Mayor of Compton, California.4
According to news reports, Tucker wrote to California Governor Pete
Wilson and to House Speaker Newt Gingrich, stating in his letter that he
"was not judged by a jury of [his] peers and ... did not receive a just
verdict."5
What did former Congressman Tucker mean? Who were the "peers"
of whom he claimed to be deprived?6 According to Henry Toulmin,
United States Judge for the Mississippi Territory and author of an 1807
book called The Magistrate's Assistant, "[tjhe fundamental principle of
this institution [trial by jury] is, that a man should be tried by his peers
or equals, a commoner by commoners and a nobleman by nobles .. .
This proposition, however, is, and for the most part always has been, a
fairy tale. Historically, we boasted about juries of our peers while ex-
cluding half the population-women-from jury service! We also fol-
lowed practices that kept racial and other minorities off juries or that left
them drastically underrepresented. In the not so distant past, the United
3 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
See Kathryn Wexler & William Claiborne, Rep. Tucker Convicted of Extortion,
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1995, at Al.
' Greg Pierce, Inside Politics: Tucker Resigns, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1995, at A6.
The news story was distributed by United Press International on December 12, 1995.
See California Rep. Tucker Resigns, United Press International, Dec. 12, 1995, available
in LEXIS, News Library, ARCNWS File.
6 See Tucker, City News Service, Dec. 12, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, ARCNWS File. Former Congressman Tucker possibly was alluding to the racial
composition of the jury (which consisted of "seven whites, four Asian-Americans and
one African-American"), suggesting that, as an African-American, his race was unfairly
underrepresented. Id.
7 HARRY TOULMIN, THE MAGISTRATE'S ASSISTANT 140 (Natchez, Samuel Terrell
1807); see also Lewis H. LaRue, A Jury of One's Peers, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841
(1976).
' In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), Justice Strong, writing the
majority opinion, stated: "The very idea of a jury is a body of men composed of the
peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that
is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society
as that which he holds." Id. at 308. In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), dissent-
ing Justice Field remarked that "no one will contend that equal protection to women, to
children, to the aged, to aliens, can only be secured by allowing persons of the class to
which they belong to act as jurors in cases affecting their interests." Id. at 367 (Field,
J., dissenting); see also LaRue, supra note 7, at 846-47.
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States also maintained requirements of property ownership that excluded
the poorest segments of the economic spectrum of society.'
Both the jury of peers concept and the reasonable cross-section re-
quirement relate to jury composition procedures. They do so, however,
with sharply different objectives. As Judge Toulmin suggested, the jury
of peers notion is aimed at giving the defendant a fair trial by placing on
his jury at least a representative number of people that share the
defendant's cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or possibly socio-economic cir-
cumstances.10 Historically, this idea gave rise to the "mixed," or "half-
and-half," jury-the jury de medietate linguae (literally, "of the half-
tongue")-to which foreign defendants would have been entitled. Half of
the jury would be citizens of the state where the case was tried, while
the other half would be foreigners.' The notion was not merely to facil-
itate communication, but also, as expressed by a defendant in a seven-
teenth-century English case, to secure jurors "of my own country, that
may be able to know something how I have lived hitherto."" Occasion-
9 In People v. Ruppert, 279 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Westchester County Ct. 1967), the court
upheld a New York statute that stated that jurors must own at least 250 dollars worth of
real or personal property. According to the court:
It does not seem unreasonable in our "free society" to have a minimal ownership
in something real or personal to invest a person with the privilege of performing a
vital public function, such as being a member of the Grand Jury or Trial Jury, to
whom the free rights of individuals, as well as great public interests are commit-
ted for resolution in the respective spheres granted to these bodies by custom and
statute.
Id. at 989-99. The New York Supreme Court reached the same result in People v. Co-
hen, 283 N.Y.S.2d 817 (Sup. Ct. 1967). The Cohen court quoted an earlier opinion by
United States District Judge Medina that called a challenge to the property qualification
under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "frivolous." Id. at 824 (quoting United States v.
Foster, 83 F. Supp. 197, 207 (1949)).
10 See TOULMIN, supra note 7, at 140.
For a thoughtful analytical treatment of the "half-and-half' jury, see MARIANNE
CONSTABLE, THE LAW OF THE OTHER: THE MIXED JURY AND CHANGING CONCEPTIONS
OF CITIZENSHIP, LAW, AND KNOWLEDGE (1994). For good reviews of eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century applications of the procedure in American cases, see LaRue, supra
note 7, at 850-63; Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of
Trial by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L.
REV. 777, 783-89 (1994); see also Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action
in Jury Selection: Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and Affirmative Juries
of the Hennepin Model and the Jury De Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
645 (1997); Daniel W. Van Ness, Preserving a Community Voice: The Case for Half-
and-Half Juries in Racially-Charged Criminal Cases, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1
(1994).
" Rex v. Gascoigne, 7 State Trials 959, 963 (K.B. 1680). According to LaRue,
Justice Field understood the jury de medietate as a mode of trial made available in
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al voices recently have echoed this idea by calling for racial or ethnic
quotas for certain types of juries. 3
The reasonable cross-section requirement, by contrast, is designed to
ensure that members of all significant, or "cognizable," segments of the
community have the opportunity to be jurors. 4 This egalitarian require-
ment pulls strongly against any procedure or tradition that would permit
the formation of juries from lists of persons with special qualifications.
One well-known example of such a jury with special qualifications is the
so-called "blue ribbon" jury, that is, the "high-class" jury. 5 Another
historical example is the jury of experts, most notably the merchant
juries that were instrumental in absorbing commercial practices into
common law.16 Both of these examples fall within the meaning of the
"special jury" as used and understood in England and in the United
States for several centuries.17
England for an alien "probably as much because of the difference of language and
customs between him and Englishmen, and the greater probability of his defense being
more fully understood, as because it would be heard in a more friendly spirit by jurors
of his own country and language." LaRue, supra note 7, at 847 (quoting Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339, 369 (1879) (Field, J., dissenting)). For an elaboration of the several
rationales supporting the jury de medietate, see CONSTABLE, supra note 11, ch. 6;
LaRue, supra note 7, at 852-63; Van Ness, supra note 11, at 37-39.
13 See Fukurai & Davies, supra note 11; Van Ness, supra note 11. These articles
make the explicit argument for adapting the historical de medietate practice to modern
trials that promise to be racially charged. Others argue for racial quotas in order to give
reality to the "jury of peers" and thereby to secure a fair trial. See Albert W. Alschuler,
Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L. J. 704 (1995); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black
Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611 (1985); Diane Potash, Mandato-
ry Inclusion of Racial Minorities on Jury Panels, 3 BLACK L. J. 80 (1973); Note, The
Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L. J. 531 (1970); see also CONSTABLE, supra note 11,
at 41-48. Ramirez uses the history of the mixed jury to argue for what she terms "affir-
mative peremptories." Ramirez, supra note 11, at 806-17; see also infra notes 255-64
and accompanying text.
14 See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
" See infra Part II.A.
16 The best-known example of effective use of merchant juries is that of Lord
Mansfield, Chief Justice of the Court of King's Bench of England from 1756 to 1788.
For explanation and discussion, see I JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS
AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 93-99 (1992).
" In earlier articles, I have explored in detail the history of the special jury in Eng-
land. In these works, I gave summary descriptions of the special jury experience in the
United States and cited representative sources that have given limited attention to the
topic. See James Oldham, Origins of the Special Jury, 50 U. CHi. L. REV. 137, 137,
138 n.6, 210 n.453 (1983) [hereinafter Oldham, Origins]; James Oldham, Special Juries
in England: Nineteenth Century Usage and Reform, 8 J. LEGAL HIST. 148, 160-61
(1987) [hereinafter Oldham, Special Juries]. Because the American special jury built
directly upon the English experience, the history of the English special jury is essential
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The idea of drawing exclusive special juries from specialized lists
seems to be anachronistic today. Elite special juries surely are antitheti-
cal to the hard-fought, long-delayed goal of opening up jury service to
everyone. Having eliminated the unsavory exclusions of the past, how
can there remain a place in modern American society for an exclusive
special jury?
I argue that there is still such a place-that our history justifies con-
tinued experimentation with jury composition, including the special jury.
However desirable the reasonable cross-section requirement is as a
means of keeping an increasingly stratified people personally involved in
the business of democracy, the requirement contributes little or nothing
to other goals, such as coping effectively with jury trial of complex
cases, or striving for fairness to litigating parties; yet the latter
goal-picking juries that will be fair to the parties-has long been cen-
tral to the jury selection process, especially as embodied in peremptory
challenge and voir dire practices. The Supreme Court has outlawed the
use of peremptory challenges to eliminate potential jurors on the basis of
race or gender as improperly discriminatory and as inconsistent with the
reasonable cross-section requirement;18 however, voir dire screening,
including the use of nondiscriminatory peremptories, continues to be the
principal method of ferreting out undesirable jurors.
The voir dire process brings into view another prominent feature of
the special jury. Historically, the term "special jury" has had two main
connotations-the jury comprised of jurors with special qualifications, as
discussed above, and the jury formed by a special procedure involving
the presentation of a large panel of potential jurors to the parties who
then reduce the panel to a specified smaller number by taking turns
striking names off the list. When this procedure is used, the resulting
jury usually is referred to as a "struck jury." Legal literature and case
law often have used this expression interchangeably with "special ju-
ry. ,, 9
In England, the special jury is now extinct. In the United States, it
survives in about a dozen states, and in most of these states, it persists
solely as a "struck jury" formation procedure." For reasons later ex-
plained, this procedure often is viewed as being fairer to criminal defen-
dants than is the peremptory challenge-the more customary device
to an understanding of the American patterns.
See infra notes 270-78 and accompanying text.
The first significant legislative treatment of the special jury in England was in
1730. The legislature described such a procedure for jury formation, saying nothing
about who were to be the jurors. See infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
2 See infra Part I.A.
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designed to protect criminal defendants in jury selection.
The other goal mentioned above--coping effectively with jury trial of
complex cases--encourages the use of a jury of experts, the modem ana-
logue of the merchant jury. Here, too, recent voices have called for the
revival or extension of this type of special jury.21 In actual practice,
Delaware is the only state where this occurs, as I will later show.'
Part I of this Article discusses the history and current validity of the
struck jury in both civil and criminal cases and deals with the relation
between struck jury procedures and peremptory challenges. Part II ex-
plores the history and current validity of special juries in which jurors
have special qualifications. Part III comments on the relation between the
special jury and the reasonable cross-section requirement, especially as
reflected in recent Supreme Court cases and other federal cases dealing
with peremptory challenges based solely on "protected group" charac-
teristics such as race and sex.
I. THE STRUCK JURY
It is helpful at the outset to understand the relationship between
"struck jury" procedures and the jury composed of jurors with special
qualifications. Usually there is no official or formal connection. Eigh-
teenth-century American statutes authorizing the special jury typically
approved and set out a struck jury procedure, but said nothing about
empaneling jurors of special qualities or characteristics. Most of the
American statutes followed the 1730 English statute.' The English stat-
ute, after noting that some doubt had arisen about the power of the cen-
tral courts "to appoint Juries to be struck" before the appropriate officers
in the several courts, confirmed that such power existed and provided
that, on motion by any party in any civil case or in the prosecution of
any misdemeanor, juries could be struck "in such manner as special
juries have been, and are usually struck in such courts respectively upon
trials at bar had in the said courts, which said jury so struck as aforesaid,
shall be the jury returned for the trial of the said issue."' The statute
excluded trials of capital offenses (felonies) in order to preserve
defendants' peremptory challenges.'
21 See Rita Sutton, A More Rational Approach to Complex Civil Litigation in the
Federal Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 575 (1990); Note, The Case
for Special Juries in Complex Civil Litigation, 89 YALE L. J. 1155 (1980).
2 See infra notes 224-49 and accompanying text.
2 An Act for the Better Regulation of Juries, 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25, § 15 (1730) (Eng.).
24 Id.
2' Id. § 20. Each defendant in a capital case was entitled to thirty-five peremptory
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The 1730 English statute said nothing about who the special jurors
should be, except for one provision that called for the proper officer to
bring into court the books or lists of qualified jurors from which to
choose the jury panel.26 The statute did, however, adopt for everyday
trials the model of the special jury as it had been used in trials at bar.
The trial at bar was a jury trial conducted before the full bench of four
justices. In writing his Commentaries in the 1760s, Blackstone claimed
that special juries were "originally introduced in trials at bar, when the
causes were of too great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freehold-
ers."'27 Dozens of American cases have quoted this language in explain-
ing the special jury.'
It is not at all clear that Blackstone fully understood the seventeenth-
and early-eighteenth-century uses of the special jury,29 but he was es-
sentially correct in associating the special jury with "big cases"-those
tried at bar. In the early 1700s, the trial at bar was commonly allowed in
cases involving especially difficult questions, parties of high station in
government or society, or a substantial amount of money.' By the time
Parliament passed the special jury statute, the Court of King's Bench
was trying to limit the costly and inefficient trial at bar,31 but whenever
trials at bar were granted, they typically were tried by special juries.
Who were the special jurors in trials at bar? If the issues were "of
too great nicety for the discussion of ordinary freeholders," presumably
there must have been some way to select "extraordinary freeholders" as
jurors." Evidence of quarrels about who the special jurors should be
exists even in trials at bar. In a case decided in 1710, the Solicitor Gen-
eral argued, on a motion for a special jury in a trial at bar, that the Sher-
iff would be obliged "to return gentlemen of the better [rank," but Jus-
tice Eyre of the Court of Queen's Bench observed that "[i]n a trial at bar
challenges. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
347 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1769).
26 See 3 Geo. 2, ch. 25, § 17 (1730) (Eng.). Country juries would have been selected
from the Freeholders' Book, but in the sixteenth century, Parliament recognized that
there were too few freeholders in cities and towns to supply jurors, so the legislators
fashioned a property qualification in personalty for these venues. See Oldham, Origins,
supra note 17, at 211-13.
27 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 357-58
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1979) (1768).
' See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 228-32; cf. infra text accompanying notes
121-22.
29 See Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 177-84.
30 See id. at 192-94.
See id. at 194 (citing Goodright v. Wood, 94 Eng. Rep. 98 (K.B. 1728)).
32 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 357-58.
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the jury is returned by the Master. The jury is special only because it is
returned in a special manner, it is no objection that a man is a common
juror."
33
Justice Eyre's remarks notwithstanding, it is clear that special jurors
in the early-eighteenth-century English trials at bar were "gentlemen of
the better [r]ank."' Exactly how this was accomplished is somewhat of
a mystery. The empaneling officer probably had favored names that he
could choose out of the jury book; counsel possibly had their own choic-
es; and separate lists of special jurors may have been maintained.35
When Parliament passed the 1730 statute, it specified merely that
special juries were to be formed in such manner as special juries had
been struck in trials at bar. This directive appears to have been procedur-
al, and by 1730 the practice was well-established. The proper court offi-
cer would produce the jury book (usually referred to as "the Freeholders'
Book" even if some or all of those on the list were personalty-holders36)
from which forty-eight names would be chosen.37 These forty-eight
names would be reduced to a panel of twenty-four names by alternate
strikes by counsel for plaintiff and defendant. The Sheriff then would
summon the twenty-four persons to attend as trial jurors in the hope that
at least twelve of them would show up at trial.3" This procedure may
well have been all that Parliament had in mind by .its reference to the
manner of striking special jurors in trials at bar. Nevertheless, because
special jurors "of the better Rank" had become customary in trials at bar,
the special jury came to be thought of as regularly composed of such
persons, even when the trial was not at bar.39 This fact is important in
understanding the adoptions of the special jury in America. In 1741, for
example, New York enacted a statute that copied Parliament's 1730
statute and declared that "his Maje[s]ty's Supreme Court of this Colony"
could, upon motion:
order and appoint a jury, to be struck, before one of the
Judges of the said Court, for trial of any issue joined in any
13 Regina v. Harcourt (Q.B. 1710), Hollinshed's Reports, Harvard Law School MS
1142, at 190. For a discussion of this case, see Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 200-
02. The "Master" referred to the Secondary, an officer of the Court of Queen's (or
King's) Bench.
3' Harcourt, Harvard Law School MS 1142, at 187.
For speculation about these possibilities, see Oldham, Special Juries, supra note
17, at 153-58; I OLDHAM, supra note 16, at 96-97.
36 See supra note 26.
37 See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 358.
38 See id.
'9 See Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 202.
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of the said cases, and triable by a jury of twelve men, in
such manner as special juries have by law heretofore been
struck, for trials at bar; which jury, so struck, as aforesaid,
shall be the jury returned for the trial of the said issue.4"
As we shall see, the New York statutory treatment of the special jury
changed after statehood, but the notion that special jurors were jurors "of
the better rank" persisted.
The heritage thus was one of a statutorily endorsed struck jury proce-
dure that said nothing about who the special jurors should be, yet was un-
dergirded by a custom of filling the special jury with upper-class gentlemen.
By the time of American independence, the custom had expanded so that in
commercial cases, special juries of merchants were commonplace.4
Against this background, I turn to the struck jury as it took root and
prospered in the United States. The formulas in the several states, even in
the eighteenth century, were by no means uniform. Clusters of states, how-
ever, followed similar patterns, especially as the statutory adoptions spread
westward in the nineteenth century. In the discussion that follows, I provide
representative examples of special jury enactments, including references to
formulations in the states in which the special jury survives.
A. Representative State Patterns: States in Which the Special Jury Remains
Valid
There are about a dozen states in which the special, or "struck,". jury
remains on the books. 2 In several of these, the struck jury procedure is
used in criminal cases because it is viewed as allowing a voir dire superior
40 Act of Nov. 27, 1741, ch. DCCXX, N.Y. Colonial Laws (encouraging the return
of able and sufficient jurors, as well as the better regulation of juries).
41 See I OLDHAM, supra note 16, at 95-96. A special jury of merchants was not a
matter of right. See id.
42 I refer to states in which the struck jury originated by statute. As is noted later,
there are other states in which trial judges adopted the struck jury method without statu-
tory authorization. See infra text accompanying notes 106-07. There are also instances
of the adoption of the method by court rules. I have not attempted to canvas federal,
state, and local trial courts to discover struck jury usages in states in which there is no
statutory history supporting the practice. For a description of the adoption of the struck
jury method by court rule, see State v. Enno, 807 P.2d 610, 614 (Idaho 1991). After
referring to a 1961 case in which a new trial was granted because the struck jury meth-
od used by the trial court was at odds with statutory requirements, the Idaho Supreme
Court noted that the struck jury procedure followed by the trial court had been made
available by court rule. See id. For a recent challenge to many Idaho trial judges' prac-
tice of placing time limits on attorney voir dire during struck jury selection, see State v.
Larsen, 923 P.2d 1001 (Idaho 1996).
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to the "jury box" method.43 Indeed, as I will explain, this perceived superi-
ority led Hawaii trial judges to use the struck jury method in the face of a
contrary statutory mandate.
In three states-Delaware, Virginia, and Alabama-the special or struck
jury continues to be regarded as a significant part of the jury trial heritage.
The approaches in the three states, however, are very different, and each
requires explanation.
Delaware is a special jury laboratory. Constitutional challenges to the
special jury have been unsuccessful in Delaware, and the current statute is
the only one in the nation that overtly authorizes the use of the special jury
for complex civil litigation. This authorization is a recent development; the
early history began in 1793 when the Delaware legislature passed "[a]n Act
for more certainly obtaining returns of impartial juries, and their better regu-
lation."" That statute gave the sheriff directions about what to do with the
return of the venire facias, "unless in cases where a special jury shall be
struck by rule of court." '45 A "rule of court" was a court order, and thus it
is clear that informal special jury usage was in place in Delaware during the
eighteenth century.
The first detailed statutory recognition of this usage came in an 1810
act, which provided that a struck jury was required on application of either
party "in any action, cause or suit whatsoever" in the Supreme Court or the
Court of Common Pleas.46 According to the Delaware Supreme Court in
Nance v. Rees,47 the 1810 act could be traced to the English statute Of
1730, and "the Act of 1810 did no more than codify into statutory law a
practice long followed in Delaware courts as a part of the legal heritage
from England."48 Open to question, however, was whether the procedure
applied to criminal as well as civil cases. In Rush v. State,49 a defendant in
a murder case claimed that his request at trial for a special jury should have
been granted, but the Supreme Court of Delaware concluded that "[t]he
legislative history of the Delaware special jury statute, from its inception in
1810, indicates that special juries were to be confined to courts of civil
jurisdiction."5
4 See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
" Act of Feb. 2, 1793, Del. Laws ch. VIII (1793).
45 Id.
46 Act of Jan. 30, 1810, Del. Laws ch. CXX (1810).
47 161 A.2d 795 (Del. 1960).
48 Id. at 799.
4' 491 A.2d 439 (Del. 1985).
O Id. at 443. The Delaware Supreme Court quoted the trial judge in pointing out
that special juries originally had been authorized only for courts of civil jurisdic-
tion-the Supreme Court and the Court of Common Pleas-and not for the criminal
courts (the court of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery and the court of
General Quarter Sessions of the Peace and Gaol Delivery). See id. at 443 n. 3.
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The formula specified in the 1810 statute was one that is now famil-
iar-forty-eight freeholders "most indifferent" and "best qualified," to be
reduced to twenty-four by alternating strikes by the parties.5 With compar-
atively minor adjustments, this formula persisted in Delaware for 177 years.
In 1987, however, Delaware repealed the statute and replaced it with a
single paragraph, which opens with the following sentence: "The court may
order a special jury upon the application of any party in a complex civil
case."52 The methodology for empaneling special juries under this law is
left, apparently, to court rules or to the ad hoc invention of trial judges. 3
Substantively, the two major changes were the conversion from special
juries as a matter of right (as they had been under the 1810 statute) to one
of court discretion, and the limitation of special juries to complex civil
cases.
Both the traditional struck jury statute and the succinct 1987 version
survived constitutional challenge during the 1980s. Because both challenges
were based largely on claimed conflict between the Delaware practice of
maintaining a separate list of jurors for special juries and the reasonable
cross-section requirement, discussion is deferred to Parts II and III, be-
low. 4
In Virginia, the first statutory appearance of the struck jury appears to
have been in 1788 for impeachment trials. The statute provided for the
sheriff to return a panel of twenty-four jurors from the senatorial district
where the accused resided; then "[t]he prosecutor for the commonwealth,
and the person accused, shall, in open Court, alternately strike one, until the
number shall be reduced to twelve . . ,5" The general availability of the
struck jury entered the statute books much later. The Code of 1849 provided
that a trial jury would be formed by reducing a panel of twenty-four to
eighteen by lot, after which the eighteen would be reduced to twelve by
alternate strikes by the parties.56 In 1887, however, the Virginia Code was
changed to provide: "Any court, in a case where a jury is required, may
allow a special jury."57 The procedure was to summon a panel of twenty
qualified jurors, to choose sixteen of them by lot, and to reduce the sixteen
Act of Jan. 30, 1810, Del. Laws ch. CXX (1810). The statute also provided that
in civil cases in which the jury was empaneled according to the 1793 statute, each side
was to be allowed three peremptory challenges. See id.
52 66 DEL. LAwS ch. 5, § 4506 (1987).
"' See Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., No. C.A. 83C-AU-56, 1987 WL
28311 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1987) (granting part of the motion for summary judg-
ment in the libel action); see also infra text accompanying note 249.
54 See infra notes 224-32, 288-91 and accompanying text.
55 Act of Dec: 2, 1788, 1788 Va. Acts ch. 67, § 128 (establishing district courts and
regulating the general court).
56 See VA. CODE OF 1849, ch. 162, § 8.
-57 VA. CODE OF 1887, ch. 152, § 3158.
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to twelve by alternate strikes by the parties. This formula remained until
1950, when Virginia moved to smaller juries for most cases and adopted the
struck jury across the board.5" The 1950 Code specified that juries in minor
civil cases (up to one thousand dollars in controversy) should be five jurors
out of a panel of eleven; in other civil cases the jury was to be seven out of
a panel of thirteen, "except that when a special jury is allowed, twelve per-
sons from a panel of twenty shall constitute the jury."59 In all cases, alter-
nate strikes by the parties were to reduce the panel to the number of jurors
for the applicable jury.
The jury provisions of the Code of 1950 remain in place today, except
for an increase in the jurisdictional limit for the five-person civil jury from
one thousand to fifteen thousand dollars.60 The only difference between
ordinary civil juries and special juries in civil cases is the size of the jury
panel and the jury itself. Nothing in the statutory language or case law indi-
cates that special jurors are to be persons of special qualifications.6 Anoth-
er provision of the Code of 1950 (still in effect), however, permits the par-
ties to create a jury of three members by consent. The plaintiff selects one
juror, the defendant selects a second, and the two jurors in turn select a
third, and "any two concurring shall render a verdict in like manner and
with like effect as a jury of seven."62 Although not a struck jury, this jury-
by-consent is a special jury in the sense that it is formed by a special proce-
dure. What the jury-by-consent most resembles is arbitration.63
58 The current statutory references are, for civil cases, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-362
(Michie 1997) ("Any court in a civil case in which a jury is required may allow a spe-
cial jury, in which event . .. a jury shall be made in accordance with the provisions of
§ 8.01-359A."), and for criminal cases, VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-262(C) (Michie 1997)
("The parties or their counsel ... shall alternately strike off one name from the panel
until the number remaining shall be reduced to the number required for a jury.").
59 VA. CODE OF 1950, § 8-208.21.
60 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-359A (Michie 1997); see supra note 59.
61 In an early case, Atlantic & Danville R.R. Co. v. Peake, 87 Va. 130 (1890), the
court disallowed a special jury because there was nothing in the case suggesting preju-
dice or exceptional difficulty. This case suggests that cases of exceptional difficulty
qualify for special juries, and further, that the jurors would be specially qualified. I have
had no opportunity to investigate whether such a practice in Virginia courts is called for
in court rules or is followed informally.
62 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-359D (Michie 1997).
63 During the eighteenth century in England, it was common to refer pending court
cases to arbitration, and one or some number of jurors would at times be chosen to be
the arbitrators. More commonly, arbitrators with expertise in the subject matter in dis-
pute would be selected. If the number of arbitrators chosen were an even number, there
would customarily be a provision for the named arbitrators to select an umpire for tie-
breaking purposes. See I OLDHAM, supra note 16, at 151-55; II id. app. E. There are
examples of naming two arbitrators with instructions to them to choose a third. See
Hotchkin v. Cotes, Nisi Prius (Trinity Feb. 15, 1758) (Radford and Sweet, Arb.), cited
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Alabama uses the struck jury in both criminal and civil cases. The origi-
nal 1841 statutory authorization in Alabama for struck juries applied to civil
cases "sounding in damages merely" or involving more than one hundred
dollars.' Alternate strikes were to reduce panels of twenty-four persons to
twelve. 65 Alabama later expanded this authorization to "all civil actions
triable by jury, '' 66 an expansion that is still in operation. 67 The Alabama
Rules of Civil Procedure, which control all Alabama courts except district
courts, codify the same procedure.68 The struck jury method of Rule 47(b)
superseded the older method of peremptory challenges that was available in
civil cases for which no special jury was selected.69
Meanwhile, early in this century, the struck jury procedure was made
applicable to criminal cases.7" A sliding scale was fashioned so that a panel
of at least thirty-six is required for capital offenses, twenty-four for non-
capital felonies, and eighteen for misdemeanors. This scheme supplanted
peremptory challenges in criminal trials.71 Constitutional attacks on the
statutes applying the struck jury to criminal cases have failed.72
Other states in which the struck jury remains valid by statute include
South Carolina, Indiana, Arkansas, Maryland, and West Virginia.73 Use of
the method of striking jurors in lieu of peremptories, without calling the
result a struck jury, is codified in Arizona and Texas. In addition, there is
evidence that the method is used pursuant to court rules in Massachusetts
in II OLDHAM, supra note 16, app. E, at 1544. These practices became common in
American colonies and states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The experience
with arbitration in colonial America and in the early republic was extensive, but it is
inadequately documented. I have amassed materials that illuminate that experience, but
at present they are in unpublished form. For an excellent study of arbitration in colonial
Connecticut, see Bruce Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before
the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 443 (1984).
6 ALA. CODE OF 1841, ch. 10, § 52.
65 See id.
66 ALA. CODE OF 1932, Ex. Sess., at 34.
67 See ALA. CODE § 12-16-140 (1997); see also Wallace v. Alabama Power Co., 497
So. 2d 450 (Ala. 1986).
68 See ALA. R. CIv. P. 47(b).
69 For an explanation of superseding peremptories, see the Committee Comments to
the 1973 promulgation of Rule 47; see also Holman v. Baker, 169 So. 2d 429 (Ala.
1964).
' Act of Sept. 29, 1919, 1919 Ala. Acts No. 715. For current statutory provisions,
see ALA. CODE § 12-16-100 (1995) and Rule 18.4(f) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
71 See Brown v. State, 231 So. 2d 167 (Ala. App. 1970).
71 See Dixon v. State, 167 So. 340 (Ala. App. 1936).
7 See supra note 42 for the method I followed in identifying states with current
special jury practices.
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and that it has been employed by trial judges as a matter of personal prefer-
ence in Alaska and Hawaii.
The South Carolina experience with the special jury has been unique in
its explicit use of merchant juries in the eighteenth century. 74 A 1769 stat-
ute authorized special juries in the Charleston Court of Common Pleas, if
consented to by both parties in a case involving trade or considerable mon-
ey, or between merchants.' Although the statute referred to ordering "a
special jury to be struck," the method of juror selection was by ballot-
ing-either from lists of potential jurors that the parties supplied (for trials
at bar of causes "of weight and importance") or from regular jury lists.'
The legislature later observed that the 1769 plan sometimes resulted in spe-
cial juries "drawn entirely out of the number of those whose names were
given in or delivered to the court by one of the parties in controver-
sy .... , 77 South Carolina thus changed the law in 1791 to a complicated
formula, applicable on consent of both parties, on request of either party, or
at the court's discretion in big money cases.78 The gist of the formula was
that each party supplied eighteen names of qualified grand jurors; then each
party was to strike ten names from the other party's list and identify two
names from the twenty rejects to serve as "talesmen" (back-up jurors), if
needed. This resulted in a panel of twenty names to be summoned for tri-
al. 79 Five years later, this act was repealed, and the next year, the right to a
special jury was abolished "except by consent of both parties" because the
device had been found to have been "abused to the purposes of delay and
chicanery."80 When both parties consented, however, the 1791 procedure
still could be used.
There were other legislative adjustments over time, and during the pres-
ent century, the South Carolina legislature adopted a straightforward struck
jury approach. The current version calls for the clerk in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas to supply a list of twenty jurors from "the whole number of
jurors who are in attendance," and then alternate strikes will reduce this list
to the trial jury of twelve persons."
74 See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
71 See Act of July 29, 1769, 1769 S.C. Acts, No. 1095, sec. XXIII ("establishing
courts, building gaols, and appointing sheriffs and other officers, and for the more con-
venient administration of justice in this province").
76 See id.
77 See Act of Dec. 20, 1791, 1791 S.C. Acts, No. 1526 ("to alter and amend the
Law Respecting Juries and to make some additional regulation to the Acts for establish-
ing and regulating the Circuit Courts").
71 See id.
71 See id.
' Act of Dec. 16, 1797, 1797 S.C. Acts No. 1665.
8' S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1050 (Law. Co-op. 1996).
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The nineteenth-century statutory authorization of special juries in Indi-
ana began with the simple declaration that "[t]he Court shall have the pow-
er, when the business thereof requires it, to order the impaneling of a spe-
cial jury for the trial of any cause."82 This was accompanied by a provision
captioned "Jury by agreement," allowing the parties to "agree upon the ju-
rors to compose a special jury, and notify the Court thereof ... ,,." Alterna-
tively, the parties were allowed to have a "struck jury, by consent," formed
by a return by the sheriff of eighteen competent jurors, reduced to a jury of
six via six strikes by each party-or any other number of strikes the parties
might choose.' When the court ordered a struck jury, the Indiana formula
was for a panel of the forty "most indifferent" and "best qualified" men to
be returned, with each party's twelve strikes reducing the panel to sixteen. 5
Amendments in 1913 deleted the language calling for the clerk to select
forty men "most indifferent" and "best qualified," substituting instructions
for the clerk to take forty names from a well-shaken box containing the
names of qualified ordinary jurors.86 In 1988, Indiana repealed the provi-
sions allowing the court to order struck juries, but the sections described
above allowing a special jury by agreement or a struck jury by consent
remain intact.8 7
The remnant of the struck jury in Arkansas is evident in statutes grant-
ing each party three peremptory challenges. In criminal misdemeanor cases,
each side has three peremptories that can be exercised orally, after which
the names of twenty-four jurors are put in a box, eighteen names are drawn
and entered on a list, each side strikes up to three names, and the first
twelve names remaining constitute the jury.' In civil cases the formula is
similar, but the process of striking from a list of eighteen names drawn from
twenty-four is optional. Previously the state utilized a more typical struck
jury method; on the request of either party, the circuit court had discretion
to order a panel of forty-two names to be returned, which after each party's
twelve strikes would be reduced to eighteen names.9°
82 1 Indiana R.S. 1896, Homer, § 522. The 1896 compilation is the earliest set of
Indiana statutes to which I have had access. Later historical annotations show that the
special jury provisions originated in "An Act concerning proceedings in civil cases."
1881 Ind. Acts 240, ch. 38, §§ 357-362.
83 1 Indiana R.S. 1896, Horner, § 523.
' 1 Indiana R.S. 1896, Homer, § 524.
85 Id. § 525.
86 1913 Ind. Acts ch. 15, § 1.
87 The repealing authority was 1988 Ind. Acts, P.L.180-1988, § 2. For the retained
provisions in the current statutes, see IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-19-2 (Michie Supp. 1986)
("Special jury by agreement") and id. § 34-1-19-3 ("Struck jury-By consent").
8 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-32-203 (Michie 1997).
89 See id. § 16-33-203 (Michie 1994).
' See ARK. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 20-21 (1837). The statute had an interesting,
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Maryland used the struck jury method for nearly two centuries in the
jury formation for all trials. Under a 1797 statute, for each civil case, the
clerks drew a panel of twenty jurors by ballot; then the list was delivered to
the parties, each of whom then struck out four names.9 Maryland extended
this procedure to criminal cases in 1802, except for capital felonies or trea-
sons, for which peremptory challenges were allowed.92 Currently, the pro-
cedural rules contain the method for striking names that is used to effectuate
peremptory challenges. In civil cases in the circuit court, each side has four
peremptories (and possibly more, if alternate jurors are empaneled), which
are exercised by striking names off of a list "sufficient to provide the num-
ber of jurors and alternates to be sworn after allowing for the exercise of
peremptory challenges."93 Larger numbers of peremptories are allowed in
criminal cases,94 and striking names off a jury list occurs only if no party
requests alternating challenges. 95
Until 1985, West Virginia law provided that "any court may allow a
special jury in any civil case," and such juries were formed in a typical
manner-twenty names to be drawn, reduced to sixteen by lot, and then
reduced to twelve by two strikes by each party.96 By 1985 amendments, the
numbers were changed to ten, reduced to eight by lot, and then ultimately
reduced to six by one strike each. 97 The original formula was retained,
however, for eminent domain cases.9
The last group of active struck jury states I mention only briefly here. In
Arizona, the rules of civil procedure state that the clerk shall make a list
consisting of as many names drawn from the jury box as the court di-
rects.99 From this list the parties alternate in making peremptory challenges,
until such challenges are exhausted. Failure of a party to make a challenge
in turn acts as a waiver of that party's remaining challenges." From the
list of remaining names the clerk calls the first eight persons to serve as the
pragmatic twist: If the request came outside of term time, the clerk of the circuit court
was authorized to order the struck jury if "satisfied that a struck jury ought to be grant-
ed." Id. § 18. The statute did not indicate the criteria to be applied in deciding whether
to grant the request. See id.
91 See 1797 Md. Laws ch. 87, § 9.
See 1802 Md. Laws ch. 69.
MD. R. 2-512(g).
See id. 4-313(a).
See id. 4-313(b)(2).
W. VA. CODE § 56-6-13 (1966).
9' See W. VA. CODE § 56-6-13 (a)-(b) (Michie Supp. 1991)
's See id. § 56-6-13(b). For eminent domain cases, the twenty names are to be quali-
fied freeholders of the county where the land being condemned is located. See infra
notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
See ARIz. R. CIv. P. 47(a)(1).
, o See ARIz. R. CIV. P. 47(a)(3).
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jury. °' In Texas, the law provides that in all non-death-penalty criminal
cases, "the party desiring to challenge any juror peremptorily shall strike the
name of such juror from the list furnished him by the clerk.""1 2
The occasional use of a struck jury method of choosing jurors in Massa-
chusetts is demonstrated by Commonwealth v. Johnson. 3 In Johnson, the
defendant was convicted of rape, and among his challenges on appeal was a
claim that the trial judge had deprived him of his peremptory challenges by
imposing the "struck jury method" upon him."l The claim was rejected
after the court explained that the "struck method" was not a system for
exercising peremptory challenges, but was, rather, "an alternative method for
selecting a jury," in which
a venire pool of about one hundred members [is] drawn.
After venire persons from the pool are excused for cause or
hardship, the jury are "struck": the defendant strikes two
members of the remaining venire, and then the prosecutor
strikes one member. This process is repeated until twelve
jurors remain, who then serve as jurors for the trial.0 5
Similarly, in the Alaska case of Van Huff v. Sohio,"'° the Alaska Su-
preme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by using
the "struck jury" method of jury selection; neither was this method viewed
as inconsistent with an Alaska rule for peremptory challenges. Finally, in
Hawaii and California, the use of the struck jury method by trial judges has
been held to be improper because it is inconsistent with the method of jury
selection prescribed by statute, but if the defendant fails to object to the
struck jury method at trial, or if the defendant cannot show prejudice, its use
will not justify reversal of a conviction."
B. States in Which the Once-Authorized Special Jury Is No Longer Valid
New York and New Jersey have especially rich special jury histories,
See ARIz. R. Civ. P. 47(a). In criminal cases, the number of jurors to serve in the
case is to be drawn and then augmented by the number of alternates plus the number of
peremptories allowed each party. See ARIz. R. CRiM. P. 18.5(b).
102 TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. art. 35.25 (West 1989).
103 631 N.E.2d 1002 (Mass. 1994).
104 See id. at 1004, 1007-08.
Id. at 1007 n.7.
106 835 P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1992).
"01 See People v. Wright, 802 P.2d 221, 240-41 (Cal. 1990); State v. Echineque, 828
P.2d 276 (Haw. 1992); State v. Corpuz, 880 P.2d 213 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994); State v.
Shiroma, 855 P.2d 34 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993).
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including, for New York, two United States Supreme Court cases. The spe-
cial jury survived in New York until 1965,"° but in a surprising, inverted
way. Although the special jury remained theoretically available in both civil
and criminal cases until its repeal, it rarely was used in civil trials; instead,
its most interesting twentieth-century history was in capital criminal cases.
Most states with early struck jury histories followed England's lead and
withheld the device from capital cases so as not to impinge on the
defendant's right to peremptory challenges. New York, however, fashioned a
unique statute in 1896 that provided for special juries only in criminal cases
and only in two counties-those having a population of more than
500,000.'" Special juries were allowable if necessary for a fair and impar-
tial trial, or because of the "importance or intricacy" of the case."0 Special
jurors were to be chosen from a special list to be prepared by jury commis-
sioners after personal interviews."' In addition to ordinary trial juror quali-
fications, candidates had to have a clean record in the courts, be able to
disregard newspaper publicity, disavow any conscientious objection to the
death penalty, and be able to resist any negative presumption if a defendant
were to decline to testify."'
In a 1960 decision, Schuster v. City of New York,"3 Supreme Court
Judge Henry Martuscello wrote a lengthy opinion denying the defendant's
108 See Laws of 1965, ch. 778, § 3.
o Act of Apr. 23, 1896, ch. 378, 1896 N.Y. Laws 354.
1Id. § 13. Here one can detect an echo of the English trial at bar and of
Blackstone's reference to cases that "were of too great nicety for the discussion of
ordinary freeholders." 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at 357. Shortly after the 1896
New York special jury statute was passed, Benjamin Tucker gave a speech at the Coo-
per Union under the auspices of several labor unions, constituting a scathing criticism
of the elitist and exclusive effects of the new law. The speech was published in 1889
under the title, A Blow at Trial by Jury. In his opening remarks, Tucker stated that
instead of the actual title ("An Act providing for a special jury in criminal cases in each
county of the State having a certain population, and for the mode of selecting and pro-
curing such special juries; also, creating a special jury commissioner for each of such
counties, and regulating and prescribing his duties"), a more accurate title would have
been:
An act providing for the enforcement of those laws of the State of New York
which, having found their way into the statute-books only through the insidious
machinations of a clique or a cabal or a boss or an interest or a handful of fanat-
ics, are so unpopular with the citizens of the State of New York that a conviction
of the violation of them can seldom, if ever, be secured from a jury fairly and
impartially impaneled from the mass of sober-minded people.
BENJAMIN TUCKER, A BLow AT TRIAL BY JURY 3-4 (New York, Benjamin Tucker
1889).
... 1896 N.Y. Laws 354, § 9.
112 Id. § 8.
113 205 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
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motion for a special jury in an action for damages allegedly caused by po-
lice negligence in not preventing an informer's murder. The judge observed
that "the historic purpose for which the special jury was introduced to com-
mon law [was] to provide more intelligent and competent jurors in excep-
tional cases," and he concluded that the case before him was not sufficiently
important or intricate to justify a special jury."' In reaching this conclu-
sion, he expressed his strong distaste for the elitist nature of "blue ribbon"
juries, noting that five separate New York judicial councils or conferences
from 1937 to 1952 had recommended abolition of the special jury."5
Judge Martuscello stated, incorrectly, that special juries "were not authorized
in this state" until the 1896 statute and "were not established in civil actions
until the enactment of Chapter 602 of the Laws of 1901.,,116
In fact, the special jury in civil cases had a much longer history in New
York than 1896. That history is laid out by Morton Horwitz in The
Transformation of American Law 1780-1860."" Horwitz describes "the
'struck' or special jury" as "a favorite institution of colonial merchants" that
the 1741 statute initially authorized and that a 1786 enactment re-endorsed
after independence."' In 1801, however, New York codified a detailed
struck jury procedure that, according to Horwitz, "for the first time placed
struck juries within the judges' control, permitting them only where the
court 'may deem it necessary, by reason of the importance or intricacy of
the case.""' 9
By the time George Caines published his New York practice book in
1808, the special jury had assumed sufficient importance to occupy a full
chapter. 2 Caines quoted the 1801 statute verbatim. Among other things,
the statute sets forth the New York version of the English procedure: In the
presence of the parties, the clerk or his deputy was to copy out of the jury
book forty-eight names, which would then be reduced to twenty-four by
alternate strikes by the parties; the panel of twenty-four would be summoned
for jury service, and on the day of trial, "the jurors so struck shall be called
as they stand upon the panel, and the first twelve of them who shall appear
and are not challenged, or shall be found duly qualified and indifferent,
n4 Id. at 197.
"' Id. at 200-03 (quoting Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565, 570 (1948) (Murphy,
J., dissenting)).
116 Id. at 196-97. The 1901 statute amended the 1896 act to make it applicable to
both criminal and civil cases in counties with a population of over one million (New
York and Kings).
117 MORTON HORWIrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at
155-58 (1977).
118 Id. at 155. For the 1741 statute, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
19 Id. (citing 1801 N.Y. Laws ch. 98).
120 See GEORGE CAINES, A SUMMARY OF THE PRACTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK ch. 43 (New York, Isaac Riley 1808).
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shall be the jury, and be sworn to try the said cause."'' Nothing in the act
called for a special list of, as Judge Martuscello put it, "more intelligent and
competent jurors,"" but the act made the special jury a matter of judicial
discretion in "intricate or important" cases.2 3
Horwitz points out that the 1801 statute led to a number of special juries
between 1801 and 1807, chiefly in marine insurance cases. 4 Thereafter,
however, "we hear no more of merchant juries in New York commercial
cases of any sort," even though the statute remained on the books "and
indeed special juries continued to be used in libel cases."'" In Schuster v.
New York, Judge Martuscello gave the twentieth-century history of the civil
special jury in New York, based on a total of six cases-four in the first
decade, one in 1922, and one in 1935." In declining to make Schuster the
seventh case, the judge wrote:
Juries were intended to serve as instruments of justice. They
cannot fulfill that purpose unless they are truly representative
of the community. There can be no true equal representation
of a community if jurors are selected because of an alleged
economic, social or superior educational status. Responsibili-
ty in our democracy should be shared by all and not a
few ....
Juries of character, courage, and independence can only
exist in an atmosphere where there is no discrimination in
their choice because of social, economic or philosophic rea-
sons.
2 7
These sentiments anticipated, or were in the vanguard of, the "reasonable
cross-section" movement that has since swept the country.2 They are, of
course, open to challenge. It is not self-evident why juries cannot accom-
plish "justice" unless they are truly representative of the community. Pre-
sumably New York would continue to achieve justice in capital criminal
cases while special juries persisted. 29
121 Id. at 456.
'" Schuster v. New York, 205 N.Y.S.2d 190, 197 (1960).
123 Id. at 203.
124 See HORWrTZ, supra note 117, at 155-56.
125 Id. at 157-58.
'2 205 N.Y.S.2d 190, 193-96 (Sup. Ct. 1960). One case involved the valuation of
railroad bonds, which called for "a jury equipped with practical business experience";
two were libel cases; one was a quo warranto to test the validity of the mayor's elec-
tion; and two were probate contests. Id.
127 Id. at 205.
128 See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 1.
129 See People v. Willis, 257 N.E.2d 650 (N.Y. 1970) (upholding a murder conviction
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New Jersey adopted its version of the English special jury practice in
1797 and retained it until 1991. The original act validated the granting of a
special jury in any civil case or in any criminal case that did not involve a
right to peremptory challenges. 3 ' When granted, the sheriff was to select
forty-eight men from the jury book-men deemed by the sheriff "most
impartial and indifferent" and "best qualified as to talents, knowledge, integ-
rity, firmness and independence of sentiment."'' The parties then were to
strike out twelve each, leaving a jury panel of twenty-four to be summoned
for trial.' New Jersey made significant changes to this scheme in 1851.
The new law made struck juries available in any civil or criminal case, but
in civil cases the court had to be satisfied (by an affidavit by the party re-
questing the struck jury) that the nature and importance of the matter in
controversy merited the step.' Perhaps New Jersey had encountered the
same thing that had happened in the English courts-tactical special jury
requests by lawyers seeking only to delay proceedings."
Another significant change made in New Jersey in 1851 was to give the
court, in civil cases, the option of ordering a panel of forty-eight to be re-
duced to twenty-four, or a panel of thirty-six to be reduced to eighteen (by
nine strikes per side).'35 The law then remained stable until the end of the
century, when New Jersey revised the formula to require a jury panel of
and finding that the defendant was not deprived of due process because he was tried
before a special jury); People v. Jackson, 231 N.E.2d 722 (N.Y. 1967) (rejecting a
challenge to a special jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution); People v. Horton, 241 N.Y.S.2d 224, 227 (App. Div. 1963) (up-
holding a special jury conviction, despite the claim that the special jury list excluded
Puerto Ricans: "In a county such as New York, composed of a vast number of minority
groups, it will be almost inevitable that the small number of prospective jurors called
for Special Jury service will not conform in proportion to the percentage of each minor-
ity group in the population."), affid, 221 N.E.2d 909 (N.Y. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 934 (1967); People v. Follette, 306 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Sup. Ct. 1970) (upholding the
use of a special jury drawn from the 1964 New York County Special Jury panels).
30 Laws of New Jersey, An Act relative to juries and verdicts, 10 Nov. 1797, §§ 14-
15.
131 Id.
132 See id.
,33 New Jersey P.L. 1851, at 92.
134 See Oldham, Special Juries, supra note 17, at 158-59. One of the findings of a
commission of inquiry in London in 1851, the same year as the New Jersey act, was
that "[i]t is well known to be a frequent practice of defendants who wish for delay, to
obtain a rule for a special jury, which practically, in London and Middlesex, has the
effect of postponing the trial." Id. at 158 (quoting First Report of Her Majesty's Com-
missioners for Inquiring into the Process, Practice and System of Pleading the Superior
Courts of Common Law, at 44, Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons (1851) xxii,
567); see also supra text accompanying note 68.
135 New Jersey P.L. 1851, at 92.
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ninety-six names, to be reduced to forty-eight by twenty-four strikes on each
side, after which the forty-eight names remaining were to be "placed in the
box," and "the jury' for trial of the case is drawn in the usual way."'36
These numbers, however, must have become cumbersome because New
Jersey changed the law again to assume the form that it retained until 1991;
the enabling language returned to what it was in 1851--discretion in the
trial court to grant a struck jury in any civil or criminal case after the nature
and importance of the case were established by affidavit. 37 When granted,
the order was to "direct the jury commissioners of the county in which the
cause is to be tried to prepare a list of 36 or 48 persons or, in special causes
or in a criminal cause, a larger number of persons"; the parties or their
attorneys were then to strike names until half of the names on the list re-
mained, and the trial jury was to be selected from the remaining names "in
as nearly as possible the same manner as a jury from the general panel is
required to be selected."'"
Over the years, the New Jersey struck jury statutes were tested often in
the courts. In Fowler v. State, 39 for example, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the struck jury statute was valid under the New Jersey Con-
stitution of 1844 and its guarantee of trial by jury. The court observed that
the struck jury was derived from English law and had been confirmed by
New Jersey legislation in existence when the constitution was passed. 4
Another attack, this time after the 1898 amendments, failed in Brown v.
State.'41 There, the struck jury system was claimed to be inconsistent with
the defendant's right to challenge potential jurors; 4 1 however, the New
Jersey Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that the struck list of forty-eight
names had to be given to the defendant at least twelve days before empanel-
ing, providing ample time to ascertain grounds of objection to individual
jurors.'43 Moreover, the defendant was entitled to five peremptory chal-
lenges as the names of the trial jurors were drawn from the box of forty-
eight names.'"
After a period of relative calm, several cases decided in the late 1980s
contested anew the New Jersey struck jury system. Because these cases
dealt with voir dire issues, I will mention them shortly in connection with
136 Act of June 14, 1898, ch. 237, § 76, 1898 N.J. Laws 866, 895, quoted and dis-
cussed in United States v. Ricks, 802 F.2d 731, 735 n.2 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Brown
v. State, 42 A. 811, 812 (N.J. 1899)).
137 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:75-1 (West 1971).
138 Id. §§ 2A:75-2, 2A:75-5 (West 1971).
139 39 A. 1113 (N.J.), affig 34 A. 682 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1896).
140 Id. at 682.
141 42 A. 811 (N.J. 1899), aff'd, 175 U.S. 172 (1899).
142 See id. at 813.
143 See id. at 818.
144 See id.
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peremptory challenges. 145 Still other cases, scattered across most of the
twentieth century, questioned the struck jury system in terms of its "exclud-
ing" effect-its leaving protected groups underrepresented or unrepresented
in the jury pool. 14 6 Finally, in 1991, New Jersey repealed the struck jury
procedure. 47 Two special applications of the struck jury remain on the
books, but their retention after the 1991 repeal may have been oversight.
48
Because a wide variety of historical patterns has been traced, I will
provide only a brief description of comparable "struck jury" experience in
other states in which the procedure has been repealed. Although this may
not be an exhaustive list, the following states, by region, once had struck ju-
ries: in the Northeast and mid-Atlantic: Pennsylvania and Vermont; in the
South: Georgia; in the Midwest: Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Ohio, and Wisconsin; and in the West and Southwest: Nevada and Oklaho-
ma. Some of these states followed the standard English model or a close
variant.4 9 Often the size of the pre-strike panel was smaller than forty-
5 See infra Part I.C.
146 See State v. Gilmore, 489 A.2d 1175 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (holding
that the assistant prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all black jurors
violated the defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury), aff'd, 511 A.2d 1150
(N.J. 1986).
14' Act of Apr. 9, 1991, ch. 91, § 533, 1991 N.J. Laws 329, 610.
148 The two statutes are akin to the procedures later discussed for state condemnation
of land or other property rights. See infra text accompanying notes 251-54. The first of
the two New Jersey statutes in question provides for payments to riparian owners for
uses of or improvements to land under water, and it provides that if the riparian owner
"is dissatisfied with said award he may apply to the Superior Court for a struck jury to
try the question in such place as may be designated by the said court . . . ." N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12:3-9 (West 1994). The second statute relates to payments for encroachments
upon cemeteries and provides that, if an objection is raised, "[tihe court may hear any
such objection or proceed in the action in a summary manner or otherwise and with a
struck jury if any party demands a jury." Id. § 40:60-25.45.
149 See MICH. REV. STAT. tit. XXII, ch. 103, §§ 36, 38 (1846) (requiring that a spe-
cial jury be ordered by a circuit court when it appears "that a fair and impartial trial
will be more likely to be obtained in any cause pending therein, by having a struck
jury," and that a panel of forty-eight deemed "most indifferent" and "best qualified" be
returned and reduced to twenty-four by twelve strikes by each party). In 1929, the num-
bers were changed to a panel of thirty-six, with six strikes per party. See MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 13856 (1929). This method was authorized until 1963. See People v. Miller,
276 N.W.2d 558, 561 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 307 N.W.2d 335 (Mich. 1981).
As has been true elsewhere, however, the struck jury method continued to have appeal
because of perceived voir dire advantages. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying
text. In Miller, a trial judge's use of the procedure in a murder trial, although violative
of the Michigan jury selection rules, was held to be a nonprejudicial error, insufficient
to overturn the convictions. See Miller, 276 N.W.2d at 561. The Supreme Court of
Michigan, however, held that failure to follow the Michigan jury selection rules, cou-
pled with an appropriate challenge before the jury selection process had begun, required
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eight. 5 ° Surprisingly, however, in Nevada, the pre-strike panel was to
number one hundred, to be reduced to fifty by alternate strikes. 5 ' At the
other end of the spectrum, Iowa in 1851 legislated a six-man struck jury,
reduced from a panel of eighteen,' and in 1873, the parties in a struck
reversal. See Miller, 307 N.W.2d at 337. The court further stated that "the 'struck jury
method' or any system patterned thereafter is disapproved and may not be used in the
future." Id.
In Georgia, a colonial statute provided "that all special juries that shall hereafter be
moved for and allowed by the court shall be struck in the manner now used in the
Courts of Westminster." Act of Dec. 13, 1756. After independence, however, special
juries were tied to grand juries. Special jurors were to be taken from the grand jury list,
and when a special jury was needed, the clerk was to supply the names of grand jurors
then empaneled, which would be reduced to twelve by alternate strikes by the parties.
Judiciary Act, § 27 (1796). This method remained in place until the special jury disap-
peared in Georgia around 1930. Special juries appear in the 1926 Code but are absent
in the 1933 Code.
In Vermont the standard formula (forty-eight names, reduced to twenty-four by
alternate strikes) was followed from 1884 to 1968 whenever it appeared to the judges of
a county court that a struck jury was needed to obtain a fair and impartial trial of an
issue of fact or because of the intricacy, importance, or special circumstances of a case.
See An Act Providing for Summoning Special Juries in Extraordinary Cases in the
County Courts, Public Act No. 117 (1884); VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 1471, 1474 (1958); Act
of Mar. 14, 1968, § 3, 1967 Adj. Vt. Acts & Resolves, 132, 134.
150 In 1816, Ohio adopted a struck jury statute calling for a panel of forty to be re-
duced by striking to sixteen; of the sixteen, the first twelve to appear in court and not
be challenged became the jury. See OHIO STAT. § 17 (1816). In 1824, this statute was
made inapplicable to criminal cases in which more than two peremptory challenges
were made on either side. See An Act Relating to Juries, c. 580, § 19 (1823-24). This
scheme remained in place until its repeal in 1894. See 91 OHIO STAT. 290 (1894). In
1880, an amendment for counties with a population greater than 200,000 was passed
calling for the presiding judge in the court where a jury was to be struck to select the
names of the special jurors "personally, and without suggestion from anyone." Act of
Feb. 26, 1880, House Bill No. 11, 1880 Ohio Laws 12, 13.
Apart from the large county feature, Minnesota followed the "40 to 16 to 12" for-
mula (reportedly copied from Ohio) from 1864 until its repeal in 1891, see MINN.
STAT. ch. XXXI, §§ 1, 5 (1864), as did Wisconsin (reportedly copied, in turn, from
Minnesota) from 1898 to 1913. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 2544a (1898); Wis. STAT.
§ 2544a (1913). Wisconsin, however, had a simpler struck jury (panel of thirty-six,
reduced to twelve by alternate strikes) from 1858 to 1898. See REV. STAT. Wis. ch.
115, § 9 (1858).
Missouri utilized a formula calling for a much smaller jury panel-eighteen, re-
duced to twelve by alternate strikes of three on each side. See Act of Mar. 17, 1835,
§ 14, repealed by MO. REV. STAT. § 3791 (1899).
" See NEV. GEN. STAT. § 3183 (1861-1885) (1875 amended statute). This statute
disappears from the books in the early 1900s, but I have not located the specific point
of repeal.
152 See IOWA CODE ch. 96, § 1776 (1851). The struck jury was granted at the request
of both parties, and when chosen, it supplanted the parties' right to five peremptories
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jury case were given statutory authority to elect a verdict by majority
vote.' Iowa repealed these procedures in 1927.154
In 1890, the legislature of the Oklahoma Territory passed a statute au-
thorizing a special jury whenever the court's business required it.'55 If or-
dered, the statute provided that "[tihe parties may agree upon the jurors to
compose a special jury."' 5 6 Alternatively, the parties could have the sheriff
return a panel of eighteen, to be reduced to six by alternate strikes; other-
wise, the "40 to 16 to 12" formula used in other states 5 7 was to be fol-
lowed. "'58
In Pennsylvania, the struck jury had a long history, starting in the eigh-
teenth century. Initially authorized by statute in 1785, the special jury sur-
vived until 1937.' By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the sta-
tus of the statutory authorization was uncertain, as is shown by the follow-
ing annotation to the special jury provision in the 1894 Code:
This subject is in a very confused state; but as the right is a
common law one, and the act of 1785 has never been ex-
pressly repealed, it seems safer to insert it. There is certainly
nothing corresponding to the clear irreconcilability that is
necessary to constitute a repeal by implication."
C. The Relationship Between the Struck Jury and Peremptory Challenges
The right to strike a specified number of jurors without giving any rea-
son closely resembles the right to a specified number of peremptory chal-
lenges. In practice, however, the two concepts differ in important ways.
The reason the struck jury was inapplicable to trials of capital offenses
in England in the eighteenth century was pragmatic. The struck jury tradi-
tion that had crept into practice the century before had settled on a jury
panel of forty-eight with twelve strikes on each side, and this did not ac-
each. See id. § 1774.
"' See id. § 2778 (1873).
154 See id. ch. 496, § 11484 (1927), repealed by Act of Mar. 31, 1927, ch. 221, § 1,
1927 Iowa Acts 193.
155 OKLA. CODE (Terr.) ch. 70, § 7 (1890).
I5 Id. Compare the Oklahoma Territory statute with the like provision in Indiana,
supra note 83 and accompanying text.
157 OKLA. CODE (Terr.) ch. 70, § 7 (1890).
158 See id. The Oklahoma statute did not last long; it does not appear in the 1893
Code. I have not been able to mark its exact disappearance.
"' Act of June 25, 1937, No. 419, § 1, 1937 Pa. Laws 2093.
160 PA. CODE ch. IX, Juries, § 81 n.3 (1894).
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commodate a defendant's right to thirty-five peremptory challenges. There is
no apparent evidence that anyone seriously argued for extending the struck
jury procedure to capital offenses by increasing the size of the jury panel
from which names would be struck. Had there been any such attempt, an-
other problem immediately would have come into view.
The struck jury procedure was a preliminary process implemented in the
clerk's office before any jurors whatever had been summoned to the
courthouse. The struck jury tradition was that of striking names off a list,
whereas the tradition of peremptory challenges was one of eliminating per-
sons who had appeared for jury duty and who stood ready to serve. As Jus-
tice Harlan wrote in Pointer v. United States:161
The right to challenge a given number of jurors without
showing cause is one of the most important of. the rights
secured to the accused .... Any system for the empaneling
of a jury that prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted
exercise by the accused of that right, must be condemned.
And, therefore, he cannot be compelled to make a perempto-
ry challenge until he has been brought face to face, in the
presence of the court, with each proposed juror, and an op-
portunity given for such inspection and examination of him
as is required for the due administration of justice.'62
Thus it is obvious that the traditional struck jury system fell far short of
the protection intended by peremptory challenges. Changes in court practice,
however, eliminated the problem. A good review of the issue is given by
Judge Winter of the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Ricks,'63 in which
convicted drug dealers challenged the use of the struck jury system at their
trial by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Judge
Winter explained:
[A]t common law, the veniremen were summoned by the
sheriff after the parties exercised their strikes against the list.
Experience demonstrated that twenty-four veniremen were
usually necessary to ensure that at least twelve persons ap-
peared .... The rationale for summoning more than the
minimum number required to draw a jury does not exist
today where the veniremen are summoned and are present in
16 151 U.S. 396 (1894) (approving a struck jury system).
162 Id. at 408-09.
163 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1986).
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the courtroom before any exercise of peremptory challeng-
es. MA
Under modern practice, therefore, the struck jury method can satisfy statuto-
ry rights to peremptory challenges. Indeed, the method is widely viewed
from the criminal defendant's vantage point as superior to the traditional
"jury box" method. As the Second Circuit explained in United States v.
Blouin:165
Within the Second Circuit, both the "jury box" and the
"struck jury" methods are used. The goal of the "jury box"
system is to fill the box with twelve acceptable jurors, and
the system is indifferent whether the parties use all their
challenges before acquiescing in a panel, or waive all chal-
lenges and accept the first twelve called. The goal of the
"struck jury" is to whittle down an initially selected group of
normally twenty-eight candidates (twelve jurors plus sixteen
challenges) to twelve survivors, and it therefore builds in a
preference for the parties' exercising all their allotted chal-
lenges. This difference in procedure highlights the different
outlooks of the two systems. The "jury box" system tends to
focus the parties' attention on one member of the venire at a
time, as he or she is seated in the box, and prompts the
parties to ask, "Is this juror acceptable?" The "struck jury"
system, by contrast, emphasizes the overall complexion of
the panel and suggests the very different question, "Which
twelve of these twenty-eight will be most favorable to my
side?"
By permitting full comparative choice among a panel of
twenty-eight prospective jurors, the "struck jury" system lets
the parties make the most effective use of their challenges, in
the sense that through their choices they are able to deter-
mine from the initial panel not only who will not serve but
also who will serve as the petit jury .... The "jury box"
system does not afford the opportunity... of full compara-
tive choice, for the parties do not know ahead of time who
the replacement for a challenged juror will be.1"
'6 id. at 734-35.
165 666 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1981) (footnotes omitted).
166 Id. at 798.
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With this explanation in mind, it will not be surprising to learn that
convicted criminal defendants have raised on appeal the claim that they have
been deprived of the full and effective use of their peremptories when the
struck jury method of empaneling the jury was not used at trial.'67 In the
Blouin case, for example, the court, although admitting that the struck jury
method "affords a more 'effective' opportunity for the use of peremptories
than the 'jury box' system," held that both systems fell within trial court
discretion and that neither was mandatory. 168
Sometimes the challenge on appeal is the opposite-that the use of the
struck jury method somehow deprived a defendant of the full effect of his
peremptories. These challenges also fail. In People v. Miller,69 the Michi-
gan Court of Appeals lost its patience, stating, "We cannot accept the con-
tention that defense counsel could not keep track of the responses of the
prospective jurors. The struck jury method has been used and continues to
be used in other jurisdictions and the attorneys there handle the situa-
tion."' 70 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alaska rejected a defendant's
protest that "the struck jury method is inconsistent with the Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 47(d) because that rule provides for the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges as to jurors in the box, and under the struck jury method
peremptory challenges are exercised before jurors are seated in the box.'' 7.
The courts, however, continue to face new issues about the struck jury
system. In United States v. Ricks,7 2 a divided Fourth-Circuit observed that
"from the historic operation of the struck jury system and from the careful
recitation of facts showing that in each case upholding its validity, the num-
ber of veniremen supplied to counsel did not exceed the number of jurors
actually required plus the authorized number of peremptory challenges" and
held that such a limitation on the size of the panel "is an essential require-
ment of a valid struck jury system."'73 The dissent called this "a new rule
that affects every criminal trial in this circuit"-a rule that prior authority
refuted and that worked against the "fair cross-section of the community"
goal. 74 In operation, at least in the state courts, struck jury panels often
have been qualified that were larger than the number that would be pro-
duced by the Fourth Circuit's formula.
75
167 For representative cases from New Jersey, see State v. Bey, 548 A.2d 887 (N.J.
1988), and State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987).
168 See Blouin, 666 F.2d at 799.
169 276 N.W.2d 558 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 307 N.W.2d 335 (Mich. 1981).
170 Id. at 561.
171 Van Huff v. Sohio Alaska Petroleum Co., 835 P.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Alaska 1992).
172 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1986).
17. Id. at 736-37.
174 Id. at 737-39 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
17' New Jersey cases are again illustrative. See State v. Perry, 590 A.2d 624, 631
(N.J. 1991) (qualifying "approximately fifty-four" jurors); State v. Zola, 548 A.2d 1022,
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The history of the struck jury does not support the viewpoint of either
the majority or the dissent in Ricks. The limitation that the majority articu-
lated cannot be found in "the historic operation of the struck jury.' 76 Even
though, as the dissent stated, "[a] large venire... enhances the likelihood
that the jury will include a fair cross-section of the community,"'" that
goal was never a rationale for the struck jury. The struck jury originated in
civil cases, and it gave the parties some degree of control over jury com-
position that they otherwise would not have had.'78 In doing so, the struck
jury concept was cousin to the "jury of peers" in that it allowed parties
some leeway to pick jurors sympathetic to their lifestyles and circumstances.
At least in theory, the same can be said of peremptoriesY9 Regardless of
whether the number of strikes is limited to the number of peremptories, the
struck jury formula is not complementary to the reasonable cross-section re-
quirement. The struck jury formula is a protection for litigants, while the
cross-section requirement is a device to protect the citizens' right to serve
on juries."'
II. THE SPECIAL JURY COMPRISED OF JURORS WITH SPECIAL
QUALIFICATIONS
It is not radical to hope to fill juries with capable people. Early statutes
explicitly made the point. Statutory requirements customarily called for
jurors to be "well-informed,"'' or "most indifferent" and "best-quali-
fied."' 82 These formulations typically accompanied other general qualifica-
tions such as property ownership. As I have noted, however, the special jury
1028 (N.J. 1988) (qualifying forty-eight potential jurors); State v. Halsey, 526 A.2d
1165, 1171 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987) (qualifying fifty-six potential jurors by the
court before striking began). For an example of a formula that is limited in the way the
Fourth Circuit describes, see the Arizona criminal procedure rule, supra notes 99-101.
176 Ricks, 802 F.2d at 736.
Id. at 739 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
178 Indeed, the opportunities for control became, in the views of some, opportunities
for improper jury packing. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF
PACKING AS APPLIED TO SPECIAL JURIES (Garland Publishing, Inc. 1978) (1821).
179 Some believe that this theoretical justification for peremptories has been mangled
in practice beyond recognition. See HAROLD J. ROTHwAx, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 203-07 (1996). Rothwax is a New York judge and former criminal
defense attorney who observes that criminal defense attorneys attempt to exploit the
jury selection system by seeking "jurors who will not or cannot intelligently evaluate
evidence." Id. at 200-01.
1go See infra text accompanying notes 292-311.
161 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 2 (1874); KAN. COMP. LAwS ch. 54, § 2 (1879).
182 See the Michigan statute, supra note 149, and the Indiana statute, supra note 86.
One Indiana jury commissioner testified that he tried to make sure that jurors had been
"somewhat successful in life." Shack v. State, 288 N.E.2d 155, 161 (Ind. 1972).
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was often thought to be a "blue ribbon," or "high-class," jury, somewhat in.
the tradition of the grand jury."3 This is only one of at least four types of
"special qualification" juries represented in American jury traditions and
practices, each of which is discussed below.
A. The "Blue Ribbon," or "High-Class," Jury
In the United States, the practice of empaneling "gentlemen of the better
rank"' was ordinarily an unwritten custom,8 5 although sometimes a
statute explicitly required it. In one instance, the practice was explicitly tied
to the grand jury.
In New Jersey, the 1797 statute authorizing the struck jury specified that
the sheriff was to select as the struck jury panel the forty-eight persons from
the jury book that he thought were "most impartial and indifferent ... and
best qualified as to talents, knowledge, integrity, firmness and independence
of sentiment, to try the said cause ... ,, 6 Indeed, the 1929 amendment
that dropped these qualifying words was unsuccessfully challenged in court
as unconstitutional.
87
In Georgia, the special jury was expressly linked to the grand jury. From
1796 until 1914, Georgia statutes required special jurors to be taken from
the grand jury list." Grand jurors, in turn, were to be "the persons most
able, discreet and qualified."' 8 9
The struck jury procedures in New York are those that have been most
notoriously associated with jurors "of the better rank."'" The procedures
twice came before the United States Supreme Court in the 1940s-in Fay v.
183 For a description of the grand jury tradition as it existed in England in the seven-
teenth century, see Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 162-64.
"u See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
"8 The Tennessee Code of 1843-44 authorized the circuit courts in any civil case, on
motion of either party, to empanel a special jury. In construing this statute, the Tennes-
see Supreme Court explained that this section "contemplates the selection of men with
reference to their superior competency and fitness to try and determine the particular
issues involved in the case." Jackson v. Pool, 91 Tenn. 447, 453 (1892). Interestingly,
the court added that the special jurors were not to be selected with reference to their
relationship to the parties in nationality or color and that it was error for the trial court
to select one-half of the jury from among colored persons upon the motion of a colored
party litigant, solely because they were colored. Id.; see also Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313 (1880). For a discussion of this case, see infra note 279.
186 Act of Nov. 10, 1797, § 15 (relating to juries and verdicts).
187 See State v. Donato, 148 A. 776, 780 (N.J. Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
188 See Judiciary Act § 35 (1796). In 1914, the statute was amended to allow special
jurors to be selected from either the grand or traverse jury, at the discretion of the
judge. See GA. CODE ANN. art. 8, § 852 (Park 1914).
189 Judiciary Act § 28 (1796).
190 See Oldham, Origins, supra note 17.
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New York 9' and Moore v. New York.'92 Both times the Court barely up-
held the special jury statutes by a five-to-four vote, over strongly worded
dissents by Mr. Justice Murphy. In Fay, Justice Jackson, writing for the
majority, explained: "Special jurors are selected from those accepted for the
general panel by the county clerk, but only after each has been subpoenaed
for personal appearance and has testified under oath as to his qualification
and fitness."'93 Justice Jackson reviewed the prior unsuccessful attacks on
the New York special jury because of its restrictive composition, after which
he turned to the proof presented in the case before the Court. Tabulations
and studies of New York jury questionnaires claimed to show that laborers,
operatives, craftsmen, foremen, service employees, and women were sys-
tematically excluded from the special jury panel. The Court was not con-
vinced that the statistics proved "that the jury percentages are the result of
discrimination,"'94 stating that "petitioners adduced no evidence whatever
that the occupational composition of the general panel is substantially differ-
ent from that of the special"' 95 and that women had an absolute exemption
from jury service should they wish to exercise it, which apparently they
often did.'96 Dissenting Justice Murphy, anticipating later developments,
thought that the "blue ribbon" jury "denies the defendant his constitutional
right to be tried by a jury fairly drawn from a cross-section of the
community."'97 Justice Murphy admitted that "[t]here is no constitutional
right to a jury drawn from a group of uneducated and unintelligent persons"
or "chosen solely from those at the lower end of the economic and social
scale,"' 98 but he observed that the jury "is a democratic institution, repre-
sentative of all qualified classes of people," so that the jury lists had to
include persons "with varying degrees of training and intelligence and with
varying economic and social positions."'' He continued the argument in
the Moore case, characterizing the New York special jury panels as "com-
pletely at war with the democratic theory of our jury system, a theory for-
mulated out of the experience of generations.""
332 U.S. 261 (1947).
192 333 U.S. 565 (1948).
193 332 U.S. at 267 (citing N.Y. Judiciary Law § 749 (McKinney 1946)).
'94 Id. at 276.
'9 Id. at 276-77.
16 See id.
197 Id. at 298.
198 Id. at 299.
'9 Id. at 299-300.
2 0 333 U.S. at 570. Other challenges to the New York special jury statute on
grounds similar to those presented in Fay and Moore cases were rejected by the Second
Circuit. See United States ex rel. Torres v. Mancusi, 427 F.2d 168 (2d Cir. 1970). The
juries in these cases were empaneled before the repeal of the New York blue ribbon
jury statute in 1965. The argument in Mancusi was interesting; the defendant claimed
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The repeal of the New York blue ribbon jury statute in 1965 ended the
chapter in United States history that expressly permitted the formation of
trial juries from special lists of persons in the upper echelons of society. It
is not surprising that this chapter happened or that it is now closed; never-
theless, the idea of special juries of experts persists. Because experts typical-
ly are highly educated, most of them fall within the upper end of the socio-
economic spectrum. It is usually less objectionable, however, to think of
selecting special jurors from this segment of society when those jurors are
chosen for their expertise, rather than solely because of their social standing.
B. The Jury of Experts
The notion of bringing experts into dispute settlement processes makes
good common sense and has an extensive history. Perhaps the best known
example is the use of experts as arbitrators. The idea of expert decision
makers is also at the heart of the extensive network of quasi-adjudicatory
administrative agencies that have flourished since New Deal days. Another
example is the formation of specialty courts, such as a commercial court2 1
or the United States Court of Patent Appeals.2 2 Neither the private arbitra-
tor nor the administrative judge, however, need worry about submitting
questions of fact to a jury. Specialty courts must do so, continuing to recog-
nize the preserved right to jury trial embodied in the Seventh Amendment,
comparable state constitutional provisions, and statutes.,
The courts have responded to some extent to the robust debate in legal
literature about the constitutionality of dispensing with the jury in complex
civil litigation.2 3 By and large, the argument that a "complexity excep-
tion" can be carved out of the Seventh Amendment has not succeeded.23'
that the jury had a large number of educated and well-to-do people on it and "was less
well equipped than a general jury would have been to pass judgment upon his offense,
which he represents was a crime of passion committed by a man of underprivileged
background, frail in health, of low intelligence, and who had been working at poorly
paid menial jobs." Id. at 169.
20" Louisiana, for example, once formed a commercial court. See infra note 218.
202 Patent appeals are now part of the responsibilities of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
o See Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 138 n.5; M.S. Arnold, A Historical Inqui-
ry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829
(1980).
204 That the issue remains alive, however, is shown in the patent case of Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), afftd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
The Federal Circuit decided that in a patent infringement action, questions of patent
claim construction and interpretation were exclusively questions of law for the court and
that neither the Seventh Amendment nor precedent required these questions to go before
a jury. See id. The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, affirmed.
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One alternative, as earlier noted,2 5 is to revive and expand the use of the
special jury and to utilize jurors equipped by education or training to under-
stand the complex issues in dispute. This idea is currently on the statute
books in Delaware. Before discussing Delaware's statutory provisions, how-
ever, I will lay out the historical use of special juries of experts.
The most common historical example, following the English experience,
is the use of the "merchant jury" for commercial cases. There was such a
chapter in New York law, as earlier explained.' South Carolina and Loui-
siana also utilized the "merchant jury."
In addition to discussing New York's use of the "merchant jury," Mor-
ton Horwitz summarized the South Carolina history in The Transformation
of American Law 1780-1860.' According to. Horwitz, "[e]ven more than
in New York, merchant juries seem to have exerted a powerful influence
over the course of development of post-revolutionary South Carolina com-
mercial law."2' He gives several examples of the power of merchant ju-
ries during the 1780s and early 1790s (their heyday in South Carolina)
authorized by a colonial statute of 17 6 9 ' and allowed on the court's own
See Markman, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). In the Federal Circuit opinion, Judge Mayer, con-
curring in the judgment for different reasons, protested that the majority opinion marked
a bizarre "sea change in the course of patent law" that was "of a piece with a broader
bid afoot to essentially banish juries from patent cases altogether." Markman, 52 F.3d at
989 (Mayer, J., concurring). He characterized the majority decision as threatening "to
do indirectly what we have declined to do directly, that is, create a 'complexity
exception' to the Seventh Amendment for patent cases." Id. at 989, 993. In the Supreme
Court opinion, Justice Souter, after disposing of the constitutional issue, observed that
complicated patent issues can be handled better by judges than by juries. See Markman,
517 U.S. at 388. Nevertheless, applying the historical test for the scope of the Seventh
Amendment jury trial guarantee, the Court concluded that a jury would not have decid-
ed the patent claim issue in England in 1791. See id. at 379-80. In my view, the Court's
conclusion was incorrect, but that is a topic for another day.
2 See supra note 21.
See supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text. One twentieth-century example
cited by Judge Martuscello in Schuster v. City of New York, 205 N.Y.S.2d 190 (Sup. Ct.
1960), was the case of Industrial & Gen. Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, 46 Misc. 492 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1905). The case involved valuation of railroad bonds, and the trial court granted a
motion for a special jury on the ground that the issue should be determined by a jury
"of intelligence and of practical business experience ... the best which any established
method of selection may secure." Id. at 493. Indeed, the court stated that "each juror
should have much of the capacity for financial analysis which a successful reorganizer
of railroad properties may be deemed to possess." Id. at 494.
201 MORTON J. HORWiTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860
(1977).
208 Id. at 158.
' See id. The statute allowed special juries, on consent of both parties or motion of
one willing to pay the cost, in cases involving much money or "concerning trade, and
disputes with merchants." Id.
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motion by an Act of 1791.21°
The Library of Congress holds a privately printed volume containing
South Carolina jury lists from 1778 to 1779.211 These were copied from
original handwritten lists in the South Carolina archives and are broken
down by judicial districts, as shown on explanatory maps. Three categories
are tracked-grand jurors, petit jurors, and special jurors. Special jurors
comprised thirty-eight percent of the total number of jurors in Charleston,
whereas in other districts the percentages ranged from two percent to eight
percent. Clearly the use of special juries of merchants in the commercial
center of South Carolina was well-established by the time of American
independence, and probably earlier. As Horwitz has pointed out, however,
parties began to use special juries as a delay tactic, and in 1797, South
Carolina passed a statute that limited special juries to cases in which both
parties consented."' Thereafter the special jury trail goes cold. Presumably
the use gradually died out.
213
Louisiana is another jurisdiction with a history of actively using mer-
chant juries. In 1807, Louisiana passed a statute that proved to be unique in
United States history by allowing the trial judge to appoint special jurors
who had expertise relevant to the litigated dispute. The statute provided:
In all cases when the judges shall be of opinion that the
matters to be submitted to the decision of a jury, are of such
a nature as to require certain information peculiar to certain
occupations or professions, then and in that case the judges
are empowered, at the request of either party, to direct to be
summoned a sufficient number of jurors; being of the occu-
pation, profession or trade, an acquaintance with which is
more particularly necessary for the decision of the cause. 4
210 Act of Dec. 1791, No. 1526 (altering and amending the South Carolina law re-
specting juries of 1769 and instituting additional regulations to the Acts for establishing
and regulating the circuit courts).
211 GELEE CORLEY HENDRIX & MORN McCoY LINDSAY, THE JURY LISTS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 1778-1779 (privately printed n.d.).
212 See HORWITZ, supra note 207, at 159; Act of Dec. 1797, No. 1665 (abolishing the
right of trial by special jury, except by consent of both parties).
213 See HORWTZ, supra note 207, at 159. As Horwitz has pointed out, standard print-
ed sources show no special juries in use after 1796, but they likely were used with the
consent of both parties in cases with no printed record or in cases that were reported
but in which there was no occasion for the reporter to note the fact that the jury was
special. See THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 257 (New York, T. & J.
Swords 1810) (describing how the special jury lists in Charleston and other districts are
to be fashioned, even though the description that had been in the 1788 edition (at page
291) of the empaneling of special juries pursuant to the 1769 statute no longer appears).
214 Act of 1807, ch.23 (authorizing a special jury in certain cases).
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The experience in Louisiana with this statute (which was repealed in 1823
and reinstated in 1831) is described by Richard Kilbourne in Louisiana
Commercial Law.215 According to Kilbourne, the statute, after its revival in
1831, "remained viable during the antebellum period and even appears in
John Ray's Digest of 1870. ''216 He attributes this longevity to facts pecu-
liar to New Orleans-its civil law tradition, the dependence of its economy
on international trade, and the concomitant traffic in commercial paper.1 7
His own examination of juries summoned during the first three years of the
Commercial Court,"' from 1839 to 1842, showed a large percentage of
merchants even when the juries were not special. This abundance of mer-
chants was due primarily to the fact that often merchants were the only men
who met the qualifications for regular jury service.219
After the Commercial Court was eliminated in 1846, the preeminence of
merchants on juries, both special and ordinary, undoubtedly dwindled.
For several decades, however, the experience with merchant juries in New
Orleans represented the closest approximation in the United States to Lord
Mansfield's use of merchant juries to incorporate mercantile practices into
the common law.22' Kilbourne names many of the prominent commission
merchants, brokers, bankers, directors of insurance companies, and directors
of the chamber of commerce who served as jurors.2 22 Moreover, he notes
that "[p]ermitting juries of merchants ... to generate their own laws with a
stamp of approval on trade practices had important economic repercus-
sions.,2
23
Delaware also has a rich history of special jury use. As earlier ex-
plained, the Delaware statute passed in 1987 allows a special jury to be
ordered "upon the application of any party in a complex civil case. ' '2' The
Delaware Superior Court upheld the constitutionality of special juries in In
re Asbestos Litigation.22 The court concluded that "qualifications of jurors
and the exercise of peremptory challenges, which are the distinguishing
21 R. KILBOURNE, LOUISIANA COMMERCIAL LAW: THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD 101-05
(1980).
216 Id. at 101.
217 See id. at 102.
218 This court lasted in New Orleans from 1839 to 1846. See id. at 85.
219 See id. at 102-03.
See id. at 102-03, 106-07.
22 See id. at 26-28, 102-05; see also supra note 16.
See id. at 103-04.
223 Id. at 102-04.
22A DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4506 (1987).
2 551 A.2d 1296 (Del. Super. Ct. 1988). In reaching its conclusions, the superior
court leaned on the 1982 decision of the Delaware Supreme Court that upheld the con-
stitutionality of the special jury statute then in effect. See id. at 1298 (citing Haas v.
United Techs. Corp., 450 A.2d 1173 (Del. 1982)).
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characteristics of the special jury procedure, are not constitutionally protect-
ed."226 The statutory change in 1987 that converted the Delaware special
jury from a matter of right to a matter of court discretion was legiti-
mate.227
In reaching this conclusion, the Delaware court briefly reviewed the
English special jury background, including Blackstone's reference to "causes
of too great nicety for discussion of ordinary freeholders .... "' The
court also noted that "[t]he use of special jurors who had particular knowl-
edge or experience in the subject of the trial had been customary in England
from early times."229 At various stages in Delaware, jurors were required
to be "the most discreet and judicious freeholders," "sober and judicious
persons of fair characters," and "qualified to vote at the general elec-
tion., 23" No special statutory requirements differentiated special jurors
from common jurors in England." In Delaware, they were to come from
the general jury lists and were to be (initially) the "most indifferent" and
"best qualified" or (later) "indifferent and judicious citizens. 232
Presumably the Delaware legislature, in making the 1987 change in the
special jury law, intended both to make the special jury more exceptional by
making it discretionary, and to respond to the perceived problem of relying
on ordinary juries in complex civil cases. No guidance, however, was given
about what constitutes a complex civil case, or for that matter, about how
special jurors are to be selected whenever a special jury is ordered in such a
case.
The several reported cases that have used special juries or that have
responded to motions for special juries under the new law show that the
new law may lead more to confusion than clarity. A growing distaste for the
special jury option among superior court judges may be discernible. In four
Delaware cases, the court denied motions for special juries, all on the
ground that the cases before the court were insufficiently complex. One of
these cases, Amoroso v. Joy Manufacturing Co.,23' was a product liability
case involving a heavy air compressor, and the court, reasonably enough,
saw no complex issues. Less straightforward was a series of asbestos cases
in which special jury motions were denied,2 despite the fact that in a pre-
226 Id. at 1297.
See id. at 1297, 1300.
See id. at 1297; see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
229 Id. at 1298.
230 Id.
231 See id.; see also supra notes 26 and 33 and accompanying text.
232 In re Asbestos Litigation, 551 A.2d at 1298. The latter requirement ended when
the special jury law in Delaware changed in 1987. See id.; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4506 (1987).
23 No. C.A. 86C-MY-189, 1987 WL 26911 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 4, 1987).
' See Bradley v. A. C. & S. Co., Inc., Nos. 84C-MY-145, 85C-FE-10, 1989 WL
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vious trial the jury had been called upon to render its verdict by answering
thirty-six pages of interrogatories and that one scheduled case might require
jury answers to interrogatories from fifteen or more defendants. The court
pointed out that many of the answers would be the same as to the various
defendants, and prior verdicts in other cases "demonstrated that the issues
which are presented in these cases are well within the comprehension and
capabilities of jurors who come from the ordinary panels of jurors. 2 35 The
court explained its meticulous habits to assist ordinary juries, pointing out as
well that "[m]ost areas of science can be described in such a way that they
can be understood by people of ordinary intelligence, education and experi-
ence," for example, "by avoiding overly technical words and expressions
(particularly of Latin origin) and using less erudite verbiage." '236 Respond-
ing to defendants' reliance on an article entitled The Case for Special Juries
in Toxic Tort Litigation,237 in which the author argues for special juries
formed by a system of specific education and experience standards, the
court wrote:
The use of jurors who have expertise which relates to the
case also presents problems. One is that many cases involve
more than one area of expertise. Another is that in many
specialties, experts do not subscribe to a single philosophy or
approach, and therefore, the decision could be slanted toward
one predetermined philosophy or another and not dependant
upon the evidence presented at trial. The use of experts as
jurors could well produce a more prejudiced system of jus-
tice than does the traditional jury system.2 '8
The court also observed that the proposed scheme would represent a method
of selection that is "contrary to fundamental principles of jury trial" and
"inconsistent with established principles of justice," requiring "statutory and
perhaps constitutional modification." '239
Yet another motion for a special jury was denied in Noramco (Dela-
ware), Inc. v. Carew Associates, Inc.24 The court was not impressed by
the argument that the construction dispute estimated to occupy a two-week
70834 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 1989).
211 Id. at *1.
236 Id. at *3.
" Dan Drazan, The Case for Special Juries in Toxic Tort Litigation, 72 JUDICATURE
292 (1989).
238 Bradley, 1989 WL 70834, at *3.
I d. One prior statutory authorization in the United States came close to the pro-
posed scheme-the 1807 Louisiana statute. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
240 No. C.A. 85C-MY-54, 1990 WL 199509 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990).
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trial would involve the proverbial "battle of the experts." 241 The court not-
ed that "[t]he better experts have learned to be able to speak understandably
to lay people," adding, "That the expertise may be complex does not neces-
sarily mean that the case is a 'complex civil case.' 242
When a special jury is granted, a new question occurs-one that seems
obvious in retrospect, but that may not have been anticipated. A question
arises regarding whether the standards for the admissibility of expert testi-
mony require upward adjustment because of the supposed greater capabili-
ties of the special jurors. This question came before the Delaware Superior
Court in Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co.,243 a libel case presenting
an "actual malice" issue. The plaintiff proposed that a Pulitzer Prize-winning
journalist, professor, and author testify about journalistic standards.2" Dow
Jones filed a motion in opposition, arguing, among other things, that the tes-
timony should be rejected because "the subject of the testimony is within
the comprehension of the average special juror in this case." 245 The Dela-
ware Superior Court acknowledged the test set forth by the Delaware Su-
preme Court:
Knowledge is specialized only when not possessed by the
average trier of fact who lacks the expert's skill, training or
education. Consequently, expert testimony impermissibly
invades the province of the jury if it embraces matters in
which the jury is just as competent as the expert to consider
and weigh the evidence and draw the necessary conclu-
sions.2
Despite case authority from other jurisdictions holding that journalism stan-
dards were well within the reach of ordinary jurors, the court was "not
persuaded that members of a special jury are sufficiently knowledgeable of
the standards and practices of investigative journalism so as to render expert
testimony on the subject useless."247
The future of the 1987 Delaware special jury statute remains uncertain.
In addition to the cases discussed above, a recent product liability case
241 Id. at *1.
242 Id. The court also wondered why the parties had not followed a common path in
the case by seeking expertise through arbitration, adding that "[t]he application for a
special jury here may result in having 'expertise' the parties did not freely contract for."
Id.
243 No. C.A. 83C-AU-56, 1987 WL 28311 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1987).
244 See id. at * 1.
245 Id.
246 Id. (quoting Wheat v. State, 527 A.2d 269 (Del. 1987)).
247 Id.
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against General Motors also used the special jury. 48 The Delaware Siperi-
or Court, in Ramada Inns, published by slip opinion the following method
agreed upon with counsel for the selection of the special jury:
1. The parties shall submit to the Court a list of witnesses
likely to be called at trial ... for the Prothonotary's use in
furnishing notice to jurors.
2. The Prothonotary shall promptly identify potential special
jurors and shall send the appropriate special jury question-
naire to those persons identified.
3. After receiving the responses to the juror questionnaires,
the Prothonotary shall select one hundred persons who are
qualified as special jurors ....
4.... [T]he Prothonotary shall provide the Court and coun-
sel with (a) a list of the names of the special jurors selected
and (b) a copy of the responses by those individuals to the
special jury questionnaire.
5 .... [T]he parties shall file any written challenges for
cause on the ground that individual jurors selected by the
Prothonotary do not qualify as special jurors. Any party
objecting to such a challenge shall not file a written response
but shall reserve his objections until the hearing conducted
by the Court or until the prearranged teleconference.
6. The Court shall conduct a hearing in the Court or over the
telephone .... At that time the Court will consider the
written challenges and any oral opposition to those challeng-
es. The Court will rule on each challenge at that hearing.
7. The parties will have the right to exercise peremptory
challenges at a date to be determined during the pretrial
conference .... Each side may exercise up to, and includ-
ing, six peremptory challenges.
8. After the exercise of the peremptory challenges the
Prothonotary shall promptly summon the remaining jurors to
appear at the first day of trial ....
9. The jury and alternates in this case shall be selected from
the remaining array in the same manner as juries are selected
in non-special jury cases.4 9
M See McLain v. General Motors Corp., 569 A.2d 579 (Del. 1990).
Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., No. C.A. 83C-AU-56, 1987 WL 28311
(Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1987).
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C. Juries for Property Condemnation and Diking District Assessment
Disputes
1. Next Neighbors
In this discussion of special qualifications for special jurors, I have
considered both the "blue ribbon" jury and the jury of experts. I now turn
briefly to two features of the larger history of the jury. The first is the origi-
nal notion that jurors were to be "next neighbors" who ought to be in a
position to know something about the dispute and the parties, instead of
being disinterested strangers requiring proof of facts. The theory was that by
being "next neighbors," the jurors would be able to get to the bottom of the
dispute effectively. 2"
There is one species of jury statute that survives to the present that still
retains the flavor of this ancient notion-statutes that require juries to decide
valuation disputes caused by property condemnations effected through emi-
nent domain for public works (usually highways) or resulting from diking
district assessments. The West Virginia statute requires the jurors to be "qu-
alified freeholders" in the county where the property in dispute is locat-
ed."5 These are the only civil juries in that state still requiring twelve
members, determined by the parties' alternate strikes of four each from a
panel of twenty freeholders. 52 The language of the Washington state stat-
ute allows the court to "call a special jury ... and direct that a jury panel
be selected and summoned ... from the citizens of the county in which the
lands ... sought to be appropriated are situated, as many qualified persons
2 253as may be necessary in order to form a jury of twelve persons ....
Colorado has codified an interesting variation, circling back to the spe-
cial jury with expertise, for juries in drainage district assessments. To re-
solve a disputed assessment, the statute provides that the district court shall
"cause to be summoned six landowners living outside of the drainage dis-
trict, who are not interested in any lands or work in said district, or of kin
to any of the parties interested," and "[t]he six landowners shall be men
who have some knowledge of the costs and benefits of farm drainage. 254
250 See Oldham, Origins, supra note 17, at 173.
25' W. VA. CODE § 56-6-13(b) (1997).
252 See id.
2" WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 8.04.080 (West 1992). The parties to such a dispute in
Washington can consent to a jury of less than twelve, but no smaller than three. See id.;
see also id. § 85.06.120 (West 1995) (setting forth procedures for juries to resolve
disputes about diking district assessments).
254 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-23-104 (1997). The continued statutory reference to
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2. Juries De Medietate Linguae
The second feature of the broader history of the jury previously men-
tioned is the "half-and-half' jury and its kinship to recent arguments calling
for racial quotas for juries in racially charged cases. 5 The "half-and-half'
jury-the jury de medietate linguae-was part of the early jurisprudence of
several states."6 This type of jury required that jurors have the special
qualification of being foreigners. Judge Henry Toulmin's rationale bears
repeating:
The fundamental principle of this institution [trial by jury] is,
that a man should be tried by his peers or equals, a common-
er by commoners and a nobleman by nobles; and so liberal
was the extension of this principle even in the 14th century,
that by the 28th of Edward III, ch. 13, it was provided, that
in inquests to be taken between aliens and English subjects,
one half of the jury should consist of aliens, and the other
half of English subjects. We have a similar provision in our
,,257Own statutes ....
Often, however, a practical difficulty arose-that of finding six foreign-
ers from the defendant's own country. The solution was for the empaneling
officer to try his best to find jurors from the defendant's own country, but to
resort to any foreigners, as necessary. According to an 1803 New York
practice book:
Juries and inquests between aliens and citizens of the United
States . . . , the one half shall be citizens of this
state, ... and the other half aliens, if so many there be in
the city or county where such jury or inquest is to be taken,
and who shall be indifferent between the parties; and if there
be not so many aliens or strangers, then as many as shall be
found .... ,,258
"men" is obviously obsolete.
" See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
256 See KY. REV. STAT. ch. 55, art. III, § 5 (1852); Statute of Oct. 1788, § 44, re-
printed in XII W.W. HENING, LAWS OF VIRGINIA 746 (1823); Respublica v. Mesca, 1
Dall. 73 (Phila. Oyer & Terminer Sept. Sess. 1783).
27 H. TOULMIN, THE MAGISTRATE'S ASSISTANT 140 (Natchez, Samuel Terrell 1807);
see supra text accompanying note 7.
218 A NEW CONDUCrOR GENERALIS 257 (Albany, D. & S. Whiting 1803).
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In contrast, an 1810 South Carolina Justice of the Peace manual stated that
the sheriffs in a trial of an alien were to "summon 18 subjects of the nation
of such alien, if they may be had, or the subjects of any other nation (except
subjects of Great Britain during the war) .. .
It is doubtful that today's calls for racial quotas for juries in racially
charged cases-the modem counterpart to the jury de medietate-will be
enacted into law. Interestingly, however, the concept was officially recom-
mended in England. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice issued its
Report in July 1993, paragraph 62 of which reads as follows:
We are reluctant to interfere with the principle of random
selection of juries. We are, however, anxious that everything
possible should be done to ensure that people from the eth-
nic minority communities are represented on juries in rela-
tion to their numbers in the local community. The pool from
which juries are randomly selected would be more repre-
sentative if all eligible members of ethnic communities were
included on the electoral roll. Even if this were to be
achieved, however, there would statistically still be instances
where there would not be a multi-racial jury in a case where
one seemed appropriate. The Court of Appeal in Ford held
that race should not be taken into account in selecting juries.
Although we agree with the court's position in regard to
most cases, we believe that there are some exceptional cases
where race should be taken into account.'
Almost uniformly, case law and secondary literature in England prior to the
Royal Commission's Report opposed the idea of racial quotas.26' In the
Ford case referred to by the Commission, the Court of Appeal ruled that "in
the absence of evidence of specific bias, ethnic origins could not found a
259 SOUTH CAROLINA JUSTICE OF THE PEACE 252 (New York, T.& J. Swords 1810).
The passage in the 1810 edition is the same as that in the 1788 edition at page 288
(Philadelphia, R. Aitken & Son).
260 THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REPORT 133 (London, HMSO
1993) (footnote omitted).
261 See R. v. McCalla, 1986 CRiM. L. REV. 335 (Stoke-on-Trent Crown Ct. 1985); R.
v. Bansal, Bir, Mahio and Singh, 1985 CRIM. L. REV. 151 (Maidstone Crown Ct. 1984);
R. v. Danvers, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 680 (Nottingham Crown Ct. 1982); A. Dashwood,
Juries in a Multi-Racial Society, 1972 CRIM. L. REV. 85. In one case in 1981, a judge
on the Bristol Crown Court ruled that, notwithstanding the apparently preclusive word-
ing of the Juries Act 1974, he had discretion to manipulate jury selection to achieve
racial balance when it appeared that this would not be achieved through the use of pe-
remptory challenges. See R. v. Binns, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 522 (Bristol Crown Ct.
1981).
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valid ground for challenge to an individual juror," and that a judge does not
have discretion to remove a potential juror solely on that ground, not even
in the interest of achieving racial balance on the jury.262 In a 1995 speech
to the Leeds Race Issues Advisory Council, the Lord Chief Justice of Eng-
land stated his opposition to the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice
proposal, calling it "the thin end of a particularly insidious wedge."263 He
viewed the proposal as a dangerous departure from the time-honored prac-
tice of random selection of jurors. In the Lord Chief Justice's opinion, mem-
bers of the jury should not be regarded "as representing the views of the
community, or of discrete parts of it, nor indeed of 'representing' either the
complainant or the defendant."'
III. THE SPECIAL JURY, THE "REASONABLE CROSS-SECTION"
REQUIREMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES
Jeffrey Abramson has observed that "[t]he cross-sectional jury is so
familiar to us today that we forget how modern is its triumph."6 5 He cata-
logues the march of the idea, from infancy in the 1960s, to the Jury Selec-
tion and Service Act of 1968, to the Supreme Court's 1975 decision in
Taylor v. Louisiana,26 which raised the concept to constitutional stature
under the Sixth Amendment.267 Abramson gives this summary appraisal:
"To say, as the Supreme Court did in its landmark 1975 decision, that only
'representative' juries are 'impartial' juries is to suggest a new way of think-
ing about how to make jurors capable of impartial justice-a way that
stands the classical view of impartiality on its head.""26
Abramson's appraisal is correct. The fundamental change in opinion that
occurred regarding the selection of juries was a shift away from rules that
promote fairness to the parties to a lawsuit, especially defendants in criminal
cases, to rules that are perceived as promoting fairness to society at large
and its democratic traditions. The classical model was shaped to produce
unbiased jurors who could decide cases unencumbered by any personal
agendas. Occasionally-as in the "half-and-half' jury-this was leavened by
a desire to be as fair as possible to a defendant, by having some jurors
equipped to understand and empathize with the defendant's cultural and
262 Regina v. Ford, 1 Q.B. 868, 873 (C.A. 1989); see also Dashwood, supra note
261, at 828.
263 Frances Gibb, Lord Chief Justice Rejects Jury Race Quota as Insidious, TIMES OF
LONDON, July 1, 1995 (quoting the Lord Chief Justice Taylor).
264 Id.
265 ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 99.
26 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
267 See ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 99-125.
268 Id. at 100.
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linguistic background. The new model jettisoned this idealism, adopting a
brand of realism that frankly acknowledged the existence of sharp ethnic,
gender, and racial divisions in society. The best way to account for these
divisions in jury composition is to ensure that all clearly identifiable, "cog-
nizable" groups are fairly represented in the jury pools. This way, in the
aggregate, the biased votes by jurors of the various interest groups eventual-
ly will cancel each other out.269
The next logical development dealt with peremptory challenges. If we
insist on a fair cross section of the community in the jury lists that generate
jury panels, surely it is wrong to allow a party to tamper with the chance
that various cognizable groups will find representation on particular juries.
Thus it is wrong to allow the exercise of peremptory challenges solely to
eliminate blacks, other racial or ethnic groups, or women. A series of Su-
preme Court decisions established this proposition in the 1980s and 1990s:
Batson v. Kentucky270 (disallowing peremptories based solely on race);
Powers v. Ohio27 (holding that Batson applies regardless of whether jurors
eliminated are of the same race as the defendant); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.272 (holding that Batson applies to civil cases as well as crim-
inal); Georgia v. McCollum273 (holding that Batson applies to defense
counsel as well as to the prosecution); and J.E.B. v. Alabama74 (holding
that the Batson principle precludes using peremptories to eliminate jurors
solely because of their sex). Unsurprisingly, Batson led to a call for the
elimination of peremptories altogether, on the theory that they are incon-
sistent with the cross-section idea.275 A closely divided Supreme Court,
however, refused to eliminate peremptories completely in Holland v. Illi-
nois,"' reasoning (in the majority opinion by Justice Scalia) that the con-
stitutional principle at work seeks jury impartiality, not cross-section
representativeness on specific juries. Abramson is nevertheless correct in
concluding that "the present position of American law on peremptory chal-
lenges is incoherent." '277 He adds that "[h]aving taken the first step of pro-
269 See id. at 100-01.
270 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
271 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
272 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
273 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
274 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
" See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103-08; Rodger L. Hochman, Note, Abolishing the Pe-
remptory Challenge: The Verdict of Emerging Caselaw, 17 NOVA L. REV. 1367 (1993);
Jeffery S. Jubera, Note, The Peremptory Challenge at the Federal Level and in Mary-
land: Its Uncertain Future After Georgia v. McCollum, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 225
(1993); Edward P. Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, The Challenge of Peremptory
Challenges, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 325 (1996).
276 493 U.S. 474 (1990).
277 ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 139.
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hibiting race and sex as grounds for peremptory challenges, the Supreme
Court has little logical choice but to take the second and decisive step of
banning all uses of peremptory challenges that target specific groups for
exclusion from the jury."'27
Regardless of whether the current position of American law on peremp-
tory challenges is incoherent, one should ask what the implications of the
new law are for whatever life may be left of the special jury. If the Supreme
Court were to adopt a quota of a specified number of black jurors in a ra-
cially charged case, a new special jury would exist because at least some of
the jurors would be required to have special qualifications. This is not likely
to happen; the idea is out of fashion with the political temper of the times
and is incompatible with the cross-section concept. 279
Short of the racial quota notion, what are the implications of the new
jury rules for the special jury? Clearly the restrictions preventing the dis-
criminatory use of peremptories apply to the "struck jury" method of jury
selection and to the "jury box" method.' 0 It may be easier, however, to
camouflage discrimination with the struck jury model because the demo-
graphics of the entire panel will be known from the start, making it easier to
pick and choose. A party hoping to eliminate women from a jury may avoid
a charge of intentional sex discrimination by merely eliminating most of the
women, allowing one or two who seem least objectionable to stand.
Alternatively, the opportunity to discriminate, provided by advance
knowledge of the entire panel, could supply real meaning to the "jury of
peers" idea. By strategic striking, it often may be possible for a criminal
27 Id. In Willis v. Zant, 720 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir. 1983), the court noted:
Although the distinctiveness of a group for sixth amendment purposes is a ques-
tion of fact, . . . [c]ertainly, a court can determine as a matter of law that a group
is not cognizable or distinct. For example, no evidentiary hearing would be need-
ed to determine that redheads or vegetarians are not distinctive classes within the
sixth amendment fair cross-section analysis." Id. at 1217.
Despite the assurance of the Eleventh Circuit, the lines are ever moving. For example,
one can imagine a future argument, in litigation involving animal rights protests, that
vegetarians should represent a cognizable class.
279 The Supreme Court considered and rejected the quota idea in 1879 in Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). As Abramson has explained, "the defendants moved prior
to their trial to have the panel of available jurors modified so that it would-be one-third
black," a motion "premised on the existence of an affirmative right to have blacks actu-
ally included on the jury (that is, to have blacks represented in rough proportion to their
population in the county)." ABRAMSON, supra note 1, at 106. Thus, "the Virginia
defendants' motion ... was a claim that society was so cleaved along racial lines that
the jury had to be also." Id. Although the Supreme Court rejected this notion in 1879,
the idea is not far from the customary rationale given for the cross-section requirement.
See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
2.0 See, e.g., Lemley v. State, 599 So.2d 64 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied,
1992 LEXIS 817 (Ala. June 12, 1992).
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defendant to have some jurors from his own race or socio-economic circum-
stances. This possibility falls short of the "affirmative peremptories" argued
for by one writer,"1 but it moves in the same direction.
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Ricks28 2 presents another open
question. 3 District courts within that circuit now must tailor their struck
jury method so that the panel is no larger than the number of trial jurors
required plus the total applicable number of peremptory challenges.' It is
unclear whether federal courts in other circuits, or state courts, will adopt
this limitation.
Because the cross-section idea pertains to both civil and criminal cases,
as do the new rules on peremptory challenges, new questions arise regarding
the use of special juries comprised of jurors with special qualifications.
Despite an extensive history in the United States, this practice occurs only
in Delaware and in the few states with statutes prescribing special qualifica-
tions for jury service in real estate condemnation or drainage district dis-
putes. The number of juries convened for condemnation or drainage district
disputes is undoubtedly quite small, and it is unlikely that a serious chal-
lenge to those statutes will arise. Were such a challenge to occur, however,
the circumstances should be sufficient to justify an exception to the cross-
section concept. Sustaining, for example, the Colorado statute calling for six
jurors who "have some knowledge of the costs and benefits of farm drain-
age"'" would have the effect of excluding large segments of the commu-
nity from jury service in drainage district disputes, but this outcome should
not be viewed as evil or impermissible. The cross-section requirement and
the limitations on peremptories need not blot out the view of the two-plus
centuries of American jury tradition. That history was built upon fairness to
parties in litigation, a perspective that should not be lost. It would be sense-
less to return to the elitist days of blue ribbon juries and prescriptive dis-
qualifications from jury service. The reasonable cross-section concept is now
rightfully prevalent and strong. It is strong enough not to be shaken by
exceptional jury composition procedures when special circumstances justify
them.
The Delaware special jury statute, as implemented in the Ramada Inns
case, is again illustrative.' In Ramada Inns, the special jury was assem-
bled through the use of questionnaires designed to produce a panel that
could handle a complex civil case. Can such a special jury be valid? The
answer should be yes. What is prohibited is intentional discrimination,
281 See Ramirez, supra note 11.
282 802 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1986).
283 See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
24 See Ricks, 802 F.2d at 736-37.
2s See supra text accompanying note 254.
" See supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
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which a selection process that used neutral criteria shaped by the needs of
the case would not demonstrate. This is true even if the criteria could be
shown to have a disparate impact on "cognizable classes" entitled to be
proportionately represented on the jury rolls. This practice parallels the
realm of employment, where specific business needs justify neutral selection
criteria in hiring and promotion despite disparate impact on classes protected
by the Civil Rights Act of 1964.287
The Delaware practice in Ramada Inns calls on the parties to stipulate
under court supervision to a procedure to produce the special jury panel and
to select the trial jury. The superior court does not seem to have responded
to the advice that the Delaware Supreme Court offered in Haas v. United
Technologies Corp.28 In upholding the pre-1987 special jury statute, the
court called upon its power under the Delaware constitution to supervise the
administration of justice, and commended to the superior court "the delicate
and difficult task of drafting a rule of court stating the criteria and guidance
for the selection of special juries to ensure 'a cross section of the population
suitable in character and intelligence for that civil duty.' '' 8 The Delaware
Supreme Court admonished the superior court to "be mindful of the twin
goals of achieving a fair representation of the community on the jury panel
while providing for intelligent, educated and competent jurors for the adjudi-
cation of complex cases."29 The Supreme Court concluded:
We offer as a suggestion, and without fettering the Superior
Court's discretion in this matter, that jurors be randomly
selected from a special jury pool comprised of individuals
meeting specified age, intelligence and educational require-
ments and, to the extent deemed legally permissible by the
superior court, possessing special occupational skills. Perhaps
a minimum educational requirement of a bachelor's degree
from an accredited college or university might be one of
those criteria.2 91
The superior court probably has chosen the wiser course by handling each
case ad hoc rather than trying to write a rule of court for all cases. Several
factors support this course of action, including the discretionary nature of
the special jury in Delaware since 1987, the uncertainty among Superior
Court judges about when a case is complex enough to merit such a jury, and
287 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (comparing a neutral selection
process in the use of peremptory strikes to employment discrimination).
2.. 450 A.2d 1173 (Del. 1982).
... Id. at 1185 (citation omitted).
291 Id.
291 Id.
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the palpable tension between a jury pool composed along the lines suggest-
ed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Haas and a jury pool conforming to a
cross section of the community.
CONCLUSION
The current prevailing philosophy about jury composition, the "reason-
able cross-section" requirement, is ahistorical. The history of jury composi-
tion rules and practices before American independence and in the following
centuries, especially those creating or permitting special qualifications for
jurors to decide particular types of cases, demonstrates this fact. Such rules
and practices define the special jury. Although the term "struck jury" was
often used as if synonymous with "special jury," many struck juries were
merely juries formed in a specific way, different from the traditional "jury
box" method, with no statutory or customary second feature calling for ju-
rors to have special qualifications. The typical special jury in both English
and American history was a struck jury composed of persons of the better
rank, merchants, or others with special capabilities that facilitated under-
standing the dispute in question.
The rationale behind the typical special jury has always been to improve
the decision-making process. In some states, courts have the power to order
a special jury when the nature of a particular dispute .calls for it, but ordi-
narily one or both parties will request a special jury. A party's request for a
special jury was a matter of right (although the requesting party might have
had to bear any extra cost), or a matter of court discretion. The fundamental
point, however, is that the special jury aids the parties or the court.
Occasionally one encounters a claim that the reasonable cross-section
requirement also aids defendants. For example, in State v. Gilmore, a New
Jersey court wrote: "While defendant in the present case has no right to
insist that Blacks serve on his trial jury or that there be proportional repre-
sentation of Blacks on the jury,... he does have the unqualified right to be
tried by a fair and impartial jury," and the New Jersey Constitution defines
that jury as "a jury drawn from a representative cross section of the commu-
,,292
nity.
This formulation illustrates the air of unreality that so often infects jury
discourse. If a black defendant truly were entitled to a jury drawn from a
representative cross section of the community, that jury would include some
black members. In fairness, however, the New Jersey court recognized the
292 489 A.2d 1175, 1180 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (citation omitted), aft'd,
511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1986); see supra text accompanying notes 197-99 (discussing
Justice Murphy's dissent in Fay v. New York).
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following realistic appraisal by the California Supreme Court in People v.
Wheeler:293
[A] party is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that is as
near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the com-
munity as the process of random draw permits. Obviously he
cannot avoid the effect of that process: the master list must
be reduced to a manageable venire, and that venire must in
turn be reduced to a 12-person jury. The best the law can do
to accomplish those steps with the least risk to the repre-
sentative nature of the jury pool is to take them by random
means .... We recognize that in a predictable percentage of
cases the result will be a wholly unbalanced jury, usually
composed exclusively of members of the majority group.
This is inevitable, the price we must pay for juries of a
workable size.294
In cases governed by a statutory or constitutional cross-section require-
ment, the traditional special jury, one drawn from a distinct group of spe-
cially qualified jurors, is not permissible. The cross-section requirement
protects the rights of the population at large, not those of the parties to a
lawsuit or those of the judicial system.295 Skirmishes will continue over
what constitutes a "cognizable group," such that it should be a part of the
cross section, and what constitutes an impermissible basis for the exercise of
peremptory challenges,296 but judicial support for the cross-section require-
ment is strong. As the Fifth Circuit baldly stated, "the desire for competency
must not be pursued to the extent that a fair cross-section is prevented."297
293 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978).
294 Id. at 762.
295 See Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose
Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725 (1992).
29 In addition to race and sex, claims have been made based on age, education,
economic status, and religion. See generally Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805 (5th Cir.
1975); United States ex rel. Chestnut v. Criminal Court, 442 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1971);
United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366
F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966); State v. Davis, 504
N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993); Casarez v. Texas, 913 S.W.2d 468 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).
297 Rabinowitz, 366 F.2d at 55. The court quoted from the recommendations of the
September 1960 Judicial Conference, as follows: "Any attempt to gain competent jurors
that would result in a less representative cross-section than a choice from the statutorily
qualified pool destroys the 'right' Congress intended to confer." Id. at 55 n.53 (referring
to the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1861, "Qualifications of Federal jurors," effected by
the Civil Rights Act of 1957).
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In a 1947 opinion denying a special jury, the Bronx County Court quot-
ed former New York Governor Herbert Lehman's address to the Legislature:
"I recommend that Blue Ribbon Juries be abolished. The use of special or
so-called 'Blue Ribbon' juries is not consonant with the preservation of the
constitutional right to a trial by jury of peers. It is at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society."'
What did Governor Lehman mean? Did he suppose that a democratic
society cannot, under any circumstances, allow competence to prevail over
representativeness, anticipating the recommendation of the 1960 Federal
Judicial Conference?299 Even if so, special juries in civil cases have been
commonplace throughout most of the history of this democratic society.
Other juror qualifications that dilute the purity of the "trial by peers" ideal
also pervade history. That ideal, moreover, points logically toward a desti-
nation that the courts and most commentators have resisted-the mandatory
presence on a trial jury of some persons empathetic toward the parties, espe-
cially criminal defendants. As a legal commentator wrote recently, "no con-
stitution or law guarantees a right to trial by a jury of one's racial
peers."
Occasional voices still call for a return to something like the "half-and-
half' jury of an earlier era in order to make the jury-of-peers idea realistic
in some cases." 1 These voices are likely to remain lonely as two cases
29 PNeople v. Brandenberg, 75 N.Y.S.2d 851, 853 (Bronx County Ct. 1947); see also
supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Murphy's dissent in the
Moore case); supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Delaware
Superior Court in the Bradley case).
299 See supra note 297.
31 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Making Juries Look Like America, LEGAL TIMES WASH., Aug.
7, 1995, at 19. The author comments on the case of State v. Harris, 660 A.2d 539 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), in which the court held that, just as constitutional policies
limit a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude members of a particular
race from a jury, these policies "also require a trial court to consider racial demo-
graphics in exercising its authority ... to change the venue of a criminal trial or to
impanel a foreign jury." 660 A.2d at 543. The court explained:
If a trial court disregards racial demographics in selecting a county for a change
of venue or as the source for impanelling a foreign jury, resulting in a jury pool
with a significantly smaller percentage of a racial minority than would be generat-
ed in the county where the crime was committed, it will reduce the likelihood that
the jurors ultimately selected will be members of different groups whose "respec-
tive biases ... will tend to cancel each other out" in the course of jury deliber-
ations.
Id. at 543 (quoting State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150, 1158 (N.J. 1986). According to
Taylor, the holding in Harris "should not be seen as a first step toward racializing jury
selection in general. It can and should be cabined to the context of venue changes and
foreign juries . . . ." Taylor, supra, at 19.
30" See supra note 11; see also supra text accompanying note 260 (discussing the
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dealing with Spanish-speaking jurors demonstrate. In Hernandez v. New
York," 2 a jury, from which all Latinos had been eliminated at voir dire,
convicted the defendant of attempted murder. The jury composition resulted
from the prosecution's use of its peremptories to eliminate all potential
jurors who spoke Spanish. The defense challenged this behavior as an im-
proper exclusion of Latinos from the jury pool. Although there was no ma-
jority opinion, a majority of the Supreme Court rejected the challenge. Ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice Scalia), language-based pe-
remptory strikes are not the same as racially based strikes: "That is the
distinction between disproportionate effect, which is not sufficient to consti-
tute an equal protection violation, and intentional discrimination, which
is." 3 Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and
Souter acknowledged the possibility that, in some circumstances, language
ability might properly "be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal
protection analysis."' 3 4 They did not find this possibility justified, howev-
er, on the specific facts of the case before them. 5
Following Hernandez, the Third Circuit in Pemberthy v. Beyer' con-
cluded that peremptory challenges based on language ability are not
"equivalent for equal protection purposes to the types of challenges prohibit-
ed in Batson and related cases."' 7 The court, however, cautioned that
"[b]ecause language-speaking ability is so closely correlated with ethnicity,
a trial court must carefully assess the challenger's actual motivation even
where the challenger asserts a rational reason to discriminate based on lan-
guage skills."3"8
From the standpoint of the history of the special jury, the significance of
Hernandez and Pemberthy is their demonstration of how far the law has
moved away from our jury heritage. In the "half-and-half' jury, the jurors'
ability to communicate in the defendant's language was at least one reason
supporting the belief that foreign jurors were needed to ensure a foreign
1993 recommendation of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice).
302 552 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1990), affid, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). Hernandez has been the
subject of extensive legal commentary. For interesting early examples, see Deborah A.
Ramirez, Excluded Voices: The Disenfranchisement of Ethnic Groups from Jury Service,
1993 WiS. L. REV. 761 (1993); Note, Peremptory Exclusion of Spanish-Speaking Ju-
rors: Could Hernandez v. New York Happen Here?, 23 N.M. L. REV. 467 (1993).
303 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375.
3 Id. at 371.
' See id. The theory of the prosecution in striking Spanish-speaking prospective
jurors was to eliminate those jurors who might disregard translations introduced into
evidence of testimony or documents given or written in Spanish, favoring instead their
own translations.
19 F.3d 857 (3rd Cir. 1994).
id. at 870.
Id. at 872.
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defendant a fair trial. Neither Hernandez nor Pemberthy, however, discussed
the relationship between the ability of potential jurors to speak Spanish and
the fairness owed the defendants by the jury trial guarantee. The interest at
stake was that of the potential jurors.
Hernandez and Pemberthy nevertheless may provide support for the use
of higher education as a juror criterion, such as in the selection of
Delaware's special juries in complex cases. If attorneys can strike jurors
because they speak Spanish, likely eliminating at least three out of four of
the Hispanics or Latinos in a jury pool, 309 then attorneys can select educat-
ed jurors even if the education criterion has a disproportionate racial or
socio-economic impact. In 1967, Judge Botter of the Superior Court of New
Jersey wrote in response to a complaint about the method for selecting
grand jurors:
I think that legally in the discretion of the jury commission-
ers a higher education standard can be used for the selection
of persons to serve on the grand jury .... [W]e may talk
about broad economic or social classes. I'm not cer-
tain ... that the grand jurors, do not represent a fair cross-
section of economic classes.' In any case,... [i]f you accept
the proposition that a higher educational standard can proper-
ly be used, then you cannot accept the corollary that the use
of a higher educational standard must produce intentional
discrimination.310
This philosophy elevates competence over representativeness and, there-
fore, may not be permitted whenever the reasonable cross-section require-
ment applies.3 ' If such a requirement is not preclusive, however, history
supports the continuation of experiments with other models, just as Dela-
ware has done. The jury is a remarkably rich and resilient tradition. The
richness of that tradition should not be disregarded altogether to achieve the
abstract satisfaction of jury lists representative of cross sections of commu-
nities. More often than not, little correlation will exist between the reason-
able cross section and the composition of a particular jury. It is easy to
understand the conceptual appeal of the link between the reasonable cross-
section idea and democratic traditions. The reasonable cross-section idea,
however, need not be all consuming. Other formulas, especially those
shaped to achieve fair and intelligent verdicts in specific cases, have
achieved historical legitimacy and should be allowed a reasonable coexis-
tence.
See Ramirez, supra note 302, at 789-90.
310 State v. Rochester, 253 A.2d. 558, 571 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1967).
311 See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
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CHOOSING PERSPECTIVES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Ronald J. Bacigal"
In this Article, Professor Bacigal examines the Supreme Court's use of
various perspectives in examining the reasonableness of searches and sei-
zures. Although the Supreme Court purports to rely on a consistent method
of constitutional analysis when rendering decisions on Fourth Amendment
issues, the case law in this area indicates that the Court is influenced some-
times by the citizen's perspective, sometimes by the police officers' perspec-
tive, and sometimes by the perspective of the hypothesized reasonable per-
son.
After identifying the role of perspectives in a number of seminal Court
decisions, Professor Bacigal discusses the benefits and limitations of the
Court's reliance on the various perspectives prevalent in criminal procedure
cases. He notes that over time the Court increasingly has viewed cases sole-
ly from the police officers' perception of the reasonableness of their actions
and thus that the Court has weakened the protection of citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights.
Professor Bacigal advocates a principled approach to choosing perspec-
tives and assesses several such approaches. He concludes by asking both
the Court and its critics to find ways to enhance the Court's ability to bal-
ance social interests with the individual's "right to be let alone." To ade-
quately protect this right, Professor Bacigal suggests that the Court display
increased sensitivity to the individual's perspective in search and seizure
cases.
At Center Court Wimbledon it is entertaining to watch the ball shift
back and forth between the opponents. It is less captivating to observe con-
stitutional analysis in which the United States Supreme Court appears to
hide the ball, or at least makes it difficult to appreciate the nature of the
game being played, as it shifts between objective and subjective perspectives
of citizens, police officers, and hypothesized reasonable people. Unlike ten-
nis, where stroke and counterstroke are the essence of the game and visible
for all to see, constitutional analysis often obscures the fact that it is highly
dependent upon the Court's vacillating choice of perspectives, and concomi-
tantly, the identification of the appropriate decision maker. Although most
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond, The T.C. Williams School of Law. I
thank Professors Tracey Maclin, Scott Sundby, Gary Leedes, and John Douglas for their
comments, criticisms, and suggestions.
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Supreme Court cases center on whether a particular outcome is constitution-
al, this question is uniquely related to the questions of who should decide
what is constitutional, and who should decide who decides. Of course the
Court is always the final decision maker when interpreting the Constitution,
but there are times when the Court defers to the decisions of police, reason-
ably prudent people, or individual citizens by adopting their perspectives.
Consider the diverse perspectives the Court applies to a seemingly sim-
ple scenario that begins with a police officer approaching a pedestrian and
stating, "Please stop, I'd like to talk to you." The initial question for the
Court is whether the officer's actions constitute a Fourth Amendment sei-
zure of the pedestrian.1 That question is answered by an objective assess-
ment of the situation as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable person:
Would such a hypothetical person have felt free to leave?2 At this point, it
is constitutionally irrelevant whether the citizen subjectively believed that he
or she had to submit to the request to stop,3 or whether the officer subjec-
tively intended to prevent the citizen from walking away.
4
If application of this objective standard were to indicate that a reason-
able person would not have felt free to leave, the Court would then discard
the perspective of a hypothetical person and would examine the way this
particular citizen responded to the police officer.5 Submission to the
officer's request could constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, but, resis-
tance would reduce the officer's request to a mere "attempted seizure,"
which is beyond the coverage of the Amendment.6 Submission, however,
"If there is no detention-no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment-then no constitutional rights have been infringed." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 498 (1983). "[W]here the [F]ourth [A]mendment is inapplicable, the law does not
give a constitutional damn about noncompliance." Charles E. Moylan, The Fourth
Amendment Inapplicable vs. The Fourth Amendment Satisfied: The Neglected Threshold
of 'So What'?, 1977 S. ILL. U. L.J. 75, 76.
' "[A] person has been 'seized' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only
if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion).
' The Mendenhall rule which governs seizures of a person, "looks, not to the sub-
jective perceptions of the person questioned, but rather, to the objective characteristics
of the encounter that may suggest whether a reasonable person would have felt free to
leave." California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 640 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' "[Tihe subjective intention of the DEA agent in this case to detain the respondent,
had she attempted to leave, is irrelevant except insofar as that may have been conveyed
to the respondent." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 n.6.
' See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628; see also Woodson v. Commonwealth, 429 S.E.2d
27, 29 (Va. 1993) ("[T]he issue ... [is] not what a reasonable person would have as-
sumed under the circumstances, but what the accused actually did in response to the
police officer's show of authority.").
6 "[N]either usage nor common-law tradition makes an attempted seizure a seizure."
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does not end the Court's inquiry because the encounter also must be exam-
ined from the officer's perspective. If the officer did not seize the citizen
through "means intentionally applied,"' there would be, at most, an "acci-
dental seizure," which, like an attempted seizure, falls outside the scope of
the Fourth Amendment.8
The interplay between objective and subjective perspectives continues if
the citizen were to stop and face the officer, who then asks, "May I see
some identification?" If the citizen were to comply by producing his wallet,
the Court must then discern whether the wallet was surrendered voluntari-
ly,9 or whether there was mere acquiescence to a police command that left
the citizen no choice.' Consent is determined by employing a subjective
perspective that takes into account all surrounding circumstances, including
the citizen's personal characteristics (characteristics that are irrelevant when
defining a seizure of the person according to the objective perception of a
reasonable person)." The applicable standard shifts once again, however, if
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 n.2; see infra text accompanying note 54.
" "[A] Fourth Amendment seizure ... [occurs] only when there is a governmental
termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." Brower v.
Inyo County, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989).
- See Ronald J. Bacigal, The Right of the People to Be Secure, 82 KY. L.J. 145
(1994) (discussing both attempted and accidental seizures).
' See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973); see also United States v.
Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 880 (1990). The
circuit court cautioned that the lower court had "treated the tests for seizure and volun-
tary consent as identical. Although there is overlap in these tests, they are not identi-
cal." Id.
10 The prosecution's burden to prove free and voluntary consent to a search "cannot
be discharged by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority."
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968); see also Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968) (discussing "a show of ... authority which left [the suspect] no
choice"); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(denouncing an encounter in which "[t]he citizen's choice is quietly to submit to what-
ever the officers undertake or to resist at risk of arrest or immediate violence").
" In United States v. Analla, 975 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S.
1033 (1993), the court held that the initial approach by the police toward the suspect
was governed by the standard for seizures of the person---"an objective test, not a sub-
jective one." Id. at 124. Thus, the fact that the particular suspect "thought, based on his
experience with Moroccan police, that he would be restrained or even tortured should
he try to leave" was irrelevant. Id. The court, finding no seizure, held that the subse-
quent request to search the suspect's vehicle was governed by the standard for consen-
sual searches-"a factual question determined in light of the totality of the circumstanc-
es." Id. at 125. Consequently, it was relevant that the defendant was "24 years
old ... had ... graduated from high school and had attended some col-
lege ... appeared intelligent, [and] articulated his views and positions well . . . ." Id.;
see also United States v. Wilson, 895 F.2d 168, 171 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he determina-
tion of consent to search is subjective.").
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the officer were to misperceive the citizen's subjective intent. For example,
suppose the citizen voluntarily surrendered his wallet for the limited purpose
of allowing the officer to examine the citizen's identification papers, but the
officer scanned the papers and then opened other compartments of the wal-
let. At this point, the Court would discard the citizen's subjective intent and
turns to the perspective of an objectively reasonable officer: Could such an
officer have believed that he had obtained consent to examine the entire
wallet? 12
The same shifting of perspectives becomes relevant in a Fifth Amend-
ment context if the encounter were to continue with the officer commenting
on the contents of the wallet. For example: "This bag of white powder looks
like cocaine." Although at this point the citizen may have been seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes, this seizure is not equivalent to custody, a
necessary prerequisite for the Miranda warnings. 3 For purposes of
Miranda,4 custody is determined from the vantage point of "how a reason-
able man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation,"'5
and by examining whether the particular suspect was subjectively aware that
he faced a police officer. 6
The Court's inquiry must continue, however, because custody alone does
not trigger Miranda; there also must be police interrogation. 7 In order to
define interrogation, the Court switches perspectives to that of a reasonable
police officer, asking whether an officer would know that his comment
about the cocaine was "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect."'" As an added complication, this particular use of the
reasonable person perspective incorporates the subjective perceptions of both
the officer and the suspect. 9
12 See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) ("The standard for measuring the
scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' reason-
ableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange
between the officer and the suspect?") (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183-
89 (1990)).
13 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1984).
14 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5 Berkermer, 468 U.S. at 442.
16 In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), the issue was whether Miranda ap-
plied to a situation in which a police undercover agent, feigning to be a cellmate, ques-
tioned a suspect in his jail cell. The Court found that, because the suspect subjectively
did not know he was being interrogated by the police, the suspect was not under coer-
cion, and thus Miranda did not apply. See id. at 300.
1 See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980).
18 Id. at 301 (citation omitted).
"Any knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of
a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determin-
ing whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." Id. at 302 n.8.
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Suppose that this encounter were to conclude with the citizen attempting
to flee after the officer referred to cocaine. The officer thwarted the escape
by producing his weapon, shoving the citizen against a wall, and roughly
patting him down while giving the Miranda warnings. The citizen then
stated, "It's not my cocaine, I'm holding it for a friend." The admissibility
of the citizen's statement hinges upon a determination that the statement was
voluntary and obtained after the suspect waived his Miranda rights to re-
main silent and to have the assistance of counsel.2' Voluntariness would be
assessed from the suspect's perspective in order to determine whether the
self-incrimination was the product of the suspect's free and voluntary deci-
sion to speak, or whether the suspect's free will was overborne by the
officer's use of physical force.21 In contrast to the subjective aspects of
voluntariness, however, an objective standard is employed to determine
whether the suspect waived his Miranda rights.22
The above scenario could be extended to include booking procedures at
the police station, further interrogation of the defendant, and possible use of
a lineup, all of which involve additional Fifth and Sixth Amendment consid-
erations; however, we have given the Court enough rope, and it has already
entangled itself in a dozen variations of subjective and objective perspec-
tives of real and hypothetical people. To wit:
1. A reasonable person's perception of the officer's initial approach.
2. The suspect's actual response to the officer's approach.
3. The officer's intent to seize the person through means intentionally
applied.'
4. The suspect's subjective intent to consent to a search of his wallet.
5. A reasonable officer's perception of the scope of the consensual
search.
6. A reasonable person's perception of whether he was in police custo-
dy.
7. The suspect's subjective knowledge that he was addressing a police
officer.
8. A reasonable officer's perception of whether his comment was likely
to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
9. Any unusual susceptibility of the particular defendant to covert per-
suasion.
See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985).
21 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
The standard for waiver is unsettled. In Connelly, the Court spoke of waiver as a
question of voluntariness (a subjective analysis). See id. at U.S. 169. In its most recent
discussion of the issue, however, the Court stated that the question of whether a suspect
waived or invoked Miranda rights would be assessed from the standpoint of whether "a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the [accused's] state-
ment to be a request for an attorney." Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
1998]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
10. The officer's actual knowledge of the suspect's unusual suscepti-
bility.
11. The suspect's subjective ability to make a free and voluntary state-
ment.
12. An objective assessment of whether the suspect waived his Miranda
rights.
The Court uses and discards these perspectives at random, rarely pausing
to articulate a rationale for choosing a particular perspective in a specific
case. This piecemeal approach has hampered judicial development of a
coherent scheme for applying the various perspectives to the Fourth, Fifth,
and Sixth Amendment problems that arise.24 A comprehensive examination
of all three amendments is beyond the scope of a single law review article,
or at least beyond the capacity of this author to address in any concise man-
ner. As a more modest start toward reconciling judicial use of interpretive
perspectives, this Article utilizes the Fourth Amendment as a touchstone for
examining the particular choices the Court has made, and for suggesting the
type of fundamental principles that should guide the Court's choicesY
I. THE COURT'S DECISIONS
The current Court's preferred method for determining reasonable search-
es and seizures is the assessment of the totality of the circumstances,' an
approach that helps obscure the underlying choice of perspectives. A com-
plete examination of the totality of the circumstances necessarily factors in
all perspectives-the subjective perspective of both the defendant and the
police officer, as well as the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable person.
' See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978).
Although we have not examined this exact question at great length in any of our
prior opinions, almost without exception in evaluating alleged violations of the
Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an
officer's actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.
Id.
4 The Sixth Amendment applies to interrogation occurring after the commencement
of adversarial proceedings. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977); Massiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). When defining interrogation for Sixth Amendment
purposes, the Court examines whether an officer "deliberately and designedly set out to
elicit information" from the defendant. Brewer, 430 U.S. at 399. For a discussion of the
differing definitions of "interrogation" under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, see Jona-
than L. Marks, Confusing the Fifth Amendment with the Sixth: Lower Court Misapplica-
tion of the Innis Definition of Interrogation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 1077 n.27 (1989)
("Massiah turns solely on the underlying intent of the government's agents.").
' "It is both regrettable and surprising that the courts have said so little of any sub-
stance about the principles of the [A]mendment . . . ." Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities
of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 49 (1976).
26 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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Although this approach is cumbersome to apply, it is difficult to fault the
Court's desire to consider all relevant factors. The problem arises when the
Justices opt to discard certain perspectives and rely exclusively on a single
perspective in assessing constitutional reasonableness. This approach allows
the Court to abdicate responsibility for determining the constitutionality of
searches and seizures by adopting, and thus deferring to, the decisions of
police, reasonably prudent people, or individual citizens. The origins of this
flawed approach can be traced to the Court's analysis of seizures of a per-
son in Terry v. Ohio.27
A. Seizures of a Person
1. The Reasonable Person's Perspective
Prior to the seminal decision in Terry v. Ohio, seizures of the person
were equated with full custodial arrests." Terry, however, extended the
scope of the Fourth Amendment to encompass temporary detentions falling
short of arrest, that is, government interference with a citizen's "freedom to
walk away" unencumbered by any restraint imposed by a police officer.29
The right-to-walk-away test for a Fourth Amendment seizure easily was
applied to the facts of Terry because the officer grabbed Terry, spun him
around, and patted him down for weapons.3" The Court had no need to ad-
dress various perspectives because from any viewpoint, Terry was not free
to leave.
In contrast to the obvious seizure in Terry, subsequent cases required the
Court to address police-citizen encounters in which the officer did not so
forcefully and unilaterally impose physical control over the citizen. For
example, United States v. Mendenhall3 and Florida v. Royer32 involved
situations in which law enforcement officials approached a suspected drug
courier in an airport concourse and asked if the suspect was willing to stop
and answer questions. Unlike the situation in Terry, the facts in Mendenhall
and Royer required the Court to choose a perspective from which to assess
whether the police-citizen encounter was consensual or whether it amounted
to a Fourth Amendment seizure.
27 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21 See, e.g., id. at 10-11.
29 See id. at 16-17.
30 See id. at 7. "[T]he officer 'seized' Terry and subjected him to a 'search' when he
took hold of him, spun him around, and patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing."
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 552 (1980).
31 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
32 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
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When analyzing police-citizen encounters, the Court starts from the
premise that "[t]he Fourth Amendment proscribes unreasonable searches and
seizures; it does not proscribe voluntary cooperation. 3 3 The Court has
fleshed out this rudimentary principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
by articulating its vision of the type of police-citizen encounter that consti-
tutes a nonseizure: It is one in which a reasonable person would not per-
ceive any restraint of his freedom of movement, and thus would voluntarily
submit to a police request to stop and answer questions.' The Court's
adoption of the reasonable person's perspective has much to recommend it,
but the Court has never explained why this perspective is preferable to the
citizen's subjective perception of government restraint or to the police
officer's subjective intent to restrain the citizen.
Any of the perspectives raised by the facts of Mendenhall and Royer
could have been incorporated into existing schools of constitutional analysis.
For example, had the Court chosen to adopt the citizen's perspective, the
Court could have drawn upon its earlier pronouncements regarding a
citizen's waiver of constitutional rights.35 A "consensual" police-citizen
encounter thus might require that a citizen knowingly and intelligently have
waived his rights to privacy and liberty.' This result, however, was not
preordained because in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,37 the Court applied a
"diluted form of 'waiver"'38 to consensual searches of property. In
Schneckloth, the Court's concern over the truth-defeating aspects of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule39 led it to distinguish consensual
searches of property from knowing and intelligent waivers of other constitu-
tional rights that "protect a fair trial and the reliability of the truth-determin-
ing process."4 What is unexplained in Mendenhall and Royer is why the
Court did not follow Schneckloth by applying the same diluted form of
waiver to consensual seizures of both property and person. The language of
the Fourth Amendment, which equally prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures of persons, houses, papers, and effects, does not support a distinc-
tion between consensual seizures of a person and consensual searches and
seizures of a person's property."' The language in Schneckloth may have
33 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991).
4 See id. at 434 ("Our cases make it clear that a seizure does not occur simply be-
cause a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.").
31 See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (defining waiver in the context
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
36 Waiver ordinarily requires "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." Id. at 464.
" 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
38 Id. at 245.
31 See infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
40 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236.
41 The gap between the Court's discussions of consensual seizures of the person or
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"diluted" the rigorous standard for knowing and intelligent waiver of consti-
tutional rights, but even the diluted standard remains a form of waiver that
inherently focuses on the citizen's subjective perspective, that is, the
citizen's actual belief as to whether he freely permitted or prohibited a
search of property;" yet, when addressing seizures of a person, the Court
in Mendenhall and Royer discarded this perspective without even mention-
ing Schneckloth.
Mendenhall and Royer are equally opaque in their sub silentio rejection
of the police officer's perspective, that is, whether the officer subjectively
intended to restrain the suspect. Examining the officer's perspective would
have been consistent with the Fourth Amendment goal of regulating the use
and abuse of government power,43 a goal the Court in Terry cited when it
reaffirmed the judiciary's "traditional responsibility to guard against police
conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal
security."" By claiming fidelity to Terry and the Fourth Amendment's cen-
tral purpose of regulating government power,4" the Court in Mendenhall
might have insisted that an officer not act on his intent to detain a citizen
of property may be narrowing. In California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), the
Court stressed the difference between seizures of the person and seizures of property,
see infra text accompanying note 62, but the Fourth Circuit recently suggested that, "in
light of the Court's evolving views on the relevancy of common law in defining Fourth
Amendment 'seizures,' it is at least plausible that . . .[Hodari D.] may ultimately be
held to extend to objects as well as persons." United States v. Letsinger, 93 F.3d 140,
143 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2437 (1997). For a discussion of the
Letsinger decision, see infra text accompanying notes 249-58.
42 "In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the con-
sent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions,
as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents."
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229.
41 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 368 (1974) (stating that the Fourth Amendment is best viewed as a regulato-
ry canon).
44 Terry, 392 U.S. at 15; see also Shirley M. Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdi-
rections of a Constitutional Right of Privacy, 26 REC. ASS'N B. CITY N.Y. 546, 552
(1971) (stating that government conduct not classified as a search or seizure is immu-
nized from scrutiny, even though it resulted from such illegitimate, or even malicious,
motives as governmental curiosity, a desire to gather and report interesting information,
or personal distaste for the political philosophies or lifestyles of certain citizens).
4' The Framers of the Fourth Amendment were concerned with indiscriminate gov-
ernment intrusions, which
expose people and their possessions to interferences by government when there is
no good reason to do so. The concern here is against unjustified searches and
seizures: it rests upon the principle that every citizen is entitled to security of his
person and property unless and until an adequate justification for disturbing that
security is shown.
Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 411.
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unless the officer has good cause to do so.4 6 Instead, the Court disregarded
the officer's intent and accorded constitutional status to a hypothetical con-
struct (the reasonable person test) while overlooking the fact that a citizen is
not free to leave when an officer intends to block any effort by the citizen
to terminate the encounter. 7
In the end, Mendenhall and Royer ignored the states of mind of both the
citizen and the officer in favor of a focus on the perceptions. of a hypotheti-
cal reasonable person. This focus is not clearly wrong, because the Court
has a legitimate concern for the proper allocation of judicial resources and
for the potentially futile and costly effort of inquiring into subjective states
of mind." Although the Court has expressed its concern for the potential
costs of inquiring into a citizen's or police officer's subjective intent; there
has been no serious attempt to assess the actual costs and benefits of such
an inquiry, nor has there been any attempt to distinguish other situations in
which the Court has attached constitutional significance to a citizen's or
officer's subjective state of mind. 9 As to the potential futility of inquiring
46 Interpreting state constitutional law, the Supreme Court of Hawaii stated:
We cannot allow the police to randomly "encounter" individuals without any
objective basis for suspecting them of misconduct and then place them in a coer-
cive environment in order to develop reasonable suspicion to justify their deten-
tion. This investigative technique is based on the proposition that an otherwise
innocent person, who comes under police scrutiny for no good reason, is not inno-
cent unless he or she convinces the police that he or she is. Such a procedure is
anathema to our constitutional freedoms.
State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358, 365 (Haw. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1031 (1993).
"" "The Fourth Amendment ... [is] not directed at some hypothetical government
agent and what he might or would have done. [it] exist[s] to regulate the actual conduct
of actual government agents in actual cases." Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43
EMORY L.J. 1311, 1335 (1994); see also John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth
Amendment: The Scope of the Protection, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1133
(1988-89) ("The danger in 'reasoning from hypothetical to actual results is that if the
supposed facts are not true to life, the judgment drawn from them will be equally artifi-
cial.").
" See Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)
(proclaiming that the inquiry into the subjective state of mind of police officers would
be a costly "misallocation of judicial resources").
" See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (holding that a defendant may be
entitled to a hearing on the accuracy of an affidavit upon a showing that police made a
deliberate falsehood); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (noting situations
in which the motivation of the officer is to perform "community caretaking functions,
totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to
the violation of a criminal statute"); United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297 (4th Cir.
1990) (holding that Franks requires subjective bad faith). See generally Ronald J.
Bacigal, An Alternative Approach to the Good Faith Controversy, 37 MERCER L. REV.
957 (1986) (arguing that recognition of both good and bad faith by police officers as
relevant factors in the totality of circumstances is consistent with the Court's overall
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into subjective intent, the Court recently announced that its prior decisions
were not based on "the evidentiary difficulty of establishing Subjective in-
tent.
5 °
What is futile, however, is to read the Mendenhall and Royer opinions
in hopes of discovering an assessment of the relevant merits of the various
perspectives, or some hint of the justification that prompted the Court to
adopt the reasonable person's perspective. The closest the Court has come to
explaining its choice of perspectives has been a terse statement in Michigan
v. Chesternut:51 "This 'reasonable person' standard also ensures that the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not vary with the state of mind
of the particular individual being approached."52 The Court did not explain
why, in Schneckloth, it accepted this type of variation when dealing with
consensual searches of property, but did not accept the same variation when
dealing with seizures of the person. Perhaps it is the failure to identify some
guiding principle for defining consensual searches and seizures that led the
Court to graft two additional perspectives onto the reasonable person stan-
dard. 3
2. The Citizen's Perspective
Mendenhall's focus on the perceptions of a reasonable person was sub-
sequently identified by the Court as "a necessary, but not a sufficient condi-
tion for seizure .. . ." An additional necessary condition is the citizen's
actual submission to a show of authority that had objectively communicated
that the citizen was not free to leave. The Court announced this additional
requirement in California v. Hodari D.,"5 in which the defendant's flight at
the approach of a police car prompted pursuit, in the course of which the
defendant discarded a small quantity of crack cocaine subsequently retrieved
by the police.56 The California court held that the officer's pursuit would
cause a reasonable person to believe that he was not free to leave, thus
balancing approach to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
5" Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (1996).
486 U.S. 567 (1988).
52 Id. at 574.
"3 Consent "is a particularly open concept, which refers to both an 'internal' state of
mind and an 'external' performance; consent is unequivocal and unquestioned only
when it includes both." Weinreb, supra note 25, at 55.
54 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991). "The narrow question before us is whether, with re-
spect to a show of authority ... a seizure occurs even though the subject does not
yield. We hold that it does not." Id. at 626.
M 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991).
16 The lower court suppressed the cocaine as the fruit of the illegal seizure of Hodari
because there was no reasonable suspicion for pursuit. See In re Hodari D., 265 Cal.
Rptr. 79, 86 (App. Dist. Ct. 1989).
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satisfying the Mendenhall test for a Fourth Amendment seizure.57 The Su-
preme Court, however, held that no seizure occurs until a defendant actually
yields to the police due to his perception that he is not free to leave.5"
Unlike the Court in Mendenhall, which ignored the perceptions of the
actual defendant in favor of the perceptions of hypothesized people, Hodari
D. ignored the consideration of how such hypothesized people would,
should, or might react to an unwelcome encounter with the police. Instead,
the Court focused exclusively on the way a specific defendant actually re-
sponded to the police officer's show of authority. In Hodari D., the Court
justified its focus on the defendant's actions by invoking the common-law
definition of arrest: "An arrest requires either physical force ... or, where
that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority."59 If Mendenhall
reflects the Court's sphinx-like silence when choosing among various per-
spectives, Hodari D. offers little more than a confusing and unexplained
choice between common-law precedents.
The dissent in Hodari D. pointed out that Terry and Katz v. United
States" had expanded the constitutional definition of a seizure beyond
common-law concepts.6 The Hodari D. majority, however, insisted that the
dissent failed to grasp the distinction between seizures of property and sei-
zures of a person.
The dissent is correct that Katz v. United States, "unequivo-
cally reject[s] the notion that the common law of arrest de-
fines the limits of the term 'seizure' in the Fourth Amend-
ment."..... But we do not assert that it defines the limits of
the term "seizure"; only that it defines the limits of a seizure
of the person. What Katz stands for is the proposition that
items which could not be subject to seizure at common law
(e.g., telephone conversations) can be seized under the
Fourth Amendment. That is quite different from saying that
what constitutes an arrest (a seizure of the person) has
changed.62
5 See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629.
58 Hodari D. thus negated one of the justifications for the reasonable person test,
which "calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the next, regardless
of the particular individual's response to the actions of the police." Michigan v.
Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988). In contrast, the Court in Hodari D. focused "on
the suspect's subjective reaction, which an officer cannot possibly predict." Bruce A.
Green, Power, Not Reason, 70 N.C. L. REV. 373, 401 (1992).
5' Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.
60 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
61 The Court in Terry "concluded that the word 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment
encompasses official restraints on individual freedom that fall short of a common-law
arrest." Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 Id. at 627 n.3 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted). The essence of Katz
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In response, the dissent urged the majority to look "not to the common
law of arrest, but to the common law of attempted arrest,"63 which focuses
on the officer's subjective intent to apprehend the defendant.' The majori-
ty countered, however, that "neither usage nor common-law tradition makes
an attempted seizure a seizure. The common law may have made an at-
tempted seizure unlawful in certain circumstances; but it made many things
unlawful, very few of which were elevated to constitutional proscrip-
tions."65
The Hodari D. dissent's two-pronged effort to place attempted seizures
within the coverage of the Fourth Amendment was thwarted by the
majority's facility for using each prong to trump the other. Common-law
concepts of attempted arrests could not expand constitutional interpretation
of unreasonable seizures of the person; yet, at the same time, the common-
law concept of completed arrests constricted the Fourth Amendment prohibi-
tion against such seizures.'M Once again, the Court appeared to be hiding
the ball67 when it failed to identify the fundamental principle that led it to
is the Court's recognition that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places or
things. The Amendment thus protects items that are not subject to seizure at common
law because they might qualify as extensions of a person's protected privacy interests.
It is difficult to comprehend the way the Court can maintain that the Amendment pro-
tects extensions of the person (for example, conversations) against incorporeal intrusions
(for example, eavesdropping) but does not protect the person himself against such intru-
sions. If physical trespass is no longer the essence of Fourth Amendment seizures of
property, physical restraint should not be regarded as the benchmark for defining sei-
zures of the person. Once the Court recognizes that government action that falls short of
physical trespass can threaten privacy interests in personal items, it would seem axiom-
atic to claim that government action that falls short of physical restraint could threaten
personal liberty interests.
63 Id. at 632 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
The common law recognized that "an officer might be guilty of an assault be-
cause of an attempted arrest, without privilege, even if he did not succeed in touching
the other." Rollin M. Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201, 201 n.3
(1940); see also State v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300, 1310 (Conn. 1992) ("The distinction
between an arrest and an attempted arrest at common law reflected the difference be-
tween battery and assault .... [W]e are persuaded that the dichotomy between an at-
tempted arrest and an arrest 'should not take on constitutional dimensions."') (quoting
Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 631 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
65 Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 n.2.
66 Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Hodari D., previously had
stated that the Fourth Amendment "should not become less than" the common law.
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). In
Hodari D., Justice Scalia seemed to assert that the Fourth Amendment can never mean
more than the common law.
67 See Green, supra note 58, at 403-04.
Given the uncertainty of the relevant common-law analogue, one might again
suspect that the Court's decision was dictated by something other than the princi-
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adopt the common-law definition of a completed seizure while rejecting
common-law recognition of attempted seizures. If, as the Court in Michi-
gan v. Chesternut69 maintained, the reasonable person test was adopted to
ensure that Fourth Amendment protection "does not vary with the state of
mind of the particular individual being approached,"7 then why did Hodari
D. make Fourth Amendment protection contingent on the unpredictable re-
sponses of individual defendants?
3. The Police Officer's Perspective
If a defendant successfully navigates through the Court's use of the first
two perspectives-reasonable perceptions and actual submission-then he
must navigate a third perspective, that of the seizing officer. In Brower v.
Inyo County"' the Court stated:
It is clear.., that a Fourth Amendment seizure does not
occur whenever there is a governmentally caused termination
of an individual's freedom of movement. . . , nor even
whenever there is a governmentally caused and
governmentally desired termination of an individual's free-
dom of movement. . . , but only when there is a govern-
mental termination of freedom of movement through means
intentionally applied.7 2
pie that common law determines the scope of the term 'seizure.' . .[. T]he Court
sounded a theme ... [that] the law should be fashioned to encourage cooperation
with law enforcement authorities. This consideration clearly explains the outcome
in Hodari D.; reliance on common law does not.
Id. (citation omitted).
Recognition of a common-law arrest as "the quintessential 'seizure of the person'
under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence," Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624, does not
mean that the Court must banish common-law prohibitions of attempted arrests to the
trash bin of peculiar historical practices that cannot be "elevated to constitutional pro-
scriptions." Id. at 626 n.2. After all, intrusion into residential dwellings is the
prototypical search specified in the Constitution. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.
573, 585-90 (1980). The Court, however, has extended Fourth Amendment coverage to
commercial premises, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967); automobiles,
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985); and quasi-public areas like telephone
booths, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
"' 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
7 Id. at 574.
7- 489 U.S. 593 (1989).
72 Id. at 596-97.
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The difficulty of translating this cumbersome language into a compre-
hensible third perspective is exacerbated by the Court's failure to clarify the
type of intent required of the officer. The facts of the Brower case were
classified as a seizure of the person because the suspect crashed into a po-
lice roadblock erected for the very purpose of stopping the suspect. 3 In
contrast, however, the Court explained that there was no seizure in Galas v.
McKee,74 in which a fleeing motorist lost control of his vehicle and crashed
during a high-speed chase by the police. In distinguishing the police intent
in Brower and Galas, Justice Scalia utilized a number of terms connoting a
subjective state of mind: for example, "willful" detention; results that are
"desired," "sought," and "meant;" and "designed" and "selected" means.75
Having authored an opinion replete with allusions to the police officer's
subjective state of mind, Justice Scalia then proclaimed that he did not think
it "practicable" to inquire into subjective intent.7 6 The concurring Justices
commended their colleague for avoiding inquiries into subjective intent, al-
though they questioned his introduction of the "concept of objective intent"
as a standard for determining Fourth Amendment seizures.' It is not clear,
however, that Justice Scalia was formulating a concept of objective intent in
Brower, because he neither employed the term in his majority opinion, nor
contested or endorsed the concurring opinion's use of the term. Again one
searches in vain for some explanation or precedent for the Court's focus on
this form of the officer's perspective. As one lower court lamented, "[t]he
reported cases all seem to look to subjective intent. However, the distinction
between subjective and objective intent was not in issue in any of those
cases."
78
The Court failed to clarify matters in its latest consideration of a police
officer's subjective intent. In Whren v. United States,79 the Justices were
asked to condemn pretext seizures, that is, situations in which objective facts
justify a seizure, but the police officer had actually seized the suspect as a
result of the officer's impermissible motives. The Court refused to condemn
pretext seizures because "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."8
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the ultimate decision in Whren,
the opinion lucidly addresses the distinction between objective facts upon
which a reasonable officer might have acted (a hypothetical construct) and
3 See id. at 599.
"' 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986), discussed in Brower, 489 U.S. at 595.
" Brower, 489 U.S. at 596-99.
76 See id. at 598.
Id. at 600 (Stevens, J., concurring).
78 Keller v. Frink, 745 F. Supp. 1428, 1431 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
79 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
'° Id. at 1774.
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the subjective factors that in reality motivated an individual officer.8' In
contrast, Brower's distinction between subjective and objective intent re-
mains elusive because of the general understanding that the term "intent"
betokens an existing state of mind rather than a hypothetical construct. 2 To
make matters worse, Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinions in
both Brower and Whren, appeared to abandon efforts to define objective
intent83 while invoking a new phrase-"virtual subjectivity"-which he
disparagingly referred to as speculation "about the hypothetical reaction of a
hypothetical constable.
8 4
The Court's tendency to coin a new phrase to resolve each new or diffi-
cult case leaves the contours of objective intent, subjective intent, and virtu-
al subjectivity in doubt. At a minimum, however, it is clear that in Brower,
the Court adopted some form of the police officer's perspective; however,
the reason the Court chose this perspective remains enigmatic. The sole
justification the Court in Brower offered for focusing on the officer's intent
was the observation that "[tihe writs of assistance that were the principal
grievance against which the Fourth Amendment was directed ... did not
involve unintended consequences of government action." 85 The Court's
characterization of the writs of assistance controversy is accurate, but falsely
suggests that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment equated the reasonable-
ness of searches and seizures with the absence of malicious intent.8 6 The
Court's parsimonious reading of history ignores our nation's Founders'
desire for protection against both intentional misconduct by government
officials and the arbitrary exercise of governmental power.87 In a nation
81 See id. at 1774-76.
82 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After
Hodari D. and Bostick, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 841 (1991) ("Brower demonstrates
that the intent to seize is measured objectively but does not specify how that is to be
done.").
83 During oral arguments in Hodari D., Justice Scalia "asked counsel what he
thought the words 'intentional acquisition of control' in [Brower] meant." [Arguments
Heard:] California v. Hodari D., 48 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 3131 (U.S. Feb. 6, 1991).
Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775.
85 Brower, 489 U.S. at 596 (citations omitted).
816 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) ("An officer's evil intentions
will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of
force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of
force constitutional.").
87 One of the most "odious features of writs of assistance [was] the unbridled discre-
tion given public officials to choose targets of the searches." Shirley M. Hufstedler,
Invisible Searches for Intangible Things: Regulation of Governmental Information Gath-
ering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (1979); see also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523, 528 (1967) ("The basic purpose of this Amendment ... is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental offi-
cials."); Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 417 ("A paramount purpose of the [F]ourth
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that cherishes the "right to be let alone,"'8 the Fourth Amendment compels
the Court to articulate constitutional standards that protect the individual
from arbitrary or intimidating police conduct, whatever the officer's actual
intent. The Brower opinion fails to persuade because it focuses on a specific
historical practice (writs of assistance) while refusing to address the funda-
mental purposes underlying the Fourth Amendment and the role that the
officer's perspective plays in furthering or frustrating those purposes.
In summary, the Court's seizure-of-the-person decisions in Mendenhall,
Hodari D., and Brower, evoke the rationale often given to the student who
questions why he or she received less than an "A" on his or her examina-
tion: "It's not that what was said is wrong, it's what wasn't said. The fault
lies in the failure to adequately address all aspects of the question."
B. Consensual Searches of Property
1. The Citizen's Perspective
The essence of the Mendenhall test for a seizure of the person is the
possibility of choice, that is, whether a reasonable person would have under-
stood that he or she was free to leave. The possibility of choice is also the
essence of determining a suspect's consent to a search of his or her proper-
ty, but here the choice must be that of the actual suspect, not a hypothetical
person. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,"9 all the Justices agreed that the de-
terminative factor was the citizen's subjective decision to consent to a
search of his property. 9 The only controversy in the case centered on
whether the citizen's "consent" must be a knowing and intelligent waiver of
the right to be free from unreasonable searches, or whether the consent need
only be voluntary in that there was no impermissible police coercion.9 The
Schneckloth majority concluded that the waiver standard was limited to
[A]mendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches and seizures as well as unjustified
searches and seizures."); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment As a Device for
Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1236 (1983) ("Virtually every signifi-
cant prerevolutionary search or seizure involved a nonspecific or arbitrarily obtained
warrant.").
88 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
89 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
9' "[A]ccount must be taken of ... the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person who consents." Id. at 229.
9' Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness
Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 66 (1989). Although writing
of the voluntariness of confessions, Professor Benner's observation applies equally to
voluntary consent to search. "The central teaching of Connelly [479 U.S. 157 (1986)] is
that voluntariness simply entails the absence of official coercion, and does not otherwise
require ethical conduct or fairness in dealing with the accused." Id.
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those constitutional rights that "protect a fair trial and the reliability of the
truth-determining process."92 The strict requirement for knowing and intel-
ligent waiver thus should not be applied to the Fourth Amendment because
its protections "have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair ascer-
tainment of truth at a criminal trial. 93
Having relegated the Fourth Amendment to less exalted status than those
constitutional rights serving truth and justice,94 the Court in Schneckloth
sought a less stringent standard for measuring consensual searches. The
appropriate standard conveniently was found in the Court's approach to the
voluntariness of confessions.95  As is the case with confessions,
voluntariness of a consent to search turns upon whether the consent is the
product of a person's free and unconstrained choice, or whether the will of
the individual searched was overborne and his capacity for self-determina-
tion critically impaired. 96 With respect to both confessions and searches,
voluntariness thus is determined by examining the totality of the circum-
stances, including a defendant's personal characteristics.
The Court's decision in Schneckloth to substitute voluntariness for
knowing waiver, and the Court's refusal to extend Miranda-style warnings
to the Fourth Amendment,97 is revisited in Part II of this Article.9" Justice
9 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 236.
9' Id. at 242. The dominance of the exclusionary rule in Schneckloth was even more
apparent in Justice Powell's concurring opinion, which sought to limit the Court's habe-
as corpus review of Fourth Amendment violations. See id. at 250 (Powell, J., concur-
ring). Justice Powell maintained that federal habeas corpus review of Fourth Amend-
ment violations did not serve "the central reason for habeas corpus: the affording of
means, through an extraordinary writ, of redressing an unjust incarceration.... Prison-
ers raising Fourth Amendment claims collaterally usually are quite justly detained." Id.
at 257-58 (Powell, J., concurring).
See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dis-
senting) ("We cannot give some constitutional rights a preferred position without rele-
gating others to a deferred position; we can establish no firsts without thereby establish-
ing seconds. Indications are not wanting that Fourth Amendment freedoms are tacitly
marked as secondary rights, to be relegated to a deferred position.").
'9 "The most extensive judicial exposition of the meaning of 'voluntariness' has
been developed in those cases in which the Court has had to determine the
'voluntariness' of a defendant's confession for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 223.
See id. at 225.
According to the Court in Schneckloth, the basis for the Miranda decision "was
the need to protect the fairness of the trial itself." Id. at 240. Although borrowing freely
from the Court's confession cases, the Court in Schneckloth refused to follow the pro-
gression of that line of cases to Miranda. A defendant's subjective knowledge of a right
to refuse consent is thus one relevant circumstance in determining voluntary consent,
but "knowledge of a right to refuse is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent." Id. at
234.
9 See infra text accompanying note 147.
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Marshall's dissent in Schneckloth pointed to one underlying theme that
might guide the Court's choice of perspectives when interpreting the Fourth
Amendment. According to Justice Marshall: "The Constitution guaran-
tees.., a society of free choice. Such a society presupposes the capacity of
its members to choose, . . . [and] the capacity to choose necessarily depends
upon knowledge that there is a choice to be made."99 Even without Justice
Marshall's endorsement of a broad right to free choice, Schneckloth remains
the high-water mark for judicial adoption of the citizen's perspective be-
cause all the Justices agreed that the citizen's subjective state of mind
should govern consensual searches of property.1" In Schneckloth, however,
the Court foreshadowed its inability to maintain a focus on the defendant's
subjective perspective by suggesting that "a 'waiver' approach to consent
searches would be thoroughly inconsistent with our decisions that have ap-
proved 'third-party consents.......
2. A Third Party's Perspective
As Schneckloth suggests, the issue of third-party consent is paradoxical
if conceived of as one person waiving another person's constitutional
rights.102 The third-party consent cases that troubled the Court in
Schneckloth, however, were only tangentially related to a third party's per-
spective. Two of those cases, Chapman v. United States °3 and Stoner v.
California,"° stand for the unsurprising proposition that landlords and ho-
tel clerks (or other third parties with limited property-law claims to the
9 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in
the result)).
"o The Court's focus on voluntariness in Schneckloth was reaffirmed in Ohio v.
Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
101 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 245.
102 "To conclude that a [F]ourth [A]mendment right to privacy may be lost because a
person with no or little stake in the outcome decides to throw it away is bizarre." Dan-
iel L. Rotenberg, An Essay on Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175,
180 (1991).
103 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961) (explaining that vesting the landlord with authority to
consent "would reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave [tenants'] homes
secure only in the discretion of [landlords]") (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
- 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) ("It is important to bear in mind that it was the
petitioner's constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the night clerk's nor
the hotel's. It was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner could waive by word or
deed, either directly or through an agent."). The Court in Stoner also discounted the
police officer's perspective because "there [was] nothing in the record to indicate that
the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been authorized
by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner's room." Id.
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premises being searched) cannot consent to a search of their tenants' resi-
dences. The remaining third-party consent case, Frazier v. Cupp," is
inconsistent with a waiver theory, but it is best viewed as a precursor to the
Court's shift toward the police officer's perspective. In Frazier, the
defendant's cousin consented to the search of a duffel bag owned by the
defendant but jointly used by both the defendant and the cousin. Despite this
mutual access to the duffel bag, the defendant informed the Court that the
cousin had permission to use only one compartment of the bag and thus
lacked authority to consent to a search of the other compartments in which
the incriminating evidence was found. The Court ridiculed this contention as
a "metaphysical subtlety" and stated that the defendant "must be taken to
have assumed the risk that [the cousin] would allow someone else to look
inside. '' "°
Frazier is a case that cries out for consideration of the officer's perspec-
tive. A reasonable officer, dealing with what appears to be a simple duffel
bag, would have had no way of knowing about the secret subjective limita-
tions on the suspect's apparently total control of the bag. It is in this sense
that the defendant's argument becomes a metaphysical subtlety contrasting
secret subjective intentions with objective manifestations of control. Frazier
would have been an easy decision if the Court had been prepared to apply
the officer's perspective, but it would take another twenty years before the
Court would do so.a
Frazier was not a mere misstep on the Court's path to adopting the
police perspective. Frazier and subsequent third-party consent cases actually
reinforced the citizen perspective (so long as one discards the Court's super-
ficial reference to assumption of risk). In theory and practice, third-party
consent does not rest upon an explicit or implicit delegation of authority by
defendants who, as a general rule, never pondered the possibility or risk of a
third-party sanctioning a search or seizure." The proper justification for
such consent is the third party's independent right to admit police to proper-
05 In Chapman, the government argued that, by using his rented house as an illegal
distillery, the defendant "forfeited" his rights as a tenant; thus the landlord had a com-
mon-law right to enter and to bring police officers with him. See Chapman, 365 U.S. at
616.
10M 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
107 Id. at 740.
1o8 See infra text accompanying note 115.
""9 The clearest case of third-party consent would be a situation in which the defen-
dant explicitly authorized an agent to consent to a search. Fourth Amendment rights
may be waived "by word or deed, either directly or through an agent." Stoner, 376 U.S.
at 489. It is not surprising that the Court has never encountered such a case "because
people living agreeably together usually do not arrive at explicit, regular practices; they
proceed by understandings that are most satisfactory if they are imprecise, flexible, and
unstated." Weinreb, supra note 25, at 63.
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ty that he or she jointly controls. As United States v. Matlock. ° subse-
quently recognized, "any of the co-inhabitants [of a residence] has the right
to permit the inspection in his own right ....
In third-party consent cases, the proper question for the Court is whether
the third party "possessed common authority over or other sufficient rela-
tionship to the premises" ' so that command over admitting the police
necessarily. accompanies such control. In short, the landlord and hotel clerk
in Chapman and Stoner did not have this power, while the co-inhabitant in
Matlock did. One may quibble over the degree of control that necessarily
conveys authority to admit the police, but this is a legal question for the
Court, not a choice consciously or unconsciously made by the defen-
dant."3 Assumption of risk is thus a pure fiction masquerading as a con-
cern for the defendant's perspective. Once the Court recognizes that a cer-
tain degree of lawful physical control vests a third person with authority to
admit the police, the Court may apply the third party's perspective notwith-
standing the defendant's wishes. For example, if two co-tenants fully control
access to shared premises, each may admit anyone. In so doing, one tenant
is not waiving the rights of the other, but merely is exercising his own pow-
er to do as he or she pleases with the property. Viewed in this light, third-
party consent does not involve a separate and distinct perspective. It is still
the citizen's perspective, though it is not the citizen who ultimately winds
up as the criminal defendant.
3. The Police Officer's Perspective
After ignoring the police officer's perspective in Frazier, and expressly
reserving ruling on the issue in United States v. Matlock,"4 the Court
adopted the police officer's perspective in Illinois v. Rodriguez"5 by up-
holding a search based on apparent authority as viewed from the officer's
standpoint. The consent in Rodriguez was given by a woman who referred
to the defendant's apartment as "our" apartment, and who informed the
415 U.S. 164 (1974).
I Id. at 171 n.7 (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 170.
"' The relationship between the consenter, the defendant, and the areas searched is
not a factual question, but "an inherently legal one." United States v. Kim, 105 F.3d
1579, 1581 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 844 (9th
Cir. 1986)). An appellate court thus conducts a de novo review in order "to 'consider
abstract legal doctrines, to weigh underlying policy considerations, and to balance com-
peting legal interests."' Id. (quoting Hamilton, 792 F.2d at 844 (quoting United States v.
McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824
(1984))).
114 415 U.S. at 178 n.14.
-' 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
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police that she had clothes and furniture there. In fact, the woman had va-
cated the apartment a month before the search, and the Court conceded that
she had no actual authority over the premise. Nonetheless, the Court held
that the Fourth Amendment does not require factual accuracy on the part of
the police."
6
The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth
Amendment is to impose a standard of "reasonableness"
upon the exercise of discretion by government officials. The
only basis for contending that the constitutional standard
could not possibly have been met here is the argument that
reasonableness must be judged by the facts as they were,
rather than by the facts as they [appeared to the officer]." 7
Rodriguez's endorsement of the police viewpoint reflects the Court's emerg-
ing view of the fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment: What is
demanded of police "is not that they always be correct, but that they always
be reasonable.""1
8
The Court reinforced this emphasis on the reasonable officer's perspec-
tive in Florida v. Jimeno,"9 in which the officer's perception of appear-
ances was extended beyond third-party consent situations and applied to the
scope of consent given by the defendant. In Jimeno, the defendant consented
to a search of his vehicle, but the lower court ruled that the consent did not
extend to the officer's separate act of opening a container found within the
vehicle. 2 According to the trial court, "if the police wish to search closed
containers within a car they must separately request permission to search
each container."'' The Supreme Court, however, found this approach to
be in conflict with "the Fourth Amendment's basic test of objective reason-
ableness,"'2 which Jimeno referred to as "the touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment."'2 The Court held that "the standard for measuring the scope
of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective'
reasonableness-what would the typical reasonable person have understood
11 See id. at 185.
17 Id. at 186 n.1 (emphasis added).
118 Id. at 185.
500 U.S. 248 (1991).
120 See State v. Jimeno, 550 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (declaring that
consent to a general search for narcotics does not extend to sealed containers within the
general area agreed to by the defendant).
21 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 250.
698 [Vol. 6:3
CHOOSING PERSPECTIVES IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
by the exchange?"'' As in Rodriguez, what is demanded of police "is not
that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable."'"
Rodriguez's and Jimeno's endorsement of the police officer's perspec-
tive rests upon the Court's use of the word "reasonable" in two distinct
manners. The Court used reasonableness as a term of art synonymous with
constitutionality, and, at the same time, a description of the searching
officer's rational analysis of the situation. This approach conceptualizes the
Fourth Amendment as a limited guarantee that although "subjective good-
faith belief would not in itself justify"' 6 a governmental intrusion upon
individual privacy, at least some searches and seizures are constitutional
when based on "understandable," excusable mistakes by the police; 7
however, the history of the Fourth Amendment teaches that constitutionality
hinges on more than individual ad hoc decisions, no matter how reasonable,
understandable, or excusable they may have appeared to the searching offi-
cer. The full implications of this and other views of the Fourth Amendment,
and their effect on choosing perspectives, are considered in the next section.
II. A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO CHOOSING PERSPECTIVES
When setting out to structure a principled process for judicial adoptions
of interpretive perspectives, the first question that arises is: At what level of
generality should the Court operate?"2 Should the Court settle on some
fundamental constitutional principle that favors a particular perspective?
Should the Court even concern itself with consistency, foolish or otherwise,
when choosing among various perspectives? One solution to such broad
questions is to abandon them in favor of a narrower, pragmatic approach
that merely asks which perspective works best in each unique situation. In
other words, instead of judging legal principles according to their logical
consistency, "it is much more important to study their social operation and
the effects which they produce."' 29 This form of pragmatic utilitar-
ianism 3' discounts any inherent value in favoring the viewpoint of a citi-
zen, police officer, or hypothetical person, because these perspectives are
'2 Id. at 250-51.
125 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185.
126 Id.
127 Id. (quoting Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987)).
"s "The question remains at what level of generality and in what shape rules should
be designed in order to encompass all that can be encompassed without throwing orga-
nization to the wolves." Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 377.
129 Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 514 (1912).
130 See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555 (1996) (compar-
ing legal formalism with pragmatism).
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seen merely as tools to be utilized in serving the public welfare as perceived
from a broad social perspective. Pragmatic utilitarianism propels the Court
to the forefront, where it decides what is best for society without deferring
to other decision makers.
A. Pragmatic Utilitarianism from the Court's Perspective
Nineteenth-century legal formalism dominated American judicial'thought
when the Supreme Court encountered its first important Fourth Amendment
case, Boyd v. United States.' Legal formalism in its most rigorous mani-
festation espoused the view that adjudication proceeds by deduction from
virtually absolute legal principles rooted in natural law and enshrined in
both the common law and the Constitution. Pursuant to this view, constitu-
tional rights and the rules enforcing them were to be "applied rigorously
even if this produced results that conflicted with important social goals, such
as efficient law enforcement."'' Legal formalism led the Court to con-
clude in Boyd that the Fourth Amendment is to provide absolute protection
of private papers no matter how reasonably the government were to proceed
in obtaining a warrant or subpoena satisfying the probable cause and partic-
ularity requirements of the Amendment.'33
By the time the Court encountered a sizable body of search-and-seizure
cases during the prohibition era, legal formalism came under heavy attack
from the more pragmatic and relativist vision of law associated with the
legal realists. The legal realists derided formalism's pretensions of objectivi-
ty, while insisting that the Court must weigh social policies and assess all
the facts and circumstances of a case in order to determine the most just or
socially desirable outcome." This relativistic debate over sound social
policy came to the forefront when the issue of government wiretapping
arose in Olmstead v. United States.35
In eloquent language that appeals to Americans as diverse as laissez-
faire business men and paramilitary cults, Justice Brandeis's dissent in
Olmstead put forth Brandeis's view of the contribution the Fourth Amend-
ment makes to our society:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
131 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
132 See Cloud, supra note 130, at 566.
133 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634-35.
134 "The Fourth Amendment is to be construed ... in a manner which will conserve
public interests as well as the interest and rights of individual citizens." Carroll v. Unit-
ed States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
.3' 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and
of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, plea-
sure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjusti-
fiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment."3
Justice Holmes, who was at times another leading proponent of legal real-
ism, straightforwardly confessed that he approached the issue in Olmstead
by balancing the "two objects of desire ... that criminals should be detect-
ed ... [and] that the Government should not itself foster and pay for other
crimes. ' For Holmes, it was "less evil that some criminals should escape
than that the Government should play an ignoble part."' 38
Much of modern-day constitutional jurisprudence has embraced the type
of pragmatic interest balancing championed by Justices Brandeis and
Holmes. The most militant of today's pragmatists reject the notion that
individual rights can trump social policies, and instead insist that constitu-
tional rights must justify themselves in terms of their contribution to total
social welfare.'39 The Fourth Amendment, because of its socially costly
136 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
138 Id. Perhaps the most revealing description of this pragmatic approach is Justice
Cardozo's merger of the legislative and judicial functions:
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: logic, and
history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right conduct, are
forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the law. Which of
these forces shall dominate in any case, must depend largely upon the compara-
tive importance or value of the social interests that will thereby be promoted or
impaired .... If you ask how [the judge] is to know when one interest outweighs
another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator
gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself. Here,
indeed, is the point of contact between the legislator's work and [the judge's].
The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in the end be guided by
like considerations for the one as for the other. Each indeed is legislating within
the limits of his competence.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921).
'39 "[T]he undeniable message is that those calling for greater protection of a 'right'
had better be prepared to explain how the protection benefits not only the individual
claimant but all of society." Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Priva-
cy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1765
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"remedy" of suppressing relevant evidence, has suffered most from this
form of pragmatic interest balancing. 4' Handicapped by the current
Court's hostility to the harmful effects of the exclusionary rule, Boyd's
formalistic view of the Fourth Amendment has given way to "consequential
reasoning that emphasizes not individual rights but the instrumental use of
the law to achieve social and government policy goals.'' Balancing com-
peting societal interests such as crime prevention and deterrence of police
misconduct thus has emerged as the keynote of the Court's interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment. 142
In the past few decades, judicial attempts to balance individual rights
against community interests have tended to ride roughshod over the
individual's perspective.'43 The Jimeno majority, for example, adopted the
officer's perception that he had a broad grant of authority to search the
defendant's vehicle because "the community has a real interest in encourag-
ing consent."'" In turn, encouraging consent serves the laudable social
goal of protecting the innocent, "for the resulting search may yield neces-
sary evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may
insure that a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal
offense."'45 In dissent, however, Justice Marshall saw a far different social
policy at work because he viewed adoption of the police officer's perspec-
tive as encouraging the police to exploit "the ignorance of a citizen.,'1
46
Justice Marshall rejected the Jimeno majority's view of what was in the
community's interest and the type of community the Fourth Amendment
seeks to preserve:
(1994).
140 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973) (holding that Fourth Amendment issues may not be raised in federal habeas
corpus petitions unless the state denied the defendant a full and fair hearing on the
issue). Stone and Schneckloth present the most striking examples of the way the Court
has relegated the Fourth Amendment, and its socially costly exclusionary rule, to some
lower class of constitutional rights. The Court has not provided this class of rights with
the deference reserved for constitutional rights that further truth, justice, and the Ameri-
can way.
141 Cloud, supra note 130, at 598.
142 "[T]he balancing of competing interests [is] the key principle of the Fourth
Amendment." Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
143 See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 202 (1993) ("Fourth Amendment pragmatism produces
outcomes that diminish the scope of individual liberty while increasing government
power .... ").
144 Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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[T]he majority is claiming that "the community has a real
interest" not in encouraging citizens to consent to investiga-
tory efforts of their law enforcement agents, but rather in
encouraging individuals to be duped by them. This is not the
community that the Fourth Amendment contemplates." 7
Today, those who advocate Justice Marshall's concern for individual
rights "must address why, in a world plagued by terrorism, drug cartels, and
drive-by-killings, the Court's definition of 'unreasonable searches and
seizures' should not give deference to heightened law enforcement
needs .... .""' The preordained failure of such advocacy is obvious in
such cases as Pennsylvania v. Mimms'49 and Maryland v. Wilson,'s in
which the Court was asked to rule on a police practice of ordering all mo-
torists out of their vehicles "as a matter of course whenever they had been
stopped for a traffic violation.' 51 In Mimms and Wilson, the Court ad-
dressed this uniform practice without inquiring whether the individual police
officer had any suspicion that the particular motorist was likely to be armed
and dangerous.5 5 The Court concluded that uniform treatment of motorists
as a class was justified by statistical evidence "that a significant percentage
of murders of police officers occurs when the officers are making traffic
stops.'" s3 Regardless of the particular facts of a given case, the generalized
'"' Id. at 256 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The same type of conflicting views of the
good society and the pragmatic way to achieve it are apparent in the Court's refusal in
Schneckloth to graft Miranda-style warnings onto the Fourth Amendment because such
warnings were "thoroughly impractical." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 231. Justice Marshall
again saw the issue differently:
When the Court speaks of practicality, what it really is talking of is the continued
ability of the police to capitalize on the ignorance of citizens so as to accomplish
by subterfuge what they could not achieve by relying only on the knowing relin-
quishment of constitutional rights.
Id. at 288 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148 Sundby, supra note 139, at 1771.
149 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
150 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
151 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; see also Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 884.
152 See Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109; Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886. The state conceded in
Mimms that "the officer had no reason to suspect foul play from the particular driver at
the time of the stop, there having been nothing unusual or suspicious about his behav-
ior." Mimms, 434 U.S. at 109; see also Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 886.
153 Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110; see also Wilson, 117 S. Ct. at 883. This time it was
Justice Stevens who contended that the majority's view in Mimms was not faithful to
the community that the Fourth Amendment contemplates: "[W]hether viewed from the
standpoint of the officer's interest in his own safety, or of the citizen's interest in not
being required to obey an arbitrary command, it is perfectly obvious that the millions of
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governmental interest in protecting police from attack by armed motorists
was deemed to outweigh the generalized privacy interest of motorists as a
class. 154
Whether dealing with a class of the citizenry such as motorists, or an
individual citizen confronted by a solitary police officer, the Court employs
the same pragmatic balancing of governmental and individual interests to
resolve all Fourth Amendment issues.1" Taken to its logical end, the
Court's pragmatic utilitarianism reduces all Fourth Amendment deliberations
to two related fundamental inquiries: (1) How much and what type of priva-
cy or liberty does a reasonably free society require, and (2) how much and
what type of intrusion upon privacy or liberty is required to further a rea-
sonably well-ordered society?' If the Court must grapple with such ques-
traffic stops that occur every year are not fungible." Mimms, 434 U.S. at 120-21
(Stevens, J., dissenting). To Justice Stevens, the majority's willingness to manipulate
individual motorists for the general good of society fulfilled the legal realists' view that
"the law does undoubtedly treat the individual as a means to an end .... [J]ustice to
the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the
scales." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 40-41 (Mark DeWolfe Howe
ed., Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
" Cf Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997) (rejecting a per se rule that
would eliminate the need for knock and notice in all felony drug investigations).
[W]hile drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety and
the preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to
a substantial degree.... If a per se exception were allowed for each category of
criminal investigation that included a considerable-albeit hypothetical-risk of
danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element of
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement would be meaningless.
Id. at 1421.
' "The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise
definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing of the need for
the particular search against the invasion of the personal rights that the search entails."
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979) (emphasis added). Balancing "has the danger
of becoming a sort of universal solvent, operating as a technique for resolving all con-
stitutional questions without much regard for the choices authoritatively expressed in the
language of that document itself." James White, The Fourth Amendment As a Way of
Talking about People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 165, 171.
156 "[T]he practical calculus evident in the search and seizure corpus is to decide how
much individual liberty is compatible with the social interest in security." Gerard V.
Bradley, The Constitutional Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 38 DEPAUL L. REV. 817,
859 (1989); see also Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 61 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(noting that the Constitution and Bill of Rights can be seen as "the maximum restric-
tions upon the power of organized society over the individual that are compatible with
the maintenance of organized society itself"); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 13
(1966) (claiming that issues raised under the Fourth Amendment "bring into sharp focus
the classic dilemma of order vs. liberty in the democratic state").
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tions in order to formulate a grand scheme for the good society, 5 ' it
seems almost impertinent to point out that the Court has neglected the issue
of choosing perspectives and has been inconsistent in the choices that it has
made. Understandably, the Court is concerned primarily with the far weight-
ier criticism of the undemocratic nature of judicial utilitarianism. Told by
countless commentators that the Court has no legitimate claim to making
moral and political decisions based on its conception of a good society,5 '
it is not surprising that the Court has thrown up its hands and confessed:
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only
the general standard of "unreasonableness" as a guide in
determining whether searches and seizures meet the standard
of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant is not re-
quired. Very little that has been said in our previous deci-
sions ... and very little that we might say here can usefully
refine the language of the Amendment itself in order to
evolve some detailed formula for judging cases such as
this.159
One certainly can empathize with the Court's frustration when called
upon to justify whether its decisions meaningfully contribute to building a
utopia." After all, professors can ignore tough cases or postpone mean-
ingful consideration until the next sabbatical, but the Court must decide real
cases that affect real people.'6 ' Forced to act in an imperfect world, the
Court is understandably tempted to pass on its burden to others. 62 As Pro-
"5 One rather strident comment on the death of legal formalism and the rise of legal
realism contended: "No longer could the judiciary hide behind the facade of essentially
indeterminate deductions from so-called absolute moral principles in order to force upon
society its own values and thereby obstruct progress toward maximum social efficien-
cy." Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy Under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 966 (1977).
15 "The presence of the word 'unreasonable' in the text of the Fourth Amendment
does not grant a shifting majority of this Court the authority to answer all Fourth
Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the social good." New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 370 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
159 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 448 (1973).
"6 See John B. Mitchell, What Went Wrong with the Warren Court's Conception of
the Fourth Amendment?, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 35, 42-43 (1992) (suggesting that the
Court must rethink the Amendment in terms of keeping with some basic vision of
America).
161 "Authority cannot be conceded to persons because they are right-the authority
must preexist their right or wrong judgment and must survive it too-and judges decide
cases by virtue of their authority, and not because they are any more likely to be right
than other people." Charles Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the
Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REV. 755, 761 (1963).
162 "[G]iven the magnitude of the type of societal problems that governmental intru-
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fessor Tribe suggested, "[a]bdicating responsibility for choice, then, is a
characteristic sin of the current Court.' ' 63 At times, the Court's burden has
been passed to police, hypothetical reasonable people, or individual citizens,
whose perspectives are utilized to resolve Fourth Amendment issues.
B. Reasonableness from the Police Officer's Perspective
If the Court merits our compassion as it grapples with molding the law
to serve society, the police are entitled to our commiseration when they
confront an increasingly violent class of criminal in modern-day America.
For example, an officer's sense of danger during street encounters may be
both real and accurate, yet difficult to reconstruct and articulate in some
concrete fashion.
We have all seen people so hard or mean in appearance that
they make us feel uncomfortable, perhaps to the point of
crossing the street or moving our seat on the subway. We
have confidence in such judgments, and act on them our-
selves, yet how could we explain them in a court of law?
How can we ask an officer to do so?' 6
In an imperfect world where correct answers are uncertain, a "pragmatic"
Court recognizes that it must muddle through to the best of its ability, and
that it can hardly ask more from the police. Thus, the Court often deter-
mines the constitutionality of police conduct "by resorting to a malleable
'objective' test of reasonableness viewed from the police officer's perspec-
tive,"165 and "any police conduct that is 'understandable' in the circum-
sions will address-such as weapons possession, drunk driving, drug use, and gang
activity-judicial review increasingly will defer to the government's judgment that the
intrusion was necessary." Sundby, supra note 139, at 1768-69. -
163 Laurence H. Tribe, Seven Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a
Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 155, 170 (1984).
'" White, supra note 155, at 199.
16 Cloud, supra note 143, at 265; see also Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the War-
rant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 477
(1991):
Although the [F]ourth [A]mendment conveys to "the People [the right] to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," the reasonableness approach
focuses on the acts of the police instead of the rights of the people. The question,
then, becomes whether the police acted reasonably rather than whether a person's
rights were violated. This approach endorses retrospective evaluations of police
behavior rather than prospective protections.
(footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV.).
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stances according to common sense [will] be judged 'reasonable' for pur-
poses of assessing the constitutionality of police intrusions."' ,
Although the Court's adoption of the officer's viewpoint is defensible,
once again one may ask for a fuller explanation of the way the Court chose
this perspective. Why did the Court choose to empathize with the officer's
plight while turning a deaf ear to citizens of Spanish descent who were
singled out at roadblocks,'67 or to international travelers who were held
incommunicado for twenty-four hours in a "dry cell" until they furnished a
bowel sample?'68 The distasteful answer may be that in the actual cases
that reach the Court, the defendants usually are guilty of some serious
crime. The obvious guilt of the balloon-swallowing drug smuggler in United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez,'69 allowed the Court to brush aside the
defendant's twenty-four hour confinement in a "dry cell" by noting that the
"detention was long, uncomfortable, indeed, humiliating; but both its length
and its discomfort resulted solely from the method by which she chose to
smuggle illicit drugs into this country. '  Does the Court's choice of per-
spective really come down to sorting out the good guys from the bad guys
in each case? If so, the Fourth Amendment is in deeper trouble than previ-
ously recognized because the champions of our Fourth Amendment rights
are often the least sympathetic characters in existence.17" ' If Fourth Amend-
ment cases turn on the relative blameworthiness of police and defendants,
cynics are correct in suggesting that the inconsistency in the Court's reason-
ing disappears when the true unifying principle is recognized-the govern-
ment wins!'
166 Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v.
Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exag-
gerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 52-53 (1991); see, e.g.,
United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) ("[C]ourts should not invalidate
the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense,
manner.").
167 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
161 See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
169 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
170 Id. at 544.
171 "It is a fair summary of history to say that the safeguards of liberty have frequent-
ly been forged in controversies involving not very nice people." United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "One who would de-
fend the Fourth Amendment must share his foxhole with scoundrels of every sort, but
to abandon the post because of the poor company is to sell freedom cheaply." Kopf v.
Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 379-80 (4th Cir. 1993).
1 "If the Court can identify any plausible goal or reason that promotes law enforce-
ment interests, the challenged police intrusion is considered reasonable and the constitu-
tional inquiry is over." Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 200 (1993).
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In its rush to condemn the guilty, the Court has overlooked the fact that
the standards it has fashioned to govern the ferreting out of the guilty apply
equally to the detention of the innocent. Empirical data indicates that the
sins of the few weigh heavily on the blameless. According to the dissent in
Montoya, "[o]ne physician who at the request of customs officials conducted
many 'internal searches'-rectal and vaginal examinations and stomach
pumping--estimated that he had found contraband in only 15 to 20 percent
of the persons he had examined.""' Other estimates suggested that "only
16 percent of women subjected to body-cavity searches at the border were
in fact found to be carrying contraband."'74
The ability to look beyond the obvious guilt of a particular defendant
requires judicial foresight, discipline, and courage, and it may be impossible
for judges to completely ignore the severity of the crime committed by a
defendant.'75 At a minimum, judges are painfully aware of the tension be-
tween protecting rights and knowing that some will abuse those rights and
act irresponsibly.
The First Amendment is the constitutional shelter for pro-
gressive visionaries, but it is also the refuge of those who
preach hatred. And while the Fourth Amendment erects a
barrier from government intrusion for those who wish to live
peacefully, it is also a barrier behind which the drug smug-
gler will try to hide.176
In a society simultaneously fearful of crime and resentful of "jack-booted"
government authorities, there is no avoiding the inevitable tension between
security against the government and security that depends on government
efforts to control crime.
In the final analysis, however, even the guilty are entitled to protection
against overbearing government intrusions, and to some extent we must take
the Court at its word that it strives to "prevent hindsight from coloring the
evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure."' 77 What then, oth-
173 Montoya, 473 U.S. at 557 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
174 Id.
17 See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting):
I should candidly strive hard to sustain [a roadblock without probable cause] ...
because it might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the
only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime. But I should not
strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a few bottles of
bourbon and catch a bootlegger.
176 Sundby, supra note 140, at 1808.
177 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976); see also United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948) (A Fourth Amendment entry of a home can-
not "be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does
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er than the coiparative moral worth of police and criminal defendants,
motivates the Court to adopt the police officer's perspective? Professor
LaFave has suggested that Fourth Amendment doctrine
is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-
day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that
are readily applicable by the police in the context of the law
enforcement activities in which they are necessarily engaged.
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of
ifs, ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nu-
ances and hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady
stuff upon which the facile minds of lawyers and judges
eagerly feed, but they may be "literally impossible of appli-
cation by the officer in the field." '78
At times, the Court has embraced Professor LaFave's approach by announc-
ing that "the first principle" of Fourth Amendment interpretation is that the
constitutional standard must be "workable for application by rank-and-file,
trained police officers;" ' however, formulating rules that are clear in ap-
plication says little about the substance of those rules.' "Don't search on
Thursdays" is a clear rule furthering privacy interests; "search all teenagers
who are in public after 11 p.m." is a clear rule diminishing privacy. Does
the Fourth Amendment have nothing to say about the desirability of these
equally clear rules? Once the Court settles on the conditions under which a
search or seizure may occur, we would all hope that the Court will be as
lucid as possible in defining the contours of such reasonable searches. This
is as fundamental as mom and apple pie; the police are not unique in prefer-
ring clarity over ambiguity.' If, however, clarity is all that the police
want, one very clear rule would be "when in doubt, don't search," or at
not change character from its success.").
178 Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Proce-
dures:" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. Cr. REV. 127, 141 (citations omitted).
179 Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772 (1983).
i'o Professor LaFave did not advocate clarity as the sole or dominant consideration,
but instead argued that clarity plays a role in the calculus of balancing government and
individual interests. He suggested that a rule, theoretically correct only 95% of the time,
but understandable in virtually all cases, is preferable to a rule that is 100% theoretical-
ly correct, but which police could apply correctly only 75% of the time. See Wayne
LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court: Further Ventures into the
"Quagmire," 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9, 30 n.76 (1972).
181 "[A] body of law is more rational and more civilized when every rule it contains
is referred articulately and definitely to an end which it subserves, and when the
grounds for desiring that end are- stated or are ready to be stated in words." OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 186 (1920).
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least don't search until the doubt is resolved. This was the essence of the
lower court's holding in Jimeno that police cannot open containers found in
a defendant's automobile unless they obtain permission to search not just
the vehicle, but the particular container.'82 The Supreme Court, however,
rejected this clear rule in favor of an uncertain inquiry into how a reason-
able officer might interpret permission to search an automobile.
The Court's vacillation between vague and well-defined standards'83
may stem from its realization that the quest for clearly stated, determinative
rules is futile. "[A]ny attempt to achieve certainty regarding any important
constitutional issue is unlikely to succeed and--even if it does succeed in
the short run-will inevitably create uncertainty as to more issues than it
settles."'" For example, in Hodari D.,"85 the Court sought to make the
constitutional criteria for seizures of the person contingent upon factual
predicates that police officers can readily understand-submission to author-
ity or physical touching. In Hodari D., the Court announced a seemingly
absolute rule that a seizure may be "accomplished by merely touching,
however slightly, the body of the accused .... ""' However, in the very
next seizure-of-a-person case, Florida v. Bostick,"7 the Court was asked to
apply this absolute rule to a situation in which the police officer "physically
touched the defendant's foot to get his attention."' 8 The Bostick opinion's
failure to address this contention suggests that the "absolute rule" announced
in Hodari D. had been modified to recognize that certain forms of touching
are insufficient for a seizure.8 9
The inability to formulate clear rules for addressing the myriad of situ-
ations in which police intrude upon privacy and security increasingly leads
the Court to adopt one overarching rule for the police; just use your com-
mon sense and act reasonably. As formulated in Terry v. Ohio, the standard
is whether "the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or
182 See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
..3 See Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 22 (1988) (illustrating that the Court has failed
to explain why it sometimes uses balancing and sometimes uses rigid rules).
" Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 1, 2 (1986).
18 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
186 Id. at 625 (quoting A. CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 163-64 (2d ed. 1930)).
187 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
188 [Arguments Heard:] Florida v. Bostick, 48 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 3161, 3163
(U.S. Mar. 6, 1991).
18 See United States v. Burrell, 286 A.2d 845, 846 (D.C. 1972) (holding that physi-
cal contact is acceptable if it is "a normal means of attracting a person's attention"); see
also United States v. Zapata, 18 F.3d 971 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that an officer who
placed his hand on a defendant's back for two or three seconds effected a seizure, but
not an arrest).
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the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action
taken was appropriate.' 90 In Terry however, the Court was misguided in
its suggestion that a police officer could strike the constitutionally appropri-
ate balance between conflicting governmental and privacy interests by em-
ploying a common-sense, seat-of-the-pants assessment.' 9' The Court's en-
dorsement of the police officer's perspective in Terry rests upon using the
word "reasonable" as a term of art synonymous with constitutionality, and,
at the same time, a description of the searching officer's rational analysis of
the situation. By equating reasonableness as a process of logical thought
with reasonableness as a standard of constitutionally permissible behavior,
the protections of the Fourth Amendment are reduced to a prohibition
against irrational police actions. As Justice Stevens recently charged, the
Court acts "on the assumption that the constitutional protection against
'unreasonable' seizures requires nothing more than a hypothetically rational
basis for intrusions on individual liberty.' ' 192
If taken seriously, adoption of the police perspective is "an invitation to
reviewing courts to treat a police intrusion as 'reasonable' if any explanation
for the police conduct can be given."'93 This approach admittedly requires
something more than whimsy or caprice by police officers, 94 but even a
five-percent likelihood that seizable items are present in the place to be
searched would establish that the basis for the search is rational and not
wholly arbitrary. Allowing police to act on such minimal suspicion, howev-
er, would lead to an unacceptable number of unnecessarily invasive and
harassing searches and seizures. The cost to the victims of such unnecessary
1-o 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968).
191 The Court's statement in Terry regarding a belief "that the action taken was ap-
propriate," id. at 22, is a meaningless generality to the police officer on the street. See
Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and
Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 64 (1968). In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981),
the Court eschewed balancing based on the particular facts and adopted a "single famil-
iar standard" to guide police officers because officers "have only limited time and ex-
pertise to reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the spe-
cific circumstances they confront." Id. at 458.
Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 890 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3 Davies, supra note 166, at 57; see also Sundby, supra note 139, at 1769 (arguing
that importing balancing into the Fourth Amendment shifted "control from the individu-
al over the 'facts' justifying the government's power to intrude (by not engaging in
behavior giving rise to probable cause) to the government's ability to forge a
'reasonable' policy justification"). Some lower courts have taken the Supreme Court at
its word and have concluded that the Fourth Amendment requires only "some basis
from which the court can determine that the [intrusion] was not arbitrary or harassing."
Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966).
" See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985) (acknowl-
edging that customs inspectors had more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspi-
cion or hunch") (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
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intrusions is obvious, but the state also has an economic interest because
"[the lower the level of certainty required for a search and seizure, the
more state resources will be wasted in conducting it, since more mistakes
will occur."'95
Deferring to an officer's exercise of common sense also conflicts with
the Court's view that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard
requires a delicate balance between the government interest and the individ-
ual interest in privacy or liberty. The very idea of balancing implies that
each side has some merit, that some privacy interests outweigh some gov-
ernment interests, and that all forms of privacy cannot be set aside merely
because the government offers a modicum of rational justification for an
intrusion. All searches are not equal; thus, "[t]he more intrusive an investi-
gative technique is, the more assured we want to be that it will result in the
discovery of probative evidence before we allow the police to undertake
it."'96 Determining which justifications are sufficient for which types of
intrusions requires something other than ostensibly value-free objective
rationality on the part of police officers.'9 7 The Fourth Amendment is, af-
ter all, a reflection of our society's system of values, and striking the proper
balance between government and individual interests ultimately rests on a
value-laden assessment of the comparative social utility of allowing or pro-
hibiting the intrusion in question.
When the ultimate test of reasonableness is seen to be dependent upon
the social utility of the challenged search or seizure, judicial adoption of the
police perspective reverts to a form of pragmatic utilitarianism in which the
identity of the decision maker has been blurred. If the judiciary measures
the social utility of a search or seizure, then invoking the officer's perspec-
tive is flimsy camouflage because it is the Court, not the police officer, who
functions as the decision maker. Thus, when the Court states that an officer
acted reasonably (appropriately), the Court has announced its ultimate con-
clusion, not a methodology or perspective from which to assess constitution-
ally reasonable searches. In such situations, the Court employs its own ver-
sion of judicial utilitarianism, and "'reasonableness' is merely a grab-bag of
195 Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 61 n.196 (1991).
196 Id. at 49-50.
19 The police officer in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), acted rationally, but
unreasonably in the constitutional sense, by following the well-established police prac-
tice of using deadly force against fleeing felons, a practice recognized at common law
and adhered to by a majority of modern police departments. By prohibiting the use of
deadly force to apprehend nondangerous felons, the Court recognized that an
individual's right to life, and society's interest in a fair adjudication of guilt, outweighed
society's interest in effective law enforcement.
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idiosyncratic judicial choices about what kinds of police conduct are good
for society and what kinds are not."19
This covert form of judicial utilitarianism can be avoided only if the
Court truly forgoes its own evaluation of reasonableness in favor of defer-
ring to the officer's decision (so long as the officer acts rationally). 9 If
this is the thrust of embracing the officer's perspective, one can echo Pro-
fessor Maclin's query of "Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?" 2' Is it
plausible that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment intended the Reason-
ableness Clause to insure merely that the police had some minimally rational
basis for exercising their power? Professor Davies has answered this query:
It seems unlikely the Framers would have accepted that the
government can bestow generalized discretionary authority
on a police officer through the credential of a metal police
badge ... when they clearly would not have allowed the
same officer to be given the same generalized discretionary
authority in the form of a paper general warrant.2"'
It is also unlikely that the Framers would have agreed with the Court's
decision in Rodriguez" that it was reasonable for the police to search the
defendant's dwelling without a warrant and without probable cause merely
because the police were confused about who lived where. Allowing the
police to search on the basis of a reasonable, but mistaken, perception of
apparent authority encourages them to maximize their discretion to act as
they think best; however, "if the Framers had this much confidence in exec-
utive branch officials, they probably would not have written the Fourth
Amendment at all. 203
'9 Davies, supra note 166, at 61.
"[I]t is not 'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as a
matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his judgement
dictates, following the arrest." Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (emphasis
added).
2 Tracey Maclin, Constructing Fourth Amendment Principles from the Government
Perspective: Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 669, 669 (1988).
201 Davies, supra note 166, at 53 n.203.
202 See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
2 Tracey Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seri-
ously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 723, 812 (1992); see also Eric F. Saunders, Case Comment,
Electronic Eavesdropping and the Right to Privacy, 52 B.U. L. REV. 831, 843 (1972):
If the [F]ourth [A]mendment were premised on the good faith and self-restraint of
police, its controls would be superfluous. Instead, it functions as a check on abus-
es of authority and the worst tendencies of government which courts should antic-
ipate whenever the police are given an unrestricted license to [investigate] ....
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In the days before pragmatic balancing of interests dominated the
Court's analysis of searches and seizures," 4 the Warrant Clause was
viewed as recognizing that the Amendment was not intended to enshrine the
decision-making power of the police, subject only to ex ante review of a
police officer's rationality. A basic goal of the Warrant Clause is the desire
to disable the police as decision makers by avoiding the need for them to
make judgments as to the propriety of searches and seizures.
The point of the Fourth Amendment... is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."
The danger of police overzealousness infects all situations in which they act
without a warrant, particularly when they act upon apparent or ambiguous
consent. The appropriate question in Rodriguez,"7 therefore, was not
whether the police must be perfectly accurate in assessing facts, but whether
they "should be allowed to enter a home on the basis of their own assess-
ment of a third-party's status and authority when they are not allowed to
enter on the basis of their own assessment of probable cause."2 8 In
Jimeno,' 9 the appropriate question was, "Whose Amendment Is It, Any-
way?" and that question should have been answered by giving the citizen,
204 See Ronald J. Bacigal, Dodging a Bullet, But Opening Old Wounds in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 16 SETON HALL L. REv. 597 (1986) (discussing the Court's
vacillation between the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause as the dominant
concern of the Fourth Amendment).
205
The Fourth Amendment contemplates a prior judicial judgment, not the risk that
executive discretion may be reasonably exercised. This judicial role accords with
our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved
through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different
branches and levels of Government.
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) (citations omitted).
' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); see also Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("We must remember that the
extent of any privilege of search and seizure without warrant which we sustain, the
officers interpret and apply themselves and will push to the limit.").
207 See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
28 Davies, supra note 166, at 70.
209 See supra text accompanying note 119.
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not the police, the benefit of any doubt about the scope of consent to search
containers in an automobile.
Although the Warrant Clause serves to check police overzealousness,
prior judicial approval in the form of an arrest or search warrant often is
impossible to obtain. The Court is thus compelled to identify exigent cir-
cumstances that excuse the absence of a warrant. Adjusting Fourth Amend-
ment standards to account for emergencies, however, does not justify the
Court's leap to assessing the propriety of all intrusions according to a police
officer's mistaken, but forgivable, view of the circumstances. For example,
in Rodriguez, the Court claimed that assessing a person's authority to con-
sent to a search of another's residence "is the sort of recurring factual ques-
tion to which law enforcement officials must be expected to apply their
judgment; and all the Fourth Amendment requires is that they answer it
reasonably."21 The Court took as a given that the police must make this
judgment, but the Warrant Clause suggests that the judgment properly lies
with a judicial official authorized to issue search warrants. If there are no
exigencies requiring prompt action, the police should be told that they act at
their peril if they choose to bypass the warrant procedure by relying on
questionable consent."' In such situations, it seems "reasonable" to require
that the police be both rational and correct, because the lack of valid con-
sent negates their sole justification for intruding upon an individual's priva-
cy or liberty.2"2 In the absence of an emergency, submitting questions of
valid consent to a magistrate transfers decision-making power from the
police to the judiciary, an approach that is faithful to at least one view of
* 213the Framers' intent.
The other view of the Framers' intent insists that the Warrant Clause
was designed to eliminate general warrants, while the Reasonableness
Clause was to be the sole measure of the constitutionality of warrantless
searches.21 Even this view, however, does not indicate that the Framers
210 Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185.
2" "Police officers, when faced with the choice of relying on consent by a third party
or securing a warrant, should secure a warrant and must therefore accept the risk of
error should they instead choose to rely on consent." Id. at 193 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
212 Valid consent to the intrusion provides a source of legal authority for the intrusion
that would be lacking otherwise. See infra text accompanying note 278.
213 See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 43 (1937) (arguing that the War-
rant Clause defines and emphasizes the Reasonableness Clause by identifying "the kind
of search that is not unreasonable"-one carried out with judicial approval).
214 See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 41-44
(1969) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment was intended as a condemnation of general
warrants and a preference for special warrants, and that the Framers expressed no view
on warrantless searches other than that they be reasonable).
1998] 715
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
intended to give police a general amnesty for all reasonable errors. If the
Warrant Clause does not define reasonableness, we are left with the highly
dubious conclusion that the Framers endorsed the Reasonableness Clause as
a "blank check" to be filled in according to the Court's assessment of con-
flicting social interests.2" If such was the Framers' intent, it remains
doubtful that they expected the Court to pass this blank check on to law
enforcement officials who would decide if they had acted responsibly
(though erroneously) under the circumstances; however, the Court need not
rest on attempts to discern the Framers' "original intent" because the
Court's blanket approval of reasonable police errors is unfaithful to its own
balancing approach to reasonableness. In keeping with the flexible nature of
this balancing approach, why hasn't the Court recognized that certain inva-
sions of privacy (for example, the entry of a dwelling or the seizure of a
personal diary) are so serious that even reasonable mistakes cannot be toler-
ated? The Court's rejection of court-ordered surgery to obtain evidence in
Winston v. Lee"6 suggests that certain intrusions upon privacy are prohib-
ited no matter how reasonably the government might act. If the Fourth
Amendment forbids the government's "reasonable" reliance on a court order
for compulsory surgery, how can that same Amendment defer to ad hoc
decisions, even "reasonable" ones, by individual police officers?
By way of summary, the Court's adoption of the police perspective is
unsatisfactory because, in theory, it runs contra to the Framers' distrust of
police discretion and, in practice, it blurs the responsibility for determining
which searches and seizures are constitutionally reasonable. We thus are left
with two troublesome but inescapable realizations: (1) To the extent that the
Court makes an independent assessment of the propriety of an officer's
actions, the individual officer's perception is not the defining measure of
constitutional reasonableness, but merely one factor in the multifaceted ap-
plication of judicial utilitarianism; and (2) to the extent that the Court defers
to the officer's assessment of reasonableness, the Court trivializes the
citizen's interests in privacy and liberty, which properly operate as counter-
weights to the police interest in searching. By deferring to the police, "the
Court has adopted the outlook of the fox in defining the rules that will gov-
ern the henhouse. ' 21
7
215 It is "clearly wrong" to view the Framers as commissioning "the judiciary to
develop a common law of search and seizure as time goes by and as circumstances de-
mand." Bradley, supra note 156, at 851.
216 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985). "Notwithstanding the existence of probable
cause," id. at 761, and the state's full compliance with the procedures required by the
Warrant Clause, the Reasonableness Clause demands "a more substantial justification"
for this serious intrusion into the defendant's body, id. at 767.
27 Maclin, supra note 200, at 675.
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C. The Reasonable Person's Perspective
On one level, the reasonable person perspective is but a variation on the
police perspective. If we accept the premise that Fourth Amendment rea-
sonableness is a rational, commonsensical determination, then all reasonable
people, whether police officers or civilians, can make this determination.21
The primary objection to the use of the police perspective is not that police
are incapable of applying logic to the totality of the circumstances, but that
their one-sided view of law enforcement skewed their objectivity. As be-
tween equally rational police officers and hypothetical people, we should
prefer the judgment of those better suited to appreciate the importance of
both law enforcement and individual liberty. 9
As between hypothetical people and impartial judges, however, the rea-
sonable person perspective is meaningless so long as the Court adheres to
the position that Fourth Amendment reasonableness is a rational,
commonsensical determination. Judges are rational people who can apply
their common sense directly to a situation without the superfluous step of
filtering it through the perceptions of a reasonable person. After all, by
invoking the reasonable person perspective, a judge is not saying, "I am
going to decide this case reasonably, in contrast to my normal practice of
acting irrationally." If there is an objectively correct constitutional interpre-
tation to be derived from rational analysis, the identity of the decision maker
searching for the answer makes little difference. Except for fools, knaves,
and "overzealous" police officers, all reasonable decision makers can be
guided, pushed, or prodded toward the demonstrably correct answer. When
Fourth Amendment interpretation is reduced to the simple process of apply-
ing logic to facts, judges need not adopt any perspective but their own. One
rational person will do as well as another.
2 For example, Justice Scalia conceded that when a judge resolves the reasonable-
ness of a search or seizure by invoking "nothing better than a totality of the circum-
stances test to explain his decision, he is not so much pronouncing the law in the nor-
mal sense as engaging in the less exalted function of fact-finding." Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180-81 (1989). Justice
Scalia volunteered his inclination "to leave that essentially factual determination to the
lower courts," id. at 1186, and questioned why the next logical step would not be to
leave the question to the jury, see id. at 1188. For a consideration of the use of juries to
resolve Fourth Amendment issues, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back
into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359 (1994). !
219 See United States v. Corral-Franco, 848 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1988) (defining
the term "reasonable person" as one who is "neither guilty of criminal conduct and thus
overly apprehensive nor insensitive to the seriousness of the circumstances") (quoting
United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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The perspective of the decision maker becomes crucial, however, if
Fourth Amendment reasonableness is seen as a matter of political, not mere-
ly logical, choice as to the appropriate balance of government and individual
interests. Under this view, the Court's references to simple common sense
must be put aside in order to focus on that which is unique about the rea-
sonable person perspective. It is not the innate common sense of the univer-
sal man that provides unique guidance to the Court. Rather, the collective
wisdom of reasonable and political people living together in a society strikes
a real, not a hypothetical, accommodation between an interest in law en-
forcement and an interest in personal autonomy. This accommodation some-
times takes the form of public debate over the latest Supreme Court decision
or proposed legislation affecting privacy interests. More often, the accom-
modation is worked out quietly in day-to-day living conditions that reflect
our realization that, although we may all wish to be let alone, we do not
expect this to happen in any absolute sense. Like life itself, the Fourth
Amendment is a compromise that reflects our "societal understanding" that
certain aspects of our lives are within the public domain, while "certain
areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government inva-
sion.'" When pushed hard enough, the Court drops the facade of equat-
ing reasonableness with common sense, and concedes that Fourth Amend-
ment law may turn on "understandings that are recognized and permitted by
society."" To the extent that the Court relies on what "society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable,"' 2 the constitutional standard is a normative
one. The reasonable person's understanding of current social conventions
thus describes the existing social compromise rather than prescribes some
ideal utilitarian society. In this way, the Fourth Amendment's Reasonable-
ness Clause is like the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment
clause, which "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decen-
cy that mark the progress of a maturing society." '223
A good deal of the Court's current Fourth Amendment doctrine can be
explained in terms of a search for conventional morality: All things con-
sidered, have the police comported with the community's moral intu-
itions?'2 The meaning of Fourth Amendment reasonableness thus derives
220 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (quoting Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)
(noting that, although not all subjective expectations of privacy are legitimate, those
based on property rights are likely to be).
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12.
222 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
22 See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Under-
standings Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 732 (1993) ("If one
takes the Justices at their word, a sense of how (innocent) U.S. citizens gauge the im-
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from the culture in which "we the people" live, and the Court views society
as the ultimate arbiter of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. Of course,
society speaks with many voices, but, at least in theory, the reasonable per-
son perspective constitutes a form of "virtual representation" in which the
hypothesized reasonable person stands for all citizens because they are "en-
visioned as a fungible collection with characteristic insights and out-
looks.""22 If we wish to wax dramatic, the reasonable person epitomizes
the universal soldier in the struggle for democracy, standing as a rough
proxy for the people, "feeling and thinking just as the people do in all their
plurality, acting just as the people would if actually present."2 This
sounds plausible enough in theory until we consider the methodology the
Court is to employ when discerning the characteristic insights and outlooks
of the common man. If a process of intuitive appraisal was at work in
Montoya,227 which Justice instinctively captured our shared understand-
ings? On one side stood Chief Justice Rehnquist, who concluded that rea-
sonable people understand and expect that they are subject to intense scruti-
ny when crossing international borders.2 ' On the other side stood Justice
Brennan, who maintained that international travelers do not "'expect' to be
thrown into locked rooms and ordered to excrete into wastebaskets, held
incommunicado until they cooperate, or led away in handcuffs to the nearest
hospital for exposure to various medical procedures-all on nothing more
than the 'reasonable' suspicions of low-ranking enforcement agents."'229
If the Justices cannot agree on some rough intuitive appraisal of the
reasonable person's understanding of privacy and autonomy, perhaps the
Justices are to rely on their personal experiences. If so, they may lack the
tools required for the task. Unlike the police who are too caught up in the
heat of the chase, judges are too detached from the realities of search and
seizure because they are unlikely to have experienced any type of police
intrusion," ° much less the type of intrusion they were asked to analyze in
pact of police investigative techniques on their privacy and autonomy is highly relevant
to current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.").
Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term--Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 3, 51 (1986).
226 Id. at 53.
227 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
See id. at 537-41.
229 Id. at 560 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
230 See Dorthy K. Kagehiro, Psycholegal Research on the Fourth Amendment, 1 PSY-
CHOL. SCI. 187, 188 (1990). Because judges are post hoc observers of the situation,
[t]his difference in perspective may result in differences in perceived voluntariness
of consent and perceived "coerciveness" in the phrasing of the search request.
Attribution theory and research suggest that there may be differences in the de-
gree of choice (i.e., voluntariness of consent) attributed to the consentor-actor by
a judicial observer, based on differences in perspective.
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Montoya. Unable to draw upon their own experience and lacking direct
access to the community's shared understandings, the Justices will not often
find that a hypothesized reasonable person's assessment of Fourth Amend-
ment reasonableness differs from the Justices' own assessment. "[T]he dis-
tinction between the subjective or individual and the objective or general
conscience, in the field where the judge is not limited by established rules,
is shadowy and evanescent, and tends to become one of words and little
more." 3
There is also little hope for a Justice who puts aside personal values and
experiences while searching for objectivity in empirical evidence of
society's shared understandings. Preliminary attempts to identify these un-
derstandings indicate that the Court is out of touch with society's evalua-
tions of "the privacy and autonomy interests implicated by searches and sei-
zures."2 32 For example, in Whren v. United States,2 33 the Court main-
tained that the subjective motivation underlying a police intrusion is irrele-
vant so long as there is an objective basis for the arrest.2" In a survey of
citizens' perceptions, however, Professors Slobogin and Schumacher demon-
strated that police motivation is an important factor in assessing the intru-
siveness of their actions. A preliminary sampling of citizens' perceptions
found that a frisk to detect and deter hijacking or terrorism at an airport was
viewed as beneficial and that citizens felt genuinely grateful for the govern-
ment intervention designed to protect them.235 In light of the Court's refus-
al in Whren to examine the officer's motivation for an intrusion upon priva-
cy, citizens understandably are skeptical of all government intrusions in
which the officer's motivation is unknown or ambiguous.
Although Professors Slobogin's and Schumacher's preliminary attempts
to discern social conventions are helpful, we must not allow such efforts to
create false hope that, with more refined techniques, the Court will be able
to correctly read community consensus. For example, consider the belief
that the Court would not need to speculate on the perceptions of a hypothe-
sized reasonable person if there were direct and instantaneous access to the
populace via some futuristic computer network.23 Even if future technolo-
11 BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 110 (1921). The
Supreme Court has noted that an unstructured determination of reasonableness often is
merely a statement of personal values. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764-65
(1969).
232 Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 224, at 760.
233 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996); see supra text accompanying note 79.
234 See supra text accompanying note 83.
2" See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra note 224, at 767.
236 The Court has attempted to determine society's views on reasonableness by such
.means as reference to a telephone book. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
741-46 (1979) (noting that society would not recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy in numbers dialed from the defendant's phone because the telephone book in-
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gy were to allow the Court to identify that which is usually done in the
community, and thus what is reasonable in a normative sense, determina-
tions of Fourth Amendment reasonableness still would involve value judge-
ments and political choices about what ought to be done.237 As the Court
recently noted, "[i]t is always somewhat dangerous to ground exceptions to
constitutional protections in the social norms of a given historical mo-
ment. ,, 8
When contrasts arise between matters of principle and social policy,
between individual rights and collective interests, 239 the concern no longer
is about which methodology, as an empirical matter will better identify com-
munity consensus. The primary concern is whether a democratic majority
may impose its will on the minority. Although the constitutional Framers
may have placed great trust in the citizenry's judgment, the Framers also
recognized that certain individual rights must be shielded from the popular
will." ° "The Founding Fathers thus wisely sought to have the best of both
worlds, the undeniable benefits of both democratic self-government and
individual rights protected against possible excesses of that form of govern-
ment."241 This original intent, coupled with Marbury v. Madison"2 and
the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,243 indicates that Fourth
formation pages disclosed that the phone company could identify the origin of phone
calls). However roughly a survey or computer voting might approximate society's
views, the techniques are superior media for societal conventions as compared to the
abstruse information contained in the pages of a telephone directory.
" See generally Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 384-85. The Fourth Amendment does
not "ask ... what we expect of government. [It] tell[s] us what we should demand of
government." Id. at 384.
238 Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1421 n.4 (1997).
239 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184 (1977) (explaining that
individuals have rights apart from those given them by law); JOHN LOCKE, TwO TREA-
TISES OF GOVERNMENT 366-67 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (3d ed. 1698) (noting that government is limited by the individual rights that
people reserved to themselves when they created the government); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 3-6 (1971) (emphasizing personal rights and protection against
majoritarian tyranny).
240 Discussing the Bill of Rights, James Madison stated:
The prescriptions in favor of liberty ought to be levelled against that quarter
where the greater danger lies, namely, that which possesses the highest preroga-
tive of power. But this is not found in either the Executive or the Legislative
departments of Government, but in the body of the people, operating by the ma-
jority against the minority.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
24 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 466 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
242 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the Court's preeminence in interpret-
ing the Constitution).
243 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101
YALE L.J. 1193, 1281 (1992) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment placed heavy
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Amendment rights are not entirely dependent on the popular will.244
In summary, the reasonable person perspective is either meaningless or
anathematic to the Constitution. Judges are as rational as anyone else; there-
fore, it is useless to speak of the reasonable person's rational assessment of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness in contrast to a judge's rational assess-
ment. Invoking the reasonable person's perception of community consensus
goes beyond mere rational analysis, but community consensus should not be
the sole measure of Fourth Amendment reasonableness unless we reject the
very concept of constitutional rights as a limitation on the tyranny of a dem-
ocratic majority. At most, the reasonable person's perception of community
consensus stands as one factor to be included in the Court's multifaceted
balancing of governmental and individual interests.
D. The Citizen's Perspective
After reviewing the Court's approach to Fourth Amendment seizures,
Professor Williamson concluded that "the perception rather than the fact of a
restriction of freedom of movement" determines whether a person has been
seized.245 Professor Rotenberg, focusing primarily on consensual searches
of property, insists that "[w]hat is counts; not what is perceived."2" This
debate resurrects a classic query of beginning students of epistemology: If a
tree falls in an unoccupied forest, has there been a sound? The answer, of
course, depends entirely upon one's choice of perspective. In the forest of
the Fourth Amendment, adoption of the reasonable person's perspective
means that no matter how deeply felt by the individual, some intrusions
upon personal autonomy do not exist until they are perceived by a hypoth-
esized person.
The danger in ignoring an individual's subjective perspective in favor of
hypothesized perceptions is that the Court replaces real life experience with
a pseudo-scientific perspective that claims to be neutral and objective. 7
Like medieval scholasticism, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has become
an enclosed discipline no longer anchored in reality. Consider the esoteric
result that occurred in United States v. Letsinger,2" when the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals attempted to bridge the gap between Mendenhall's
reliance on federal judges to protect minority rights).
244 But see Bradley, supra note 156, at 817 ("The Reasonableness Clause, properly
understood,... exists to affirm legislative supremacy over the law of search and sei-
zure.").
245 See Richard A. Williamson, The Dimensions of Seizure: The Concepts of "Stop"
and "Arrest," 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 771, 814 (1982).
24' Rotenberg, supra note 102, at 177.
247 See Laurence H. Tribe, supra note 163 at 156-58.
248 93 F.3d 140 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2437 (1997).
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reasonable person test and Hodari D.'s focus on subjective submission to a
show of authority.249 In Letsinger, members of a federal drug task force
confronted the defendant on a train leaving Union Station. When the officers
asked for permission to search the defendant's suitcase, the defendant re-
sponded that he had personal papers in the bag.5 The officers informed
the defendant that they were "going to detain his bag," that "he could re-
trieve it later, and that otherwise he was 'free to do whatever he wanted to
do.' '251 Without touching the bag, the officers continued to converse with
the defendant, who acknowledged that he had a small amount of marijuana
in the bag. 2 Following this admission, the officers searched the bag and
found a large amount of crack cocaine. " The government maintained that
no seizure took place until the officers physically touched the bag, which
occurred only after the defendant's incriminating statement gave them prob-
able cause to seize and search the bag.5 4 The defendant, however, con-
tended that a seizure occurred at the point when the officers stated their
intent to detain the bag-when they made a show of authority sufficient to
effectuate a Fourth Amendment seizure." The Fourth Circuit adopted the
government's position and held that the seizure of the defendant's bag "did
not occur until the officers actually took physical possession of the bag, and
not when they merely announced their intention to do so." 6 According to
the court, the officers' "simple statement that they were 'going to detain his
bag' was calmly uttered during an ongoing, casual, consensual conversation.
It was not phrased as an 'order,' e.g., 'give me your bag,' or even as a
present-tense declarative sentence, e.g., 'your bag is hereby seized.""'57
Viewed from the lofty heights of Fourth Amendment theory, the reason-
ing in Letsinger may be defended as a sophisticated attempt to reconcile
conflicting definitions of a seizure." The final decision, however, violates
29 The Fourth Circuit recognized that Hodari D. "specifically addressed the seizure
of persons," but that "in light of the Court's evolving views on the relevancy of com-
mon law in defining Fourth Amendment 'seizures,' . . . [Hodari D.] may ultimately be
held to extend to objects as well as persons." Id. at 143.
25 See id. at 142.
45 Id.
252 See id.
253 See id.
4 See id. at 143.
4 See id.
256 Id. at 145.
257 Id. at 144.
25 In Letsinger, the Court applied the Hodari D. approach to seizures of a person to
seizures of property. The Court did not address Brower's additional consideration of
"intentional" seizures. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72. Consider the facts of
State v. Johnson, 696 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). During an encounter with
the police, a nervous defendant placed his hands in his pockets. See id. at 882. When
the police told him to remove his hands from his pocket, the defendant responded by
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common sense. One wonders how the Fourth Circuit would deal with a
bank robber who were to pull a gun and hand a teller a note with the mes-
sage "I'm going to rob this bank. Don't make any trouble." According to
the Fourth Circuit's reasoning, such a note merely would express the
robber's intent to act in the future, and thus no robbery would occur unless
the robber were to utter "a present-tense declarative sentence," such as "I
hereby commence the robbery of this bank." Confronted by armed officers
who announced that they were going to seize the bag and that the defendant
could retrieve it later, the defendant in Letsinger, or anyone else in the real
world, could only perceive that, at that point, the bag was under the control
of the officers. 9 In the rarified world of the Fourth Amendment, however,
the individual is told that his perception is irrelevant. As Professor White
has suggested, this is only a small step from telling the individual that he
himself is irrelevant.
[Judicial discourse can function] as an important force of
social definition and cohesion, placing the individual or
official in a comprehensible public world in ways that he can
respect. But to the extent that the individual or official faces
a public world defined by a language he cannot speak, in
which he cannot locate himself, which does not deal in intel-
ligible ways with claims he regards as important, the dis-
course can be said to be one of authority rather than commu-
nity, its force divisive rather than cohesive."'
In the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment discourse, an individual
defendant becomes a non-person who exists only to the extent that he or she
affects the social welfare as viewed from the perspective of a pseudo-scien-
tific balancing of government and individual interests. This neglect of the
citizen's perspective conflicts with one of the fundamental moral tenets of
Western society, that governments must recognize the human dignity and
uniqueness of each individual.26 In Justice Kennedy's words: "The distin-
removing not only his hands, but also the contents of his pockets, which included illegal
drugs. See id. The court did not consider whether this Was the type of "accidental sei-
zure" that Brower placed outside of the Fourth Amendment's coverage.
" "Announcement of the officers' intent to detain luggage is the seizure, because at
that point the traveler's unrestricted liberty to call off the encounter and go unimpeded
about his business ends." Letsinger, 93 F.3d at 146 (Hall, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted). The dissent also argued that "the essence of submission is generally the absence of
physical resistance." Id. at 147 (Hall, J., dissenting).
260 White, supra note 155, at 167.
261 The Fourth Amendment embodies a
commitment to treating persons who come before the law on the basis of their
individual, particular, uncommon, and odd property and attributes. Juristic proce-
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guishing feature of our criminal justice system is its insistence on principled,
accountable decision making in individual cases." 2 Without individuality,
we become fungibles to be manipulated by the government. Judicial deci-
sions no longer are about a real person, but concern an abstraction. Individ-
uals are no longer valued for their individuality; instead they are reduced to
instruments of science freely exploited by the judiciary (the cost-benefit
managers) in an effort to maximize the total pie for society. In short, the
ideal of justice, which incorporates a theory of individual rights, has ceased
to be a weighty factor in the Court's Fourth Amendment discourse.
This pretension of scientific objectivity is purchased at a high price. It
requires the Supreme Court Justices to anaesthetize their hearts 3 and de-
tach themselves from the real human being who stands before them and,
more importantly, from all citizens a defendant represents.' Judicial indif-
ference to the individual's perspective sends a message that individuals are
not valued or trusted, and that they ultimately are powerless to prevent
intrusions on their autonomy because intrusions need not be based on their
individual conduct. 5 Professor Sundby makes a telling point about trust
and power in an article entitled, "Every Man's Fourth Amendment." 2'
Whether intentional or not, Sundby has provided one answer to Professor
Maclin's query as to "Whose Amendment Is It, Anyway?" 7
Professor Sundby conceptualizes the question of choosing perspectives
as an issue of who to trust and who should be given control. His starting
point for Fourth Amendment interpretation is that citizens are to be trusted
to act responsibly and are entitled "to be let alone" unless they forfeit this
right by engaging in suspicious conduct.26 Grounding the Fourth Amend-
dures which help show the unique characteristics of individuals and actions to the
decision-maker provide the factual evidentiary base for legal judgments which
avoid abstract moral structures and remain useful as explanations of external phe-
nomena.
Gary A. Ahrens, Privacy and Property: Can They Remain After Juridical Personality Is
Lost?, 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1077, 1082 (1977); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBER-
TY AGAINST GOVERNMENT xiii (1948) (stating that the struggle for liberty against gov-
ernment is "the oldest theme which underlies the history of American constitutional
law"); Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV.
219, 229 (1965) ("The concept of limited government has always included the idea that
governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citi-
zen.").
262 Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882, 890 (1997) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
263 Professor Tribe cautioned against using the passive voice, which "makes it look as
though someone out there, unspecified, is doing it to us. Admit that it's we who are
doing it." Tribe, supra note 163, at 170.
264 See supra text accompanying note 173.
265 See supra text accompanying note 157.
266 Sundby, supra note 139, at 1767.
267 See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
268 "So long as a person does not engage in behavior arising to probable cause of a
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ment in the reality of citizens' actual conduct thus allows citizens to main-
tain control over their fate by giving them the opportunity to structure their
conduct in a manner that denies the government any justification for intrud-
ing upon their autonomy. Citizens lose control, however, when the Court
announces, for example, that the police need no justification for approaching
citizens and posing questions to them. 9 In such situations, citizens are
powerless to avoid intrusions unless they forego a legal activity such as
walking a public street where they might encounter police.
Adopting the individual citizen's perspective would not require the
Court to surrender control of searches and seizures to the individual in all
situations. Professor Maclin's query-" Whose Amendment Is It Any-
way?"-nicely captures the essence of the debate over perspectives, but it is
not an all-or-nothing choice. When the government bases its action on some
factual justification such as probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the
Fourth Amendment is neither exclusively the government's nor exclusively
the citizen's. Without claiming exclusivity, however, the citizen legitimately
may ask that the Court be more sensitive to the individual's perspective
when balancing the government's and the individual's conflicting interests.
One need not undertake a sophisticated ethical or legal analysis to under-
stand that intrusiveness must be viewed from the perspective of the individ-
ual upon whom an intrusion was made because privacy and autonomy are
intimate, subjective, and experiential constructs.
In common parlance, privacy is "I know when I see it," an
elusive construct that has unclear and probably idiosyncratic
limits. Indeed, privacy (more precisely, invasion thereof)
may be described better as "I know when I feel it." A gut
sense of personal violation may be the tie that binds such
disparate events as being subjected to a body search, being
the subject of gossip, having one's mail read, being asked
one's income, or.having one's house entered without permis-
sion. It should come as no surprise that such an intensely
personal construct is difficult to define .... In short, com-
mon experience tells us that privacy is a subjectively impor-
tant, even critical, aspect of our lives ...."
criminal violation, individual privacy cannot be invaded." Sundby, supra note 139, at
1768.
269 See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) ("Our cases make it clear that a
seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and
asks a few questions.").
270 Gary B. Melton, Respecting Boundaries: Minors, Privacy and Behavioral Re-
search, in SOCIAL RESEARCH ON CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS 65 (Barbara Stanley &
Joan E. Sieber eds., 1992).
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A court with heightened sensitivity to the citizen's perspective will ex-
pand the concepts of privacy and autonomy to include the citizen's subjec-
tive concern with freedom from harassment and fear of being stigmatized by
government officials who single out the individual for unequal treat-
ment."' This stigmatizing often rests on the unpleasant reality that race
affects many encounters between police and citizens. It is no accident that
the chief critic of the Court's neglect of the individual's perspective was
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the sole African-American to serve for most of
the Court's history.272
What separated Justice Marshall from other members of the
Court was his "citizen perspective." His Fourth Amendment
opinions display a "candor that cut through legal abstractions
to the social reality" that exists on the street. He scrutinizes
police claims of necessity and practicality, instead of assum-
ing that the police are always a "friend.
273
Justice Marshall knew that race colors most situations in which whites and
blacks interact, yet the current Court insists on a color-blind approach
"when a color-conscious approach would lend perspective to the situation of
a black participant in the legal process."274 For example, in Hodari D.,
Justice Scalia suggested that the lower court may have erred by not having
realized that the suspect's flight upon sighting the police cruiser amounted
to suspicious behavior that justified a stop and frisk.2 " This viewpoint ig-
271 When two individuals are treated differently, the officer
should be able to point to some distinction between the two cases which it is
permissible for him to consider .... [H]e must at least be able to show ... that
cases treated differently were in fact different in some relevant respect-that is,
that he is following some sort of rational, non-discriminatory rule. If he cannot
make such a showing, his different treatment of the two cases is irrational or
invidious, and hence violative of equal, protection.
J. Skelly Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 594 (1972) (review-
ing KENNETH CuLP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969)).
Although Judge Wright was referring to prosecutors, his observation applies equally to
police officers.
272 See Maclin, supra note 203. Professor Maclin suggests that Marshall's citizen
perspective was based on personal experience: "'A dangerous, humiliating, sometimes
fatal encounter with the police is almost a rite of passage for a black man in the United
States.' Even a black man who becomes a Justice on the United States Supreme Court
can recall such an encounter." Id. at 723 (quoting Don Wycliff, Blacks and Blue Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1987, at A22).
273 Id. at 799 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Marshall, the Great Dissenter, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 1991, at L23).
274 Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black Legal Scholarship: Race and Origi-
nal Understandings, 1991 DUKE L.J. 39, 80.
275 "The wicked flee when no man pursueth." Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 623 n.1 (quot-
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nored the fact that Hodari, a black youth, may have had other reasons for
wanting to avoid the police. Perhaps Hodari D. shared a viewpoint ex-
pressed in the aftermath of the race riots in Los Angeles in 1991:176
"When black people in Los Angeles see a police car approach-
ing, ... '[t]hey don't know whether justice will be meted out or whether
judge, jury and executioner is pulling up behind them. ''2 77
Asking the Court to be more sensitive to the individual perspective,
including the racial aspects of police-citizen encounters, would help equalize
the weights on either side of the balancing equation. As long as the Court
adheres to its balancing of interests approach, however, Fourth Amendment
issues will continue to be assessed from multiple perspectives because the
police, the individual, and collective society all have a stake in the outcome.
There is, however, a situation in which the Fourth Amendment becomes
uniquely and exclusively the citizen's amendment and the individual's per-
spective rises to a controlling role. When the police purport to rely on a
citizen's cooperation, the individual need not ask that the Court be sensitive
to his perspective; the individual may demand that the Court recognize the
individual's subjective perspective as paramount "because the sole validating
source of police authority to intrude on a premier constitutional right is the
individual's grant of permission.' ', 78
Why should the citizen's decision to grant or withhold cooperation be
assessed in terms of objective reasonableness or social welfare? Whefi the
police ask for cooperation to which they are not entitled, the individual
should retain the power to grant or withhold cooperation at the individual's
discretion-rational or otherwise. When the police purport to rely on citizen
cooperation to justify an intrusion, the right to personal autonomy must not
be set aside by judicial fictions that a reasonable person would somehow
approve of what the government did when, in fact, the actual defendant
vehemently denies that he gave any approval or voluntary cooperation. If
the intruding officer thus cannot point to any objective facts justifying the
ing Proverbs 28:1).
276 The rioting was sparked by the acquittal of four Los Angeles police officers
whose beating of black motorist Rodney King was captured on videotape for all the
world to see. The rioting resulted in 60 deaths, more than 16,000 arrests, and nearly one
billion dollars in property damage. See Seth Mydans, Tape of Beating by Police Revives
Charge of Racism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1991, at A18.
277 Richard W. Stevenson, Los Angeles Chief Taunted at Hearing; U.S. Plans Wide
Inquiry on Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1991, at A16. See generally Tracey Maclin,
"Black and Blue Encounters "-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment
Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 243 (1991) (discussing whether
race should be taken into account when considering reactions of black Americans in
arrest situations).
278 Rotenberg, supra note 102, at 177.
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intrusion, and if the officer's sole claim is that the citizen agreed to the
intrusion, then the only relevant perspective is that of the individual citizen,
who must be taken as the officer finds him-subjective warts and all.
If exclusive reliance on the individual perspective seems to unduly im-
pugn the legitimacy of the government's and society's interests, we must
remember that the preeminence of the individual perspective is limited to
situations in which the government can formulate no independent justifica-
tion for intruding on the citizen's right to be let alone. A recurring problem
in the Court's analysis of searches and seizures is its tendency to treat con-
sent as one of the many exceptions to the requirements of probable cause
and a warrant; but it is the citizen's freedom to choose that renders consent
searches unique among exceptions to the Fourth Amendment requirements
of probable cause and a warrant. Most of the exceptions are based on the
overriding needs of law enforcement to react to exigent circumstances that
make it impractical to obtain a warrant or to wait until full probable cause
develops. Consent searches and consensual police-citizen encounters, how-
ever, have nothing to do with the overriding needs of law enforcement be-
cause probable cause to search or seize may be totally lacking. Consensual
intrusions upon personal autonomy are permitted "not because such an ex-
ception to the requirements of probable cause and warrant is essential to
proper law enforcement, but because we permit our citizens to choose
whether or not they wish to exercise their constitutional rights."279 A soci-
ety that "presupposes the capacity of its members to choose""2 must rec-
ognize that an individual is free to grant or withhold cooperation requested
by government officials.2"
The fundamental right of individuals to control their own fate by exer-
cising or waiving constitutional rights must take precedence over a police
officer's mistaken perception of consent, no matter how objectively reason-
able or understandable the mistake may have been. From the police perspec-
tive, the only sensible guide is that
they should never rely on consent as the basis for a search
unless they must. If they do search relying on consent, they
should be prepared to meet a heavy burden of proof that
consent was in fact meaningfully given. And even then, be-
cause of the difficulties of proof, they should expect to be
told often that the search was not proper. 2
279 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 283 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result)).
"' "[A]n individual through the exercise of will, a personal power, [may or may not
supply] the police with the keys to his kingdom." Rotenberg, supra note 102, at 179.
282 Weinreb, supra note 25, at 64. Compare the conduct of the police officer in Ohio
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The police may use the reasonable person perspective as circumstantial
evidence of a defendant's subjective state of mind, just as they often use
circumstantial evidence to prove premeditation in a murder prosecution in
which the defendant denies such an intent. 3 Considering what a reason-
able person would have intended constitutes evidence of what the defendant
actually intended, but the ultimate test for a consensual search or seizure
remains subjective, not objective.
The commitment to a "society of free choice"2 also means that when
addressing consensual searches and seizures, the individual perspective must
take precedence over society's interests. For example, in Jimeno, the Court
broadly interpreted the scope of the defendant's consent because of the
community's interest in "encouraging consent." 5 This assertion is either
misleading or misguided. The community may encourage consent all it
wishes, but the final decision to accept or reject such entreaties must remain
with the individual unless we have moved from "encouraging" consent to
imposing the community's will on the individual. In the absence of an im-
mediate crisis threatening society's well being, the autonomy of the individ-
ual remains paramount. Consensual searches and seizures thus comprise one
of the rare areas in constitutional law in which an absolute rule is appropri-
ate. Any consent obtained must be true subjective consent, rendered only
after the individual has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right
to be let alone. It is in this sense that the Fourth Amendment is exclusively
the citizen's, and thus the individual citizen's subjective perspective is the
appropriate viewpoint from which to assess government claims of consent.
III. CONCLUSION
There are few absolutes in constitutional law, and an unqualified right to
be let alone is not one of them. In most cases there is no escaping a prag-
matic approach to reconciling societal interests with individual rights be-
cause, in some situations, social concerns may override what were previous-
ly regarded as absolute rights. Our faith in treating individuals as ends in
themselves can be tested by posing a hypothetical: Assume that torture, or
some form of intrusion upon the personal autonomy of a terrorist, would
disclose the location of a pirated atomic bomb threatening the lives of mil-
v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996), who "routinely requested permission to search
automobiles he stopped for traffic violations .... He requested consent to search in 786
traffic stops in 1992 .... " Id. at 422 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgement).
23 Being professionally trained and having initiated the encounter with the citizen,
"the police are better able than the private person to plan the encounter so that if con-
sent is given, proof of it will be available." Weinreb, supra note 25, at 57.
284 Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 277 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 649 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result)).
285 Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252; see supra text accompanying note 122.
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lions. This classic dilemma for a democratic society may be resolved either
by adopting society's interest as paramount to individual rights, or by allow-
ing individual rights to prevail over societal concerns. The dilemma cannot
be resolved from any other perspective, certainly not from the perspectives
suggested by the Court-not by asking whether the police officers had a
rational basis for concluding that torture was appropriate; not by canvassing
the community to determine whether a majority approve of torture; and not
by speculating as to whether a hypothesized reasonable person would prefer
torture to the loss of millions of lives.
In a constitutional democracy in which neither individual autonomy nor
collective security may completely dominate the other, reconciling or ac-
commodating the conflict between government and individual interests is a
daunting task. What we may ask from the Court is that it face the task in a
forthright manner by forsaking what Professor Tribe described as a tendency
to "[a]bdicat[e] responsibility for choice."2 6 The Court's claim that the
perspectives of citizens, police officers, or hypothetical people can resolve
constitutional questions is disingenuous. The Court, however, may ask that
its critics temper their attacks on its use of balancing tests. Unless the acad-
emy can offer the Court a superior replacement, we are obliged to help the
Court refine and improve all forms of judicial interest balancing. This Arti-
cle attempts to meet this obligation by suggesting that the Court must dis-
play increased sensitivity to the individual's perspective when interpreting
the Fourth Amendment, and by suggesting that the Court may utilize a
"small absolute" (the individual's subjective perspective) when assessing
consensual searches and seizures.
IV. POSTSCRIPT
The task for another day is to assess the role that various perspectives
play in the interpretation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. For example,
in Colorado v. Connelly,287 the Court held that a psychotic defendant who
suffered from a compulsion to confess could nevertheless voluntarily waive
his Miranda rights and make a voluntary confession. The Court's path to
Connelly closely parallels the evolving view of Fourth Amendment perspec-
tives addressed in this Article. A decade after the Court in Boyd v. United
States" utilized legal formalism to interpret individuals' Fourth Amend-
ment rights, the Court in Bram v. United States" interpreted the Fifth
Amendment by focusing on the individual's perspective and his capacity to
make a voluntary statement. Like the right to be secure against unreasonable
Tribe, supra note 163, at 170.
7 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
288 116 U.S. 616 (1886); see supra text accompanying notes 131, 133.
s 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
1998]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
searches and seizures, freedom from self-incrimination initially was charac-
terized as the inherent right of the citizen to individual dignity, self-preser-
vation, and self-determination. In Connelly, however, the Court eliminated
any consideration of a defendant's capacity for self-determination,... while
focusing exclusively on the police officer's perspective. According to
Connelly:
The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which
Miranda was based, is governmental coercion. Indeed, the
Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned "with moral and
psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources
other than official coercion." The voluntariness of a waiver
of this privilege has always depended on the absence of
police overreaching, not on "free choice" in any broader
sense of the word.29'
As is true of the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court's Fifth
Amendment analysis increasingly has adopted the officer's viewpoint by
asking whether the officer acted "appropriately." Little concern has been
given to the individual's perspective and the underlying issue of empower-
ing individuals to control their own fate. The issue of empowerment was of
foremost importance to Justice Marshall, who urged the Court to recognize
that the Fourth Amendment embodies our commitment to a "society of free
choice." '292 In a similar vein, Justice Brennan bemoaned the majority's re-
fusal, in Connelly, .to acknowledge free will as a value of constitutional
consequence."293 There are many other similarities between the Court's ap-
proach to Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues, but at this point any detailed
effort to resolve the conflict of perspectives presented in cases like Connelly
is postponed.294 This brief comment on Connelly is offered merely to illus-
trate that the approach used in this Article points the way toward a princi-
pled choice of perspectives that can be applied to all aspects of criminal
procedure. Finding the correct perspective on the relationship between indi-
vidual free will and collective state power is the essence of criminal proce-
dure.
29 "Respondent would now have us require sweeping inquiries into the state of mind
of a criminal defendant who has confessed, inquiries quite divorced from any coercion
brought to bear on the defendant by the State." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 166-67.
291 Id. at 170 (citations omitted).
292 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
293 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 176 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
294 For a discussion of Connelly, see Benner, supra note 91, at 66.
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